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PREFACE

Nicholas Eberstadt
As a new millennium dawns over the Korean peninsula,
millenary hopes and expectations are very much in evidence
among students of Korean affairs. Half a century after the
surprise attack that launched the Korean War, almost 5
decades into the continuing high-tension military standoff
that has followed the 1953 Korean War ceasefire, there is
suddenly a pervasive and growing anticipation that this
tormented and divided nation may now be on the threshold
of a new and momentous era: an era of genuine peace, in
which the “Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula” is
at last dismantled, and a reconciliation between the
antagonist governments based in Pyongyang (the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and Seoul
(the Republic of Korea, or ROK) commences in earnest.
According to some influential voices in both Korea and
the West, in fact, the advent of this remarkable new time for
Korea is already at hand—heralded by, and prefigured in,
the drama of recent events. In this exegesis, the year 2000
was Korea’s anno mirabilis. By this telling, the year was
marked by occasion after occasion that would once have
been judged impossible by observers of contemporary
Korea. After all, the June 2000 Pyongyang summit—the
courteous, first-ever meeting between the chiefs of the two
Koreas—was extraordinary, and entirely unprecedented.
North Korea’s subsequent proposal (first reported by
Russia’s president) to shelve its program of ballistic rocket
tests if other countries would launch the DPRK’s satellites
was, for the DPRK, also unparalleled. The spectacle of
North and South Korean soldiers working conjointly (on
their respective sides of Korea’s “demilitarized zone”) to
reestablish the long-severed rail link between Seoul and
Pyongyang—as they were indeed doing later in the
year—would have been unthinkable even months before.
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And with the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s award of the
year 2000 Peace Prize to ROK President Kim Dae Jung for
his work for “peace and reconciliation with North Korea in
particular,” respected and far-removed elements of the
international community registered their own judgment
that something tremendously important and promising was
gathering on the Korean peninsula.
To one important contingent of students and statesmen,
the notion that contemporary Korea should be heading
toward an epoch of peace is entirely unsurprising. Quite the
contrary; to them, a peace breakthrough on the Korean
peninsula is the natural and perhaps even inevitable
consequence of the security policies they have advocated.
These are the proponents of what has variously been called
the “sunshine” or “engagement” approach to relations with
the DPRK—an approach that maintains that it is possible
to alter the DPRK’s menacing patterns of international
behavior, and even the regime’s inner character, through
positive external inducements and rewards.
Since early 1998, when the Kim Dae Jung government
was inaugurated, ROK policy toward the DPRK has
incarnated this theory; by 1999, with the coalescence of
what came to be known as the “Perry Process,” the
governments of both Japan and the United States became
de facto subscribers to the same theory, and joined in the
experiment. Engagement theorists, both in the academy
and in government, hold that a fundamental change in
North Korea’s international behavior is in evidence today;
that the change is attributable to the approach they
champion; and that further salutary changes can be
expected the longer and more vigorously their preferred
policies are pursued.
What fuels these theorists is easily grasped—when
hazard is close by, one should always hope for the best. A
generation hence, historians may be better placed to judge
the fruits of their theories—and the exertions these theories
have occasioned—than are we today. From our present-day
vi

vantage point, however, it may be well to emphasize that
the engagement theorists’ interpretation of current events
in the Korean peninsula is by no means the only one that can
be drawn from those events—nor even necessarily the most
compelling among competing explanations.
For all the understandable excitement that the recent
turn in inter-Korean atmospherics has engendered, this
fact remains: that the North Korean government, up to this
writing, has taken no concrete steps to lessen its
conventional, nuclear, and ballistic capabilities to threaten
compatriots in the South, or South Korea’s allies abroad.
And despite the high hopes invested in it by serious people
in many countries, the fact remains that the engagement
theory is at heart curiously, indeed strikingly, ahistorical.
Indeed, one would be hard pressed to offer a single historical
example of a situation in which a lasting peace framework
has been constructed with a closed, repressive state in the
manner that the engagement theory currently proposes to
build with the DPRK.
There is, of course, a first time for everything. Millennial
thinkers steeped in the Judeo-Christian tradition have
always professed that the day will come when the wolf shall
dwell with the lamb (Isaiah 11:6); but that day, according to
their same teachings, will be the final day of human
history—when life on earth shall end, and reign of the
eternal afterworld shall begin.
Modern-day Korea, to be sure, is hardly the first spot on
the globe where messianic notions have been embraced and
incorporated into foreign policy. Throughout the ages,
statesmen and men of affairs have often been tempted by
romantic and even utopian visions in their conduct of
international relations. But in the international arena, the
pursuit of such temptations has consequences. And
unfortunately, the historical record suggests those pursuits
have seldom contributed to the security and well-being of
the populations in whose name they were undertaken.
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Moreover, despite the acclaim (and self-congratulation)
that the engagement theory has been accorded in some
quarters, there are already signs that the North Korean
policies informed by it have begun to sag under the weight of
their own internal contradictions. The engagement
approach has reached an impasse, for it is now Pyongyang’s
turn to take steps in the envisioned Korean peace process.
For engagement policy merely to maintain
credibility—much less to advance—it will be incumbent
upon the DPRK to make a major gesture, and soon—to
recognize the right of the ROK to exist, for example; or to
demobilize part of its enormous and offensively-poised
conventional military force; or to offer verifiable assurances
that it is eliminating its multifaceted program for the
development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Any of these confidence-building initiatives, however,
would require of the DPRK a total departure from
long-entrenched state practices—and a relinquishment of
central regime priorities. Pyongyang has always
maintained that its claim to authority over the entire
Korean people is absolute and non-negotiable; further, it
has repeatedly emphasized that it regards military power
as its very key to survival.
Ordinarily, governments are not expected to bargain
over their self-identified vital interests, much less trade
them away. Yet this is precisely what the next phase of the
engagement approach would seem to expect of the DPRK.
Little wonder that the engagement process, despite
seemingly spectacular early headway, now looks to be so
very stalled.
Like the millennium itself, the millennial moment in
Korean security policy appears to be passing. Certainly it
should, at least for the sake of South Korea and her Western
allies. Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington will all assuredly be
better served by a less age-defying, and less other-worldly,
approach to dealing with the North Korean threat.
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To be sustainable and effective, a strategy for DPRK
threat reduction must begin by striving to grasp the inner
motivations, external objectives, and military capabilities of
the North Korean regime—and must continue by
unflinchingly facing the implications of those inquiries. It
should carefully and deliberately move to lower Western
vulnerability to North Korea’s diverse instruments of
menace, while simultaneously denying Pyongyang the
means by which to further perfect its techniques for
international military extortion. It should aim to anticipate
the manners and means by which Pyongyang might find it
advantageous to create tension or promote conflict—and
prepare to press the regime in its own arenas of comparative
disadvantage (such as economic performance and human
rights).
No less important, a strategy for reducing the external
threats posed by the North Korean regime must attend to
the complex particulars of constructing a sturdy regional
security architecture for post-DPRK Korea. In the final
analysis, every one of the great powers of the Pacific—the
United States, Japan, China, and Russia—could help the
ROK in the great task of building peace and prosperity on
the Korean peninsula. By contrast, the DPRK—the real,
existing DPRK that we know today—has absolutely nothing
positive to contribute to such a project.
With the change of administrations in Washington,
current U.S. policy toward North Korea will naturally
undergo review and scrutiny. The essays in this volume
offer a distinct alternative to the current engagement
approach. These authors collectively suggest the outlines of
a strategy for promoting peace and security in the Korean
peninsula manifestly sounder than the ones contemplated
or implemented by Washington in recent years.
Peace and freedom in Korea, as this volume underscores,
can be treated as a practical strategic objective, one that
policymakers need not rely on miracles to attain.
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INTRODUCTION

Henry D. Sokolski
The monographs in this book were all commissioned as
part of a year-long project sponsored by the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), the U.S.
Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies, and the
U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. They
were written to help three working groups develop
strategies to curb the threat posed by North Korea’s
strategic weapons programs.
Central to these groups’ efforts was competitive
strategies analysis. As detailed in an earlier Strategic
Studies Institute volume, Prevailing in a Well-Armed
World, this approach requires analysts to examine four sets
of questions. Stephen Bradner in his monograph, “North
Korea’s Strategy” (Chapter 2 of this volume), examines the
first three sets of questions. These concern what one’s
strategic assumptions and goals are, who the likely key
third actors are, and what strategies would make the most
sense for each party to pursue. The last set of questions
concerns what the relative costs and risks might be of the
alternative strategies devised. These questions were
discussed in consultations with experts and government
officials after the working groups made their findings
regarding the first three sets of questions.
The groups’ final report, which is this volume’s first
chapter, has received a good deal of attention. Its
recommendations concerning U.S. nuclear and space
cooperation with North Korea were detailed in The Asian
Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post and were also
highlighted in The New York Times, USA Today, and
Aviation Week. More important, the report caught the
attention of senior-level officials within the State
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
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Defense Department, all of whom asked for and received
private briefings on the report.
This volume, of course, consists of more than just the
working groups’ final report. In addition, it includes all of
the research that NPEC and the Institute for National
Security Studies commissioned to prepare the working
groups. Some of this analysis, such as Stephen Bradner’s
monograph on North Korea’s strategy (Chapter 2), Joseph
Bermudez’s and Sharon Richardson’s projection of North
Korea’s future strategic weapons efforts (Chapter 3), and
Jack Rendler’s monograph on human rights (Chapter 4), is
easily identifiable in the final report. However, the differing
analyses of China’s strategy toward Korea by Admiral Eric
McVadon and U.S. Army retired Colonel Larry Wortzel
(Chapters 5 and 6), Victor Cha’s study of Japan’s views of
Korea (Chapter 7), Marcus Noland’s analysis of the
economic determinates of Korean unification (Chapter 8),
and the conventional arms control analysis of Bruce
Bennett (Chapter 9) were just as critical to the work groups’
deliberations. Indeed, without them, the group would have
been unable to answer the competitive strategies questions
necessary to produce the final report’s recommended
alternative strategies.
The hope in publishing these essays in a single volume is
that they will provoke at least as much debate and reflection
among their readers as they did for the working groups.
Indeed, any lay reader interested in the future of East Asia
or analyst wanting to review current U.S. policies toward
Korea will get more than a fair start with Planning for a
Peaceful Korea.
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CHAPTER 1
PLANNING FOR A PEACEFUL KOREA:
A REPORT OF THE
KOREA COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES
WORKING GROUP

Henry D. Sokolski
With the major changes that Korea has seen in the last 6
months, a natural question is whether or not there really is
any need to develop a new long-term Korea strategy. Aren’t
things going well enough?
Certainly, the contrast of events before and after June
2000 is striking. Despite years of rhetorical acrimony
against South Korea and the United States, the two Kims
met in June, and Kim Jong Il agreed that the U.S. presence
in South Korea was useful. In January, Kim Jong Il
threatened to launch another new long-range missile that
could hit the United States, the Taepo Dong II. Yet in
October, he offered to end all further development of such
missiles in exchange for U.S. assistance in launching
peaceful North Korean satellites. Earlier this year, North
Korean military training activities reached record levels,
yet this fall saw the first series of high-level
military-to-military talks on threat reductions between
North and South Korea. North Korea, meanwhile, has
sought admission to the World Bank, has normalized
relations with Italy and Australia, and is seeking to do the
same with key members of the European Union.
One cannot ignore these events. Yet, recognizing the
improved atmosphere they have wrought begs the question
of why they have taken place and continue to occur. Is it
because the North Korean leadership believes their country
can tolerate more political and cultural infiltration than
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they thought it could before? Or is North Korea simply
engaging, as it has before, in strategic deception aimed at
placing the United States, South Korea, and Japan in some
new form of diplomatic disadvantage? North Korea’s tactics
have changed, but has it changed its strategic goals? Is the
North abandoning its aim of perpetuating its peculiar brand
of cult communism? Has it begun to pursue more moderate
military goals?
Unfortunately, with the possible exception of the North
Korean leadership, nobody knows for sure. Even South
Koreans are debating the merits of their new Sunshine
policy. Opposition party figures argue that South Korea
should return to the diplomacy of reciprocity. Kim Dae
Jung’s supporters, meanwhile, do not claim that their policy
has succeeded in turning the North away from its hostile,
tyrannical ways. They argue only that over time, their
concessionary diplomacy toward the North will help secure
such change.
This, then, suggests that the United States and its East
Asian allies will have to hedge their bets. There may be
cause for optimism. But progress on North Korean strategic
weapons proliferation, military intimidation, human rights
abuses, and the implementation of prior agreements must
still be pursued, much as they were before—with planning
and a good deal of vigilance.
Overview.
This report is the result of 2 years of planning, over a
year’s worth of commissioned research, and the
participation of over 40 East Asian and weapons
proliferation experts and policymakers from Capitol Hill
and the Executive Branch.
What makes it different is its use of competitive
strategies analysis. Instead of focusing on current events,
the working group used competitive strategies analysis to
anticipate the challenges and opportunities the United
2

States and its East Asian allies would face regarding the
Korean Peninsula over the next 10 to 20 years. Rather than
focus first on how the United States and its allies might
cooperate with North Korea, the group reviewed the
competing aims and strategies North Korea and others
might have regarding the Peninsula’s future.
Finally, the group tried to develop alternative long-term
strategies that would do more than address current
weaknesses in U.S. and allied efforts to secure peace in the
region. In specific, the group tried to propose how the United
States and its allies might leverage their comparative
strengths in new ways against the enduring weaknesses of
North Korea and other competing actors in East Asia. The
idea here was to first discover what peaceful competitions
the United States and its allies might engage in and then to
win those competitions in a manner that would undermine
Pyongyang’s most offensive behavior.
The group offered three specific long-term
recommendations:
First, the United States and its allies should do more to
clarify how they might develop their advantages in
advanced conventional arms against North Korea.
Pyongyang’s interest in acquiring strategic weapons
capabilities, after all, is rooted in its belief that these
weapons capabilities are all it needs to checkmate a
U.S.-allied conventional response to North Korean military
threats. By not clarifying how much more the United States
and allies can do to execute their declared conventional
counterstrike strategy against North Korean provocations,
the United States and its allies are encouraging North
Korea to believe it is correct.
Second, to ensure their long-term nonproliferation
policies are effective, the United States and its allies must
do more to oppose Pyongyang’s illiberal, militant rule and
violation of its own citizens’ human rights. Almost all
nonproliferation victories to date (e.g., in South Africa,
Ukraine, Argentina, and Brazil) were occasioned by a
3

transition to liberal self-rule. The most worrisome
proliferators, meanwhile, include nations hostile to such
liberalism (e.g., Iran, Iraq, Libya, China, Syria, North
Korea). Thus, besides being morally dubious, U.S. and
allied reluctance to work with others to get Pyongyang to
improve its human rights record is likely to undermine
genuine nonproliferation.
Finally, the l994 Agreed Framework nuclear reactor
deal and the recent space launch cooperation offer need to be
modified lest they complicate the long-term prospects for
nonproliferation. First, tying nuclear inspections and
dismantlement to the promised reactors’ construction is
only likely to produce delay. Yet, having these large reactors
operate in North Korea is also dangerous from a nuclear
proliferation standpoint. As such, it would make far more
sense to replace at least one of the reactors with a
nonnuclear power plant. There are similar concerns with
the proposed space launch cooperation deal. Here, again, it
would make sense to offer the civilian benefits of satellite
technology (e.g., space imagery, space navigational and
communications services) rather than space launch
services, which necessarily involve access to the know-how
to launch intercontinental-range payloads.
Each of these findings along with the analysis they were
based upon is presented below.
Key Assumptions.
In assessing what ought to guide U.S. and allied
strategies regarding Korea, the group reached the following
conclusions: Any U.S. or allied strategy toward North Korea
for deterrence or cooperation is most likely to be effective if
it assumes that North Korea and, at times, China and
Russia are engaged in a competition with the United States,
Japan, and South Korea over the fate of Korea.
The United States and its allies should assume that the
outcome of this competition is vital to the peace and
4

prosperity of the entire region. In fact, miscalculations could
serve as a catalyst for a strategic military rivalry between
Japan and China that could conceivably go nuclear or
ballistic and revitalize major military power competitions
beyond the Peninsula. On the other hand, if properly
managed, this competition could result in the peaceful
unification of Korea on terms acceptable to both the Korean
people and the nations in the region. The fate of human
rights, democracy, and peace for the entire region is tied to
how this competition is conducted. Any strategy that is
unacceptable to South Korea or Japan undermines
America’s ability to work with its close allies to leverage the
behavior and thinking of China, Russia, and North Korea.
Agreement on these points and reliance on competitive
strategies analysis influenced how the group went about its
development of alternative strategies. For one thing, the
group saw the most urgent U.S.-Korean concerns—e.g.,
North Korean development of nuclear and missile
capabilities—as symptoms of much more basic factors.
These factors included:

•

the Kim regime’s (or clan’s) uncompromising desire to
stay in power,

•

the political threat that true political and economic
reform presents to the Kim regime’s maintenance of
its control,

•

the imperative of sustaining the myth that the Kim
regime is superior to all others and the consequent
requirement for high levels of isolation from the South
and other cultures,

•

the North’s fear that eventual unification with the
South will come at the expense of the continued rule of
the Kim regime,

•

the importance of the military to keeping the Kim
regime in power and preventing the forces of peaceful
5

coexistence with Seoul from undermining the regime,
and

•

the Kim regime’s recent efforts to use its offensive
military capabilities (including its missile and
nuclear capabilities) to help persuade the outside
world to provide the food, fuel, and foreign credits
necessary for its short-term survival, without the
necessity of making fundamental political or
economic reforms.

Thus, North Korea’s recent seemingly schizoid behavior:
North Korea prepares to launch a new intercontinental
ballistic missile, the Taepo Dong-2, but after U.S. and
Russian pledges to open trade and possibly pay for
launching North Korean satellites, Pyongyang puts off
launching the missile. North Korea continues to
concentrate nearly 70 percent of its combat forces within
100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). It
increases its artillery and rocket launcher deployments in
this zone. It augments its production of submarines,
missiles, aircraft, and artillery at record levels within the
last year, increases the pace of military exercises, and then
offers to meet with South Korea’s president at a
history-making summit.
Korean Conventional and Strategic Weapons
Threats.
In fact, the group understood Pyongyang’s interest in
developing strategic weaponry to be a logical extension of its
conventional arms capabilities. Currently, Pyongyang can
threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul, Korea’s largest
concentration of population and wealth, with conventional
arms alone. In addition, its military could attack and
establish a modest foothold on or near the DMZ. Its ability to
sustain such operations for a long period of time or to move
its conventional forces further to the south, however, is
negligible. In fact, South Korean and U.S. air forces could be
counted upon to establish air superiority fairly quickly,
6

allowing their planes to demolish any visible North Korean
land convoys headed south. In the longer term, the buildup
of U.S. forces in Korea could be used to push back or
outflank any North Korean incursion.
The North Koreans clearly understand this. They
certainly do not need long-range missiles with nuclear,
chemical, or biological (NBC) warheads to destroy Seoul or
to make a military-diplomatic land grab along the DMZ.
They do, however, need such weaponry to deter or
complicate any allied counteroffensive. South Korean and
Japanese airfields and ports critical to reinforce U.S. and
South Korean forces are all vulnerable to missile attacks.
Certainly, the pace of reinforcements could be slowed to a
crawl if any of these logistical nodes were hit with NBC
warheads. More important, both U.S. and Japanese officials
would have to think long and hard about backing the
military reinforcement of South Korea if it risked having
U.S. or Japanese territories struck by long-range North
Korean missiles.
These concerns have gotten the bulk of attention among
U.S. and allied military analysts. Yet, the opposite
point—that without its massive offensively deployed
conventional forces, North Korea’s deployment of strategic
weaponry makes far less military sense—has received scant
attention. For this reason, research was commissioned on
what kinds of conventional arms reductions efforts might
make sense to propose to the North Koreans. Certainly, the
issue of conventional force reductions would have to be
tackled as a part of any Korean unification effort. There also
is doubt whether North Korea would have to make the most
reductions.
That said, most members of the working group were
uneasy about proposing anything specific at this time. Their
key concern was the fear that any proposal would result in
undesirable reductions of U.S. forces currently deployed in
Korea. As the Perry Report emphasized, any withdrawal of
U.S. forces now would undermine the ability of the United
7

States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack. What
the group did find to be curious, however, was the lack of any
serious ongoing study of the complicated issues
surrounding force reductions even in the government
contractor community. Many of these issues were identified
in the commissioned research.
In lieu of proposing conventional arms control at this
time, the group agreed that the United States was not doing
enough to neutralize North Korea’s military strategy. In
essence, this strategy consists of two elements. The first is
the offensive deployment of North Korea’s conventional
forces for a short-range surprise attack. The second is the
acquisition of long-range strategic weapons capabilities
that could threaten rearward U.S. and allied staging bases
to disrupt and deter any effective allied counterstrike. To
date, the United States and its allies have focused
diplomatically on efforts to get North Korea to promise not
to deploy further strategic weapons capabilities. These
efforts have produced mixed results.
The working group concluded that the United States and
its allies need to do much more to dissuade North Korea
from concentrating its conventional forces so close to the
DMZ. In the case of a North Korean attack across this zone,
the United States currently has a declared strategy of
counterstriking deep behind the line of battle against
Pyongyang. Clearly, North Korean military planners do not
believe the United States is serious about implementing
this plan. Why else would the North deploy nearly 70
percent of its offensive ground forces within 65 miles of the
DMZ? This not only makes any outflanking maneuvers by
allied forces much easier, it leaves strategic rearward areas
such as Pyongyang much more vulnerable to attack.
If we are serious about reducing South Korea’s
vulnerability and reducing North Korea’s incentives to
acquire and brandish strategic weaponry, then Washington
and Seoul, in the group’s view, need to make their current
military strategy much more credible.
8

Recommendation: Clarify What Our Military
Strategy Against Pyongyang Requires.
In specific, the group agreed that the United States and
its allies must clarify precisely what military capabilities
are needed to implement the current strategy to address a
North Korean attack against South Korea. The group also
concurred that the United States and its allies need to
identify better what North Korean actions might put this
strategy (and its variants) into play. Towards this end, the
working group created a military task force to identify what
basic military capabilities, if acquired, would help the
United States and its allies persuade North Korea to
redeploy its existing forces in a more defensive manner.
Among the capabilities the military task force identified
were:

•

Dispersed and offshore logistics capabilities, along
with stealth technology and deception operations, to
reduce U.S. and allied reliance on large logistics
facilities, air bases, and ports that are naturally
vulnerable to missile attack.

•

Deception operations and stealth technology to
conceal rapidly deployable allied maneuver forces.

•

Long-range, precision-strike systems, including
long-range bombers and fighters; long-duration
unmanned air vehicles and missiles; stealthy
mine-resistant amphibious and arsenal ships;
integrated C3I systems, and the enhanced-lethality
precision-guided munitions necessary to launch an
effective deep strike against North Korea at reduced
levels of vulnerability to North Korean air defense
and anti-shipping systems.

•

Information warfare and tailored munitions directed
at North Korea’s targeting systems and offensive
command structure.
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•

Public information campaigns focused in the United
States, ROK, and Japan to highlight the military
technological dominance noted above.

Clearly, if the United States and its Asian allies had
these military capabilities today, it would make North
Korea’s continued forward deployment of so much of its
conventional forces near the DMZ untenable. Indeed, faced
with such allied military capabilities, North Korea would
have to redeploy much of its forward forces further north
simply to protect Pyongyang against a possible allied
counter strike. Beyond this, Pyongyang would have to spend
even more on new air and sea defense capabilities—monies
that it otherwise might have spent on more offensive
weaponry. Finally, all of this might be accomplished while
reducing the footprint of U.S. forces based in Japan and
South Korea—something that would make them less
vulnerable to both military and domestic political attacks.
The potential value of these military fixes, however,
comes at a cost. The first is financial: all of these capabilities
are largely beyond the immediate procurement plans of the
United States, Japan, or South Korea and would not be
cheap. The second is political and military: unless properly
orchestrated, allied efforts to procure these capabilities
might be misread as an offensive effort aimed primarily
against Beijing. This, in turn, might produce an arms
rivalry that the United States and its allies would not want
to pursue.
The working group’s military task force was conscious of
these dangers. At the same time, they believed that the
military dangers attendant upon a failure to bolster U.S.
and allied military strategy against a possible North
Korean attack were quite real. Their recommendation,
therefore, was to play to America’s comparative advantage
in military innovation but to do so with the active
participation of the Chinese military.
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Specifically, the group recommended that the United
States invite Chinese military officials to a series of military
war games focused on scenarios involving possible U.S. and
allied responses to different types of North Korean attacks
against South Korea. These games could usefully

•

be conducted at U.S. military service schools,

•

highlight the range of damage that U.S. and South
Korean forces could inflict in a variety of
counterstrikes against a North Korean attack
against, or strikes into, South Korea,

•

be conducted on the basis of what might happen 5 to
15 years out factoring in the use of advanced military
technologies,

•

nclude exercises to demonstrate to China and other
key regional players the challenges they would face
with refugee control and humanitarian assistance
operations,

•

llow the Chinese representatives to express their
concerns, and

•

involve allied representatives as appropriate.

These games would have several objectives. First, they
would help identify what new programs and operations
were required to implement U.S. and allied strategy, which
would in turn help bring them into being. Second, they could
serve to impress upon the Chinese the seriousness of the
U.S. and allied commitment to South Korea’s security, a
perspective which the Chinese could then convey to officials
in North Korea.
With any luck, the North Koreans might reconsider their
current course. One would hope that the United States
could at least force a debate within North Korea about the
risks of simply building up offensive forces along the DMZ
backed by the further development of nuclear, chemical,
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biological, and long-range missile capabilities. Finally,
these games would give the United States and its allies
direct access to and influence on Chinese thinking on these
and related Korean matters.
Strategic Weapons Proliferation and the North
Korean Regime.
In the midterm, getting more serious about the military
competition on the Korean Peninsula should help bolster
deterrence. In fact, the Perry Report’s “Fifth Key Policy
Recommendation” was for the United States and its allies to
“approve a plan of action prepared for dealing with the
contingency of DPRK provocations.” The Perry Report goes
on to note that “these responses should make it clear to the
DPRK that provocative actions carry a heavy penalty.” The
Perry Report placed special emphasis on the need to develop
responses to possible “provocations in the near term,” but
the clarification exercises the working group recommended
clearly could be made a part of this effort.
This should help in the near and midterm. In the long
run, however, the cause of nonproliferation can be sustained
only with a significant moderation in the North Korean
regime itself. In dealing with current events, the Perry
Report may be right: We must deal with North Korea “as it
is, not as we might wish it to be.” But for the period that the
working group was considering—the next 2
decades—regime questions are important. This is not just
because we “wish” things to be different in Pyongyang, but
because we know that most of the worst proliferators—e.g.,
Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and China—have, like North
Korea, been hostile to human rights. More important, we
know that the clearest nonproliferation victories—e.g.,
South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Ukraine—all came
with these nations’ movement away from illiberal rule. If
one is serious about promoting lasting nonproliferation,
then indifference to these matters is a mistake.
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It was for this reason that research was commissioned to
examine the issue of North Korean human rights and what
the United States and its allies might do too improve them.
Several points emerged from this research and working
group discussions. First, the ability of the United States and
its allies to work within North Korea to change the regime’s
behavior is limited. On the one hand, overt, unhindered
access to North Korea is not now possible. Covertly trying to
overthrow the Kim regime, on the other hand, seems
unrealistic.
With this in mind, the working group focused on what
could be done to influence North Korean behavior from
outside its borders. Speaking out at the appropriate United
Nations (UN) forums on human rights was considered to be
the minimum. Currently, the United States is quite vocal
about abuses in China at these forums; yet it is virtually
silent at these same venues regarding North Korea’s
transgressions. Beyond this, the group agreed that the
United States and its allies should condition all
humanitarian aid upon the proper monitoring of its
distribution and that it should be given in-kind rather than
in currency. As for international loans, these too should be
made contingent upon measurable improvement in North
Korea’s protection of its citizens’ human rights. Finally, the
group concurred that the liberal democracies of the
region—South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand, etc.—should promote the further
spread of liberal democracy and spotlight the shortcomings
of states such as North Korea.
That said, the group understood that these measures
were unlikely to have an immediate impact. There also was
disagreement about the value of increasing trade and
commerce with North Korea. Most thought trade could be
used to open up North Korea, yet nearly as many feared that
trade would be conducted in a concessionary manner that
would only bolster the existing regime.
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However, one idea highlighted in the commissioned
research did seem actionable. It concerned the increasing
number of North Korean refugees fleeing to China and
Russia. Currently, there are between 100,000 and 200,000
North Korean refugees living in China and a much smaller
number who have fled to Russia. The upper range
represents nearly one percent of North Korea’s entire
population.
These North Koreans flee their country at great personal
risk. First, they must elude or bribe North Korean border
guards. Then, they must do the same with the Chinese
authorities or risk arrest. It is estimated that of those
arrested in China in l999, approximately 7,000 (i.e., nearly
ten percent of the new arrivals) were forcibly repatriated to
North Korea. In March 2000 alone, Chinese authorities are
believed to have forced 5,000 refugees back to North Korea.
All of these repatriations violate international human
rights agreements China has signed or ratified.
If the United States and its allies are serious about
promoting genuine, lasting nonproliferation in Korea, it is
essential that they promote greater North Korean respect of
human rights and of enlightened government. In this
regard, the working group agreed that one of the most
promising opportunities was to persuade China and Russia
to uphold their international obligations prohibiting forced
repatriations.
Recommendation: Encourage China and Russia Not
to Repatriate Korean Refugees.
One sure way to encourage North Korea to treat its own
citizens better is to reduce the risks for its citizens who
choose to leave North Korea. In fact, China has signed or
ratified a number of international agreements that prohibit
forced repatriations. It has violated all of them. These
agreements include:
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•

The United Nations Convention on the Status of
Refugees, Article 33 of which prohibits forced return
of refugees when there is a serious risk that this would
result in a further violation of their human rights,

•

The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which
requires close cooperation with the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees,

•

The Convention Against Torture, Article 3 of which
prohibits the forcible repatriation when there are
grounds to believe repatriated parties would be
subject to torture, and

•

The Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which
makes the freedom to leave one’s country a legal right.

China, for its part, is not eager to adhere to these
agreements. Its biggest concern is that stopping forcible
repatriation of North Korean refugees might encourage
more North Koreans to flee to China. As it is, China has
difficulty sustaining employment in Manchuria for its own
citizens and can hardly afford an influx of additional
mouths and labor.
The United States and its allies should work privately
with China to see if they can help to address these concerns.
Western aid and investments in Manchuria might be
offered to help China cope with the problems North Korean
refugees present. Arrangements to relocate North Korean
refugees to locations outside of China might also be made
quietly. A similar effort might be made to address the
smaller numbers of refugees fleeing to Russia.
Nuclear and Space Cooperation and Proliferation.
Although the working group avoided debating the merits
of current policy, one program, the Agreed Framework of
l994, kept intruding into the group’s deliberations. The
reason why was simple. Although the original arrangement
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was supposed to be completely implemented by 2003, it now
is clear that the promised reactors may not come on line
anytime before 2010 or later. This is well into the period the
working group was assigned to consider.
More important, it is the Agreed Framework, more than
any other U.S. and allied effort, that the future of North
Korea’s known nuclear production facilities is tied to. So
long as North Korea believes it is in its interest to uphold the
deal, the operation of these facilities—a small reactor and a
large reprocessing plant—will remain frozen. On the other
hand, it is only when a significant portion of the first
promised reactor is completed that North Korea must come
into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) obligations. Nor is North Korea obligated to
begin to dismantle its other declared nuclear facilities
under the deal until construction of this reactor is finished.
In fact, North Korea is free to pull out of the Agreed
Framework at any time. The same is true of the United
States and those nations contributing financially to
implement the deal. Supporters of the original deal
emphasized that North Korea would have much more to lose
from withdrawal than the United States and its allies since
it would forfeit either completion of the reactors (worth over
$5 billion) or their continued fueling. Yet, 7 years later, this
eventuality is no longer so clear.
Indeed, in the nuclear area, the two things Pyongyang’s
military nuclear planners need most are what the Agreed
Framework supplies. First it affords a vast increase in the
number of nuclear technicians (under the deal South Korea
must train approximately 1,000 North Koreans in nuclear
operations). Second, it supplies a massive expansion of
North Korea’s nuclear materials production base. Thus,
what Pyongyang could produce in l994—one to two bombs’
worth of plutonium a year—the two proposed modern
U.S.-designed reactors, when completed, would exceed by
nearly two orders of magnitude (i.e., an annual production
of between 75 to 150 bombs’ worth of material).
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Compounding these concerns is an additional danger:
the l994 deal allows North Korea to delay dismantling its
declared nuclear facilities until after the first of the two
reactors (capable of making up to 75 bombs’ worth of
material annually) is completed. Clearly, this puts North
Korea in a much more advantageous position with regard to
possible withdrawal than the United States or its allies.
Pyongyang can withdraw at any time, resume nuclear
weapons materials production with its declared facilities,
enjoy the advantage of more trained nuclear technicians,
and conceivably increase its plutonium production with one
of the two promised reactors by a factor of 30 or more.
All of this suggests that tying nuclear inspections and
dismantlement to the completion of two modern reactors is
a risky proposition. At a minimum, the l994 deal is poorly
leveraged to secure dismantlement. Supporters of the deal
who are anxious to keep the United States and South Korea
engaged in talks with the North tend to downplay these
concerns. Yet, because of technical and legal challenges that
those building the reactors would face, in the long run it is
unclear if this project will serve or undermine the cause of
North-South cooperation. A partial listing of these
difficulties include:

•

The reactors cannot be built without the export of U.S.
nuclear items, the shipment of which to North Korea
(a known violator of international nuclear
safeguards) would require a controversial waiver of
U.S. nuclear control laws.

•

The only legal way the U.S. president could waive
these laws is to secure a complex bilateral nuclear
cooperative agreement with North Korea, the
negotiation of which he has not yet begun.

•

The required IAEA inspections of the North (which
will require 2-3 years of unhindered access to North
Korea) have not yet been agreed to by North Korea
and cannot be performed in time to allow the reactors
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to be built anytime near the revised 2007 construction
target date.

•

North Korea lacks the nuclear regulatory background
sufficient to license and properly oversee the safe
construction and operation of the plants and has no
way to insure against nuclear accidents (which leaves
participating nuclear contractors dangerously
exposed).

•

North Korea’s electrical distribution system (which
consists in part of buried iron wires) will have to be
rebuilt (at a cost of as much as $1 billion) to be able to
effectively move the massive amounts of electricity
the reactors would generate and to assure the
reactors’ safe operation. To date, no one has stepped
up to this task.

•

To prevent a breakdown of North Korea’s electrical
grid (which consists of both North Korea’s electrical
distribution system and the power plants connected to
it) that would jeopardize the safe operation of the two
planned reactors. Pyongyang would have to bring 5 to
10 times more electricity on line than it currently is
producing. Otherwise, the one or two gigawatts of
electricity the two reactors would generate would
overwhelm (i.e., disrupt the smooth operation of) even
a fully upgraded electrical distribution system.
Assuming a price of $1 billion per gigawatt of newly
installed electrical capacity, this would cost
somewhere between $10 and $20 billion additional
dollars and take many years to accomplish. Also, as
part of this grid upgrading, North Korea would have
to develop an unprecedented, massive increase in its
consumption and demand for electricity.

•

Finally, there is the economic friction that continued
pursuit of the reactor project is likely to produce. This
worry was driven home recently in an analysis done
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for the organization responsible for building the two
reactors, the Korean Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) by Bradley Babson, the World
Bank’s senior advisor on North Korea. As Mr. Babson
pointed out, “If the nuclear plant project supported by
KEDO was subjected to a normal World Bank project
evaluation and appraisal, it would get an F.” The
reason why, he explained, was that North Korea’s
capacity to generate and distribute electricity was far
too meager to absorb the output of even one of the
proposed one-gigawatt power reactors. Thus, once the
plants were completed, North Korea would not be able
to sell sufficient electricity to repay the interest-free
loan it assumed to fund the reactors’ construction.
All of these factors, then, raise the question of why one
would ever build the nuclear reactors in the first place. In
fact, in l997, the South Korean press reported that
Pyongyang was well aware of these points back in l994 and
actually requested of its South Korean counterparts that
one of the generating stations be nonnuclear. When this
story ran in Seoul, and junior officials confirmed it, senior
U.S. officials quickly denied it. But the point lingers. If we
can’t complete the reactors and Pyongyang needs electrical
power, would it not be more sensible to make at least the
first of the power stations nonnuclear and to tie the nuclear
inspections and dismantlement called for in the Agreed
Framework to this first nonnuclear power station’s
completion? Alternatively, KEDO could offer to revamp
North Korea’s existing electrical grid so it could take on
more power as its economy grew.
As for its interest in space satellites, North Korea has no
more of a civilian requirement for these or space launch
services than it does for nuclear electricity. A case might be
made for its gaining access to the services satellites might
provide—e.g., imagery and communications. Yet, securing
such services from the United States would be far cheaper
and vastly superior to whatever peaceful civilian benefits
Pyongyang might secure from launching its own crude
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satellites (even if the United States and its allies paid for
such launches). Offering satellite services in lieu of funding
space launch also would avoid the risk of helping North
Korean military planners secure the one thing they lack to
perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile—a workable
upper stage.
In fact, this is precisely the kind of technology the
reported U.S. deal would be primed to provide. It is
impossible to launch a North Korean satellite properly into
orbit without developing an upper stage that can be
appropriately mated to it. Under the deal currently being
discussed, however, it is a North Korean satellite that will
be launched. Because Pyongyang will be dictating the exact
volume, weight, and fragility of the satellite being launched,
it will dictate the precise kind of upper stage needed to
launch it. Is there any way to prevent North Korea from
specifying a satellite that would require a reliable version of
the upper stage used in its frightening (and nearly
successful) August l998 launch attempt that flew over
Japan? What of preventing Pyongyang from specifying
some other satellite that would require an upper stage that
it could then use on its more advanced Taepo Dong-2
launcher? Sadly, once one helps North Korea launch its
satellites, discussions between its technicians and the
satellite launch service provider over the specifics of the
satellite to be launched and the design characteristics of the
launcher and upper stage are unavoidable.
On this point, recent history is all too instructive. As the
United States could not prevent China from gaining such
information from U.S. space contractors and Russia could
not live up to its pledges to block such technology from going
to India, the prospects of keeping North Korea from
securing such knowledge are slight. Nor does the option of
using U.S. contractors to launch North Korean satellites
(and trying again to keep these contractors from treading
into the gray areas of intangible technology sharing) appear
all that attractive.
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Finally, it should be noted that in their current form both
the nuclear and space deals risk straining the trilateral
alliance relationship among South Korea, Japan, and the
United States. Specifically, the Japanese are worried that
both the nuclear and space deals are less in Tokyo’s interest
than they are in Seoul’s or Washington’s. The nuclear
project, after all, sustains the South Koreans’ Sunshine
policy and keeps its nuclear utilities from floundering
financially. It also has helped keep the United States from
having to take a riskier, tougher stance towards
Pyongyang’s nuclear program. As for the space launch deal,
this too helps sustain South Korea’s Sunshine policy and
costs Seoul little since it is not targeted by the Taepo Dong
missiles. And it certainly relieves Washington of pressures
to deploy missile defenses.
The benefits of these deals, however, are not so clear in
Japan’s case. First, Tokyo must pay $1 billion toward the
promised reactors’ completion with only part of this money
being spent on Japanese nuclear goods. Second, the full
inspection and dismantling of North Korea’s declared
nuclear facilities are tied to the completion of the two
reactors, which may take 10 or more years. As such, Japan’s
key worry—a nuclear Korea—is a threat it must live with
for some time. Finally, a space cooperation deal that
includes the Taepo Dong missiles, which might reach the
United States, would address American concerns. Given the
conventional artillery threat South Korea already faces, it
may be possible to buy South Korean support for such a deal
by allowing Seoul to deploy SCUD-range missiles of its own
design. Yet, if it excludes No Dong missiles that can
currently hit Japan, such a deal is only likely to strain the
United States-Japan-South Korea relationship.
This, then, brings us to this report’s final
recommendation.
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Recommendation: Demilitarize Proposed U.S.
Space and Nuclear Aid to Pyongyang.
Recently, Nulceonics Week reported that senior U.S.,
Japanese, and South Korean officials discussed the idea of
substituting a nonnuclear power plant for the first of the
two promised reactors. South Korean officials objected that
making such a proposal at this late date might threaten
support for the Agreed Framework. It is worth noting that
the objection was one of timing rather than substance.
Eventually, for all the reasons noted above, the logic of
returning to this idea will be compelling.
As for the space cooperation proposal, there are real
advantages to offering Pyongyang satellite services instead.
Perhaps the most important advantage is that the United
States could make sure that such shared imagery,
navigational, and communications services would not be
used for military purposes. North Korea might request
detailed photos of South Korean bases, but lacking any
peaceful civilian purpose, the United States and its allies
could rightly deny the request. With satellite-based
communications services, the United States or its allies
might provide free access to existing transponders so long as
communications were not encrypted. The United States
should also at least try to secure Japanese backing for this
offer by making sure that missiles that can hit Japan—the
No Dongs—are somehow included in the deal as well.
Making these adjustments would not only eliminate the
potentially self-defeating aspects of the current deals, they
should help bolster the trilateral alliance relationship
among the United States, South Korea, and
Japan—something that the Perry Report itself specifically
recommends.
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CHAPTER 2
NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

Stephen Bradner
The Setting.
Internationally unpopular, with a broken-down
infrastructure, a nutritionally deprived population, a
stunted younger generation, and no evident means of
economic regeneration, North Korea, a half century after its
foundation, exhibits an unprecedented condition for a
modern, industrialized society with expanding weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missile
capabilities. Why did this happen? What, if anything, can be
done about it? These are basic questions because the way
the North got into this predicament tends to define and limit
their long-term strategic options as well as what they can do
in the near to mid term to extricate themselves. All of this
can be seen in context only if we give serious attention to the
peculiar nature of the Kim family regime (KFR) and the
political culture, which shapes Pyongyang’s1 strategic
conceptions.2 We will discuss the enduring characteristics of
the regime, the regime’s strategic options, the significance
of North Korea’s WMD and long-range missiles, why so
many find it difficult to grasp the essence of the “Kimist”
system, and the serious policy dilemmas facing Washington
and Pyongyang.
Regime Characteristics and Limitations.
The centrality of the military mindset can hardly be
overemphasized. Shaped by his early experience as a
guerrilla fighter against the Japanese, Kim Il Sung’s
outlook was something like a cross between Lenin’s
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“fight-talk, fight-talk” dictum and the view expressed in
Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf that an organism which does not
fight dies.3 For Kim, the economy was to produce the
implements of war, the education to produce capable
soldiers, and the ideology to convince the population of the
inevitability of war and the necessity for absolute obedience
to a military leader who would ultimately be extolled to the
point of infallibility.
Guerilla Dynasty by Adrian Buzo4 is an extremely useful
work in which Buzo emphasizes the significance of the
guerrilla mindset and revalidates and updates the insights
set forth in the two-volume work, Communism in Korea.5
The following quotations from Volume II are pertinent:
Unquestioning loyalty and allegiance were the determinants of
survival, and the “Party” took on an entirely military character,
discipline and hierarchy being interwoven with the
camaraderie of the small, determined—often desperate—band.6
From guerrilla to governing party thus involved more a change
of scope than a change of operational pattern or mind.7

Kim’s regime was born and bred in absolute hostility to
any political authority in the South. Simply, the South is
held to be a U.S. colony, and Southern officials are viewed as
nothing more than lackeys of their colonial masters. In more
than a half century, Pyongyang has never had anything
good to say about Southern officialdom, and the government
in the South has been seen as only one of many Southern
organizations, lacking any particular legitimacy as a
government and treated for the most part as something to
be avoided, undermined, and, if possible, overthrown.
The regime operates like a kind of combination religious
cult-crime family gang. Resort to violence is common, as are
summary executions, often for political incorrectness rather
than substantive violation of law. The regime’s leaders
utilize gangland practices—counterfeiting, drug
smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, and assassination—as
tools of state policy. And, as one might expect, they show
indifference to the welfare of ordinary citizens living on
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their piece of turf, being concerned rather with how to
maintain control and how to extract anything that may
contribute to their own security and comfort.
Undergirding the regime is a vast tissue of myth and
fabrication.8 Kim Il Sung’s first great myth was that it was
Kim and his guerrilla forces who expelled the Japanese
from North Korea in 1945. Two other foundation myths are
the contemporary North Korean society as “paradise on
earth” and the future unification of the peninsula under
Kim or his son Kim Jong Il. There is also, of course, the myth
of Kim Jong Il’s birth on Paektu-san,9 and both Kim Il Sung
and his son are held to have thaumaturgical (i.e.,
miracle-performing) power and links with the
supernatural.10
Not surprisingly, therefore, the entire society must be
kept in virtual isolation, because if isolation cannot be
maintained all these myths are likely to be challenged and
undermined, with consequent severe damage to the belief
system supporting the regime. Again not surprisingly, the
economy is failing because in a world with so much pressure
for interconnectivity, it is difficult to manage an economy of
any significant size in the relatively isolated manner the
regime attempts.
Finally, as the regime does not brook the possibility of
compromise, it is locked into a zero-sum regime survival
contest with its rival to the South. Why do we expect the
competition to be zero-sum? First, because when we look at
the major divided country scenarios of the past 2 centuries,
we see that they seem to turn out that way. With so much
water in between, the China-Taiwan scenario may turn out
differently, but the cases of Yemen, Vietnam, Germany
twice, and America in the 19th century all seem to suggest
that while division may persist for what seems like an
interminably long period, the forces for unity ultimately
prove too strong.
When unity occurs, however, it does not come about
through a fair and balanced compromise respecting and
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preserving the interests and estates of the leadership on
both sides. It’s not a case of “I’m all right—you’re all right.”
Rather, one side dominates, and it’s a case of “We’ll do the
ordering, and you’ll do the obeying.” We witness a repetition
of the ancient Athenian formula, “The strong do what they
can, and the weak suffer what they must,”11 with the extent
of the suffering having a lot to do with the political
traditions of the piece of turf in question. When that piece is
Korea, it is reasonable to expect that the leaders on the
losing side will not get the kind of generous treatment that,
in the main, East Germany’s leaders received a decade ago.
Second, the two societies on opposite sides of Korea’s
demilitarized zone (DMZ) are profoundly different, in fact,
close to antithetical. The approaches to politics, economics,
education, jurisprudence, religion, and even the meaning of
life in North and South are very different. Northerners are
taught to find the meaning of life in their devotion to their
“great leader.” The South has experienced periods of highly
authoritarian rule to be sure, but at repeated critical
junctures Southerners have clearly opted for what we may
call the imperfect decency of democracy and the
accountability of leadership rather than for the autocratic
model. As one Southerner was anonymously quoted in the
press a few years back, “North Korea deifies its leaders. We
throw ours in jail.” This is hardly an insignificant difference
and one which, we may be sure, is not lost on the leadership
in the North. Moreover, it is very difficult to identify any
significant feature of the Northern system which
Southerners could be expected to endorse—not the legal
system, not their humanitarian accomplishments, not the
success of the economic model, and certainly not the clarity
of political thought.
In sum, the trench dividing Korea is much deeper and
wider than in the German case. The big boss on the
Communist side is in Pyongyang, not in Moscow, and the
Kim family ideology appears to be much closer to the North
Korean soul than communism was to the East German soul.
Republic of Korea (ROK) news media cannot access North
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Korea’s people outside the Kim family regime audience,
there is nothing like the cross-border passage of a million
West Germans into the east prior to unification, and there is
no common Korean experience comparable to the effort to
build a modern, industrial, democratic society which
engaged the whole of Germany in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Finally, and most important, Korea had the
war that Germany was able to avoid.
The point of all this is that in spite of the common
cultural heritage prior to 1945, the differences between
North and South are profound, and it is difficult to imagine
how any policy crafted through the combined wisdom of
Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo can make them go away.
What the Regime Cannot Do.
Currently, there seems to be no particular reason to
believe that Pyongyang’s leaders can either fix the North
Korean economy on their own or “join the world” for the
rational choice—“soft landing options” of reconciliation,
reform, and opening that might bring about a fix. If by “soft
landing” one means that the peninsular confrontation may
ultimately be resolved without war, that thought does no
great violence to a realistic outlook. If, on the other hand,
one means that the confrontation can be resolved while the
Kim family regime remains viable in the North, that notion
would seem to belong on the shelf alongside the fantasy
novels of H. Rider Haggard.12
Why are the soft landing options so difficult? When the
U.S. Secretary of State visited Korea in early 1997, she was
asked whether she thought the North and South would be
able to negotiate the end of the Korean War. She answered,
It’s very hard to predict. It basically depends on how much the
North Koreans are hurting and whether they are willing to
realize that a peaceful solution to this division is the best way
to go.13
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That would appear to be a rational and humane
formulation. But the question is, who are the “North
Koreans” who are supposed to see that a peaceful resolution
is the best way to go? Are we talking about some 22 million
people walking around in the country and trying to get by
from week to week? Do we mean North Korea as a country?
Or do we mean the privileged group at the top of the power
structure who run North Korea and make all the decisions
about what North Korea as a country will and will not do? A
few years back a Korean political scientist explained that
while anyone can posit the objective need of North Korea,
viewed as a country, for the soft landing options, no one can
show the connection between that objective need and the
willingness of the Kim regime to pursue these options, or
even their ability to do them without fatal collateral
damage.
What is the problem with reconciliation? North Korea’s
leaders have programmed themselves and their people to
believe that true Korean sovereignty and patriotism are to
be found only in the inheritors of the anti-Japanese
guerrilla struggles of the 1930s and 1940s. These inheritors
are Kim Il Sung and his fellow combatants, their
descendants, and their allies. This is what defines their
identity. This is who they think they are. When they talk
about “one Korea,” they mean their Korea with themselves
in charge. The notion that somewhere on the peninsula
there is another group of Koreans with “equal standing”
with whom they must negotiate on equal terms about the
future of the peninsula is doctrinally, strategically,
ideologically, emotionally—virtually any way you look at
it—repugnant and unacceptable. In spite of the June 2000
summit meeting, unless history, defectors’ reports, and
intelligence are all suddenly without utility, we can
confidently predict that they will not do it.14
What about reform? A few years ago North Korean news
media announced that Kim Jong Il had fired a round of 18
holes of golf in 34 strokes, some 25 shots below the
recognized PGA record.15 Here’s a fellow who simply doesn’t
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make mistakes. What’s to reform? We may laugh about this,
but someone living in North Korea who starts to talk about
the need for reform will not find it so funny. The whole idea
of reform carries with it the notion that something needs
fixing, that there is a better way of doing things. The
implication is that something is wrong, impossible in a
country with infallible leadership. Moreover, to endorse
reform Kim Jong Il would have to renounce socialism, an
East European mistake he has vowed he will not make,
renounce the chuch’e ideology,16 and, in the end, even
renounce his own father, thereby undercutting his own
legitimacy as the filial son who follows his father’s correct
policies. If all of this were not problem enough, the whole
idea of reform entails a series of troublesome
decisionmaking intersections very disruptive for a rigid,
monocratic regime. For example, when to begin reform, in
what sector to begin, how fast to go, when to extend to other
sectors, and whom to put in charge? Experience in other
authoritarian systems suggests that sooner or later this
process is apt to produce debate about whether reform is
being done in the right manner and whether the right
people are doing it, a contradiction in a society where only
one person is allowed to philosophize about what is right
and wrong.
Opening entails many of the same problems.
Northerners have been told for decades that the people of
the South live in spiritual and material misery from which
they must be liberated. This is dogma basic to the belief
system and cannot be set aside. Should Northerners come to
learn not only that this notion is false, but that the great
mass of their Southern brethren live in a kind of affluence
hardly imaginable in the Kim family regime “paradise,” one
can imagine the consequences for the regime’s political
support structure and the security of the leadership.
Moreover, it must be questioned whether the North has the
infrastructure necessary for opening in terms of legal
guarantees, financial institutions, and professional
expertise. The vast majority of the North’s so-called
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“technocrats” have not been educated at places like MIT, the
Ivy League, Stanford, or the London School of Economics,
but rather at Kim Il Sung University and Moscow
University, where one can only guess at how much they
have learned that may be helpful in guiding North Korea’s
entry into the flux and turbulence of the 21st-century world
economy.
In sum, while these options sound reasonable for North
Korea as a country, they all amount to things the regime
either doesn’t know how to do or would find unacceptable, or
which would punch holes below the political water line, or
all three. It is as if by their policies the North’s leaders have
tied ropes around their necks and these changes would be
like pulling the trap door from beneath their feet.
Three consequences would seem to follow. First, while
the Kim regime may cautiously hazard some limited
experiments, in general they will opt to impose on their
population the continuing pain of economic failure rather
than to embark on a path of revitalization that will lead to
growing dependence on perceived hostile forces in the
South. Second, absent war, the superiority of the South in
every aspect of life except the military will continue to grow
and Northerners will, as time passes, become increasingly
aware of the South’s superiority. Third, if unification is not
accomplished by war, economics will tend to dominate. It
will be the economically superior South that leads the
process of reintegration which precedes, encompasses, and
continues on past political unification. While all of this may
take considerable time, the entire period is arguably only an
interim condition. Ironically, the longer the period, the more
apparent Southern superiority and the more inevitable the
final result. As this process unfolds, it will become
increasingly difficult for the Northern regime’s leaders to
maintain any relevance, as they will not have the
knowledge or the resources to do much that is useful.17
From all of this follows yet another important
consequence: the Kim family regime would seem to have no
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long-term survival option that is not military in nature.
This notion is not popular with policymakers, or with many
other observers either, for that matter. No one likes to
contemplate the horrendous cost that would attend another
peninsular war. But it is difficult to see how extended
peaceful coexistence can lead anywhere but to the
increasing appeal of the South and the gradual erosion of
popular support in the North. The only way Pyongyang can
escape such an eventuality is by gaining control of the entire
peninsula, and it is virtually inconceivable for that objective
to be accomplished by negotiation. However repugnant this
idea may be, it provides a rationale for KFR conduct over
time. In rejecting the options outsiders urge upon them, the
KFR acts as if they believe it.
Finally, I would contend that to use any other template
as a means of analyzing and predicting over time what
Pyongyang will and will not do is to set oneself up for a
virtually endless series of false expectations.
Strategic Options.
Currently, North Korea would seem to have four broad
strategic options. Two offer the prospect of long-term
survival, but they are difficult and dangerous. Two others
would seem to offer the means of temporary survival only.
The first obviously is to attack and win. The upside is the
possibility of absolute victory. If the KFR gains control of the
entire peninsula, economic failure becomes politically
irrelevant, or at least much less relevant. Peninsular
polarity would end, as would the economic and political
challenge from Seoul. The downside is, of course, that this is
the most dangerous option, as it risks total defeat and the
prospect of death, delivery into the hands of the enemy, or
ignominious flight.
The second is the campaign of subversion and
revolution, the strategy envisioned in their “peaceful
unification” slogan adopted in 1954. The upside is that it
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offers the possibility of total victory with minimal risk. The
problem, of course, is that since it is extremely hard to do,
the possibility of success is extremely small. The would-be
guerrilla operations of the mid to late 1960s failed, and
there have been no attempts to revive them. As for
subversion, the record seems to show that while individuals
can be recruited and anti-state groups formed, the ROK
society as a whole is too big and various to take down. Basic
to the likely failure of this option, of course, are four factors
which decrease the appeal of the KFR message: (1) the
evident failure of North Korea’s economic model, (2) the long
and continuing track record of violence against the South,
(3) the dynastic succession, which is viewed in the South as
ludicrous and anachronistic, and (4) political
democratization in the South, which over time has deprived
radical students of their political cover as fighters for
democracy.
The third option is the so-called “soft landing,” or
“rational choice,” option of reconciliation and economic
cooperation, reform, and opening. The upside is that over
time all of these might help to bring about economic and
social recovery in the North. The downside is that, as
already discussed, they would inevitably undermine regime
foundations and lead inexorably to the collapse and end of
the Kim family system. Moreover, in the interim, this option
does nothing to fend off the threat from the South, as the
ROK is still there and still obviously superior economically.
Finally, of course, sustained pursuit of this option would
tend to foreclose the first two options above.
The fourth option is what we may call an aid-based
survival approach with minimal or no reform. This appears
in the main to be the strategic option the KFR has currently
adopted. The advantages of this option are significant. It
avoids the pitfalls of internal change. It avoids the danger of
broad engagement with the ROK but allows for selective
ROK business activity in the North. And it preserves the
possibility of continued priority to the military and of
options one and two above. The disadvantages are also
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considerable. There is a potential sustainability problem.
Will the outside world give enough for long enough? The
ROK is still there and still superior. Collapse is still
possible, and there is rampant corruption, just as when the
ROK pursued a similar strategy in the early to mid–1950s.
Let us now take another look at option one. It has of late
become fashionable to describe North Korea’s objective as
survival. In the context of North Korea’s economic failure
and the growing gap between the South and the North,
survival has come to be equated with a defensive stance.
The assumption has been that the North’s military
establishment must be declining along with the rest of the
economy, and that the best the Pyongyang regime can do
now is to try to keep information control intact and hang on
somehow, even as the leadership agonizes over the
inevitable decision to change course, to abandon hostility to
the South, to reform, open, and accept the assistance the
South can provide. Against the background of these
assumptions there has been a tendency to believe that the
North no longer poses a military threat, and that
Pyongyang must surely have abandoned its goal of gaining
control over the entire peninsula. In this context it is held
that any decision to attack the South would be suicidal, an
irrational decision. But these assumptions require critical
evaluation.
First, here is how the North may think they can win.
They may believe they can attack with little warning and
that their artillery will smash forward defenses and destroy
the morale of the defenders. They may expect roads in the
South will be choked with refugees to the point that
Combined Forces Command (CFC)18 forces will be unable to
maneuver. They will expect that their large and well trained
special operations forces (SOF) will create havoc in the rear,
and that this along with the use of chemical and biological
weapons will demoralize and panic soldiers and civilians
alike. Finally, in spite of the good showing by the ROK Navy
off the west coast last year, they may believe that when the
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war starts a substantial portion of the defending forces will
either flee, or fight with little enthusiasm.
Second, Pyongyang’s leaders may expect that at some
point in the future the United States will be distracted by
developments elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East or the
Taiwan Straits, and be unable to respond quickly and
effectively with off-shore reinforcements.
Third, there is little doubt they have noticed the current
U.S. aversion to any kind of involvement which seems likely
to entail heavy casualties. They may well calculate that if
they can strike early and hard in a way that produces high
casualties at the outset, Washington will come under
political pressure to extricate rather than to reinforce.
Fourth, what we know about North Korean force
dispositions simply does not support the idea that
Pyongyang has abandoned the military option or that their
overall stance is defensive rather than offensive. Since
1980, along with an increase in the size of their ground
forces from 700,000 to more than a million, the North has
steadily deployed combat forces forward. Key changes
include significant numbers of mechanized and artillery
units relocating Southward. Today 70 percent of all combat
forces, to include 700,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, and 8,000
artillery systems,19 are located South of a line between
Pyongyang and Wonsan, or 100 kilometers from the DMZ,
as compared with 40 percent so deployed in 1980.
Their artillery includes 500 long-range systems
deployed over the past decade. The proximity of these
long-range systems to the DMZ threatens all of Seoul with
devastating attack. Without moving any of its artillery, the
North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds per hour against
CFC defenses for several hours. Other North Korean
threats at the outset are the use of missiles and SOF actions
against key targets in the Seoul area. Much of the North’s
military force is protected in underground facilities,
including 4,000 facilities in the forward area alone. From
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their current locations these forces can attack with minimal
preparations.
North Korea’s tactical doctrine emphasizes domination
of the battlefield by surprise, firepower, and mobility.
Critical to North Korean success are secrecy, delivery of
massive amounts of firepower against extremely narrow
frontages, widespread use of WMD, and the ability to
methodically feed reinforcing and exploitation forces to
sustain the momentum of attack. Pyongyang’s campaign
plan envisions defeat of the CFC forward defense and
isolation of Seoul within seven days and exploitation
operations throughout the remainder of the peninsula to
defeat ROK forces and close air and seaports for arriving
U.S. off-shore forces.
There are, to be sure, aspects of North Korea’s
dispositions that are defensive in nature. During the past
year, coastal defenses have been improved in the forward
area, combat positions have been established along major
routes between Pyongyang and the DMZ, and antitank
barriers have been emplaced in the forward area. But these
dispositions should be seen in context. In any projected
attack against an enemy whose strong suits are flexibility,
speed, and the ability to strike deep, the North must
anticipate the need for defensive operations even in an
overall offensive context. Moreover, in three critical aspects,
Northern dispositions do not appear defensive. First, most
of their artillery is deployed so far forward as to be
vulnerable to surprise attack and useless in defense.
Second, on the Northern side of the DMZ there are no
defensive fortifications equivalent to Forward Edge of
Battle Area (FEBA) A, B, and C in the South.20 Third, tunnel
construction under the DMZ would seem to have little
utility except for offense.
During the past year, North Korea has been
implementing an ambitious program to improve its ground
force posture. The highlight of this initiative is the
deployment of large numbers of 240mm multiple rocket
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launcher systems and 170mm self-propelled guns to
hardened sites near the DMZ. Other improvements include
construction of missile support facilities, preparations for
long-range missile testing, and enhancement of an already
impressive camouflage, concealment, and deception effort.
Production of military equipment, to include missiles,
aircraft, submarines, and artillery systems, has continued,
and since last summer training levels have surged to new
heights.21 All of this reflects continuing priority to the
military and a remarkable allocation of resources in spite of
severe overall economic deprivation.
Those who believe North Korea will not attack could in
the end be right. One can imagine a whole host of reasons for
Kim Jong Il to hesitate. Kim may hope his aid-based
survival strategy will work indefinitely. He may worry
about military sustainability and think that with time he
can fix that problem. He may think his efforts to split the
alliance will be successful. He may prefer to wait until the
U.S. commitment weakens, or until the United States is
occupied elsewhere, or until he can attain withdrawal of
U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK). He may believe that he can hold
on indefinitely with the assistance of his world-class
counterintelligence system. He may even remain indecisive,
unable to make a decision until it becomes virtually too late
to make a decision.
However, those who say North Korea is too weak to
attempt an offensive solution to the survival problem would
do well to remember that in the 20th century Asian
opponents handed the United States four big military
surprises: the Pearl Harbor attack, the Korean surprise (not
only the June 25, 1950, invasion but the skill and fighting
ardor of North Korean forces), the Chinese intervention in
late 1950, and the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. Someone
predicted each of these, but the establishment dismissed the
predictions. In all four cases there seems to have been a
measure of contempt on our part for Asian opponents and a
tendency to overrate our own capabilities.22 In all four cases,
we paid a heavy price when the enemy did attack in spite of
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all our reasons why they could not or would not. Hindsight
teaches we are better served by believing that the enemy
has the strength, will, and ingenuity to force us to fight by
his doctrine rather than ours.
With regard to all four broad strategic options, it seems
tolerably certain the KFR will attach primary importance to
insuring the security and comfort of the leadership,
especially Kim Jong Il himself, and on maintaining internal
control. At a level of secondary importance, the regime will
strive to insure that Chinese support continues for all
options.
For all options except the soft-landing approach,
primary importance will also be placed on weakening and
ultimately eliminating the ROK as a state. In pursuit of
this, the North will attack conservative forces in the ROK
through propaganda smear campaigns as well as by
assassination, kidnapping, and intimidation.23 The North
will also continue conducting espionage and surveillance
operations against the ROK, support and direct radical and
subversive organizations in the South, and try to discredit
and weaken the ROK military establishment. As a means of
marginalizing the ROK, Pyongyang will also continue
trying in any way it can imagine to split the ROK-U.S.
alliance and bring about the withdrawal of USFK by
converting the armistice into a “peace agreement” and by
discrediting USFK through propaganda and agitation over
the sovereignty issue, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),
criminal jurisdiction, and territorial issues.24
As a part of this effort, Pyongyang will push for removal
of the “Cold War structure on the peninsula” and seize every
opportunity to thrust to the forefront the principles of
independent and peaceful unification in accordance with
“grand national unity.”25 As a means of exerting leverage
against the United States and Japan, the North’s WMD and
long-range missile capabilities will be pushed at all cost
rather than abandoned. 26 Already the world’s most
hardened potential belligerent with hundreds of miles of
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underground tunnels and facilities, North Korea will
continue sub-surface construction.
For all options except attack, the North will emphasize
enhancement of its international image through diplomacy,
propaganda, and normalization of relations with its great
enemies, the United States and Japan, in order to maintain
a flow of assistance from the former and maximum
reparations from the latter.
With regard to the soft-landing option, it would seem
that priority to the military and denigration of the ROK as
lacking legitimacy would not reconcile very well, but these
are fundamental KFR tenets and consideration of the
regime’s track record to date suggests they could not be
abandoned, all of which underscores the point that, in the
end, a soft landing will likely prove to be an illusion.
In pursuing its aid-based survival strategy, Pyongyang
has an assortment of carrots and sticks at its disposal.
Carrots could be such measures as greater transparency of
WMD and missile development, greater site access, site
destruction, suspension of testing and deployment,
initiation of confidence-building measures, amelioration of
propaganda attacks, formal negotiations with the ROK, and
a suspension of kidnappings, assassinations, and
infiltrations. Sticks could include abrogation of or threats to
abrogate the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework,
provocations along the DMZ, coastal infiltrations, missile
sales, further missile testing, and suspension of or threats
to suspend various channels of dialogue with the United
States, Japan, and the ROK. It seems reasonable to believe,
however, that so long as the Pyongyang regime aims at
encouraging donations from the outside world, primarily
the United States and the ROK, its field of maneuver will be
confined between, on the lower end, a level of threat needed
to motivate donations and, on the higher end, a level of
provocation that would cause a suspension of donations.

38

The Significance of WMD and Missiles.
The Pyongyang regime appears to consider its WMD and
long-range missiles as fundamental to survival and too
important to give up. Four points would seem to be clear.
First, these capabilities enable the regime to bargain
and blackmail for what it needs rather than having to beg.
Second, while WMD and missile programs are important in
this regard, it would be a mistake to imagine that is all they
are, and to underestimate the importance attached to the
programs per se and the regime’s determination to pursue
them. Such programs do not spring into existence
overnight. Recruitment of nuclear specialists began in the
1950s. North Korea began assigning specialists to
Yongbyon in the 1960s.27 All of this occurred long before
North Korea had cause to anticipate economic failure or the
need for a negotiating card to cope with the consequences of
such failure.
Third, WMD and long-range missiles appear integral to
Kim Jong Il’s notion of making North Korea a “great and
powerful state.” Simply, he thinks great powers have such
capabilities while weak states do not. In this respect, he will
almost certainly consider these capabilities central to his
own historic mission and therefore to his notion of his own
identity. He and his regime have always been bent on
achieving these capabilities. It will hardly be easy to force
them to assume a posture that entails stripping them of
these capabilities, a posture they have always steadfastly
refused to assume.
Fourth, these capabilities should be seen against the
background of what has been happening all across
Asia—from Syria and Israel on the west, to the
subcontinent, to China, and to North Korea on the east—as
second- and third-tier states develop asymmetric counters
to western conventional military superiority. All of this is
cogently captured in Paul Bracken’s book Fire in the East, in
which he argues that as we transition not into the post-Cold
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War era but into the post-Vasco da Gama era, Asian states
are for the first time in 500 years developing capabilities
that will enable them to strike back at western states which
try to impose their will by state-of-the-art military
technology.28 These new capabilities will enable North
Korea, among others, to hit our bases in the Pacific and,
ultimately to strike at our homeland, thus raising the costs
and hazards of our attempts to dictate outcomes of our
choosing far from home. As Bracken points out, Asian states
are pursuing these new weapons, especially enhanced
missile range and accuracy, not just to create random mass
destruction, but rather to exert leverage, by force and
threats of force, toward specific political objectives. If one
asks what Pyongyang’s specific political objective is
vis-à-vis the United States, the answer is not long in
coming. They have been telling us week in and week out for
decades about the need to get USFK off the Korean
peninsula.
Finally, it may be instructive to remember that, whether
the policy was called “equal emphasis,” “military first,” the
“importance of guns,” or “great and powerful state,” North
Korea under the Kims has from the beginning placed a high
priority on maximizing its military power. Therefore, in
trying to force them to abandon their WMD and missiles, we
are very likely trying to make them revert to something they
never were.
Currently, it appears evident that the regime is
pursuing its aid-based survival strategy along with efforts
to subvert the ROK while maintaining and improving its
ability to attack. Reconciliation, reform, and opening
appear to have been rejected, although Pyongyang is
prepared to simulate these options from time to time when
doing so will facilitate donations from outside. It is
sometimes argued that this rejection is irrational. It might,
however, be more realistic to see this rejection not as a case
of irrationality but rather as a case of a rational mind
operating in a highly abnormal environment, one in which
the divided country scenario, an extreme ideology ill suited
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to economic success, and a track record of hostility to the
South have caught Pyongyang’s leaders in a trap, one
nonetheless confining even if of their own making,
depriving them of the normal options of a normal state with
leaders motivated by a normal goal orientation. Herein lies
the tragic dilemma of North Korea’s existence. What is
medicine for the populace is poison to the regime, and the
interests of rulers and ruled are as opposed as in any ancient
despotism.
Why We Do Not Get It.
All the foregoing is not profound. It should not be
difficult to grasp the abnormality and incapacity of the
KFR. Why, then, do so many smart people miss it? We can
conjure up at least six reasons.
First, most of our experience is with normal states, and it
is natural to think that the normal tools of diplomacy and
international intercourse will be effective. Second, we tend
to miss the code words even when Pyongyang provides the
code, dismissing the KFR’s statements of its goals as
propaganda. One example: The 1948 Korean Workers’
Party (KWP) Rules state that
the KWP struggles for the liberation of the Southern half of
our country from American imperialist aggressive forces and
internal reactionary rule and for the attainment of the
complete unification of the country on a democratic basis by
firmly uniting the broad masses of North and South around
itself.29

This is straightforward enough, but some seem inclined
to think it no longer applies simply because it was
enunciated a half century ago. Another example: In the July
4, 1972, joint North-South declaration, the two sides
pledged efforts for independent and peaceful unification in
accord with great national unity, yet by July 15, 1972, North
Korean news media were again proclaiming that all Korea
would be united under Kim Il Sung. More important, Kim Il
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Sung himself, in interviews later that summer with Japan’s
daily Mainichi Shimbun and monthly magazine Sekai and
in North Korean publications, explained the meaning of
these terms. “Independent” meant “to force the United
States imperialists out of South Korea”; “peaceful” meant
the reduction of armed forces and halt of military
modernization in the South; and “great national unity”
meant freedom for pro-North Korean subversive and
revolutionary groups to operate in the ROK.30 We should not
think it inconsequential that North Korean negotiators
insisted on the inclusion of this terminology in the agenda
for the June 2000 summit, as each term represents a pivotal
node in the struggle for dominance between two rival
regimes of truth.
Third, although Korean issues seldom exhibit
convoluted, Byzantine patterns, there is frequently a
measure of garbage strewn over the surface that makes it
hard to look down and see the basic simplicity. In this case,
we have strewn some of the garbage ourselves by unrealistic
predictions and by formulations which do not distinguish
between country interests and regime interests. Fourth,
there is a kind of policymaking trap in that while it is only
natural for policymakers to conceptualize the object of
policy in a manner that affords some hope of policy success,
this can pull us off target analytically.
Fifth, we have tended to accept the popular notion that
“globalization”—i.e., increased trade, the spread of
technology, and the movement of ideas and people across
national frontiers—would create prosperity and a sense of
common interest that would ameliorate international
tensions and hostile confrontation. This principle did not
work in 1914 despite active trade between Britain and
Germany and the German fondness for Shakespeare. It
seems particularly unsound to expect it to work in the
Korean case. Sixth, a serious appreciation of the North
Korean political culture and regime intentions would tend
to throw cold water on some of the hopeful expectations
prevailing in Seoul and Washington.
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Nonproliferation Policy Education Center’s
(NPEC’s) Questions Considered.
1. What is the abiding context of U.S. strategy that any
current strategy must comport with, and what major
assumptions underlie and thus condition our strategic
thinking about the future?
• North Korea expects the United States will remain the
global superpower in the near to mid term.
• North Korea’s force dispositions indicate its top
leadership does not expect the United States to launch a
preemptive attack on the North.
• North Korea’s leadership does expect the United
States to defend the ROK if North Korea attacks, and
entertains the possibility that the United States will use
nuclear weapons if needed.
• U.S. aversion to high casualties appears to be
considered a vulnerability to be exploited.
• North Korea probably believes the United States must
protect Taiwan but will try to influence the China-Taiwan
rivalry so as to avoid war with China.

2. What is the evolving nature of the global strategic
environment? What alternative futures are possible over
the next 15-20 years? North Korea will see the following
trends:
• Pressure for the reduction and, eventually,
withdrawal of USFK will increase in both the United States
and the ROK.
• U.S. and western influence in Asia will weaken due to
a lack of resolve and an increase in the military strength of
China and other Asian states.
• Development of WMD and long-range missiles in Asia
is the critical factor for change in the strategic balance and
will continue.
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• Hi-tech terrorism will increase, as will U.S.
vulnerability.
• Development of information warfare will continue.
• Chinese support for North Korea could remain as at
present or weaken.
• Russia could push for a higher-profile role in the
Northwest Pacific in concert with China or independently.
• Japan could stay in partnership with the United
States or could take a more independent path.
• Japan could become a nuclear power.
• War between China and the United States over
Taiwan is possible and could be exploited by North Korea.
• Significant improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations is
possible.
• Improvement in ROK-Chinese relations is possible.
• ROK economic superiority over North Korea is
increasing.
• North Korea is becoming increasingly dependent on
outside (U.S. and ROK) assistance.
• Korea could be united under either North Korea or
ROK control.
• Attack could become the only viable option for North
Korea under the Kim regime.
• The KFR could collapse.

3. Which alternatives do we prefer? Which do we wish to
avoid?
• North Korea’s leaders believe the United States will
try to maintain and increase its influence in Northeast Asia.
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• They believe the United States prefers the status quo
on the peninsula, but will opt for ROK control of all of Korea
if this can be realized at an acceptable cost.
• North Korea prefers a U.S. withdrawal from the
region.
• North Korea prefers to gain control of all of Korea
through a ROK collapse or war.
• North Korea prefers hostile relations between China
and the United States
• North Korea prefers hostile U.S.-Russian relations.
• North Korea prefers a breakup of the hostile
combination of the United States, the ROK, and Japan.
• North Korea prefers hostile relations between Japan
and China.
• North Korea prefers worsening ROK relations with
the three major regional powers and breakup of the
ROK-U.S. alliance.
• North Korea (specifically, the KFR) must avoid any
circumstance, or combination of circumstances, which could
lead to loss of internal control and eventual ROK
domination of the peninsula.

4. Who are our current and likely future competitors?
Who are key third parties?
• North Korea sees the United States, the ROK, and
Japan as its competitors.
• China remains the key third party.

… China shares the American interest in preventing
proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles on the
peninsula, fearing that if unchecked it could lead to
nuclear weapons development in Japan and Theater
Missile Defense (TMD).
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… China no longer endorses North Korea’s ideological
claim to the entire peninsula.
… China sees the ROK as an important trading partner
and investor.
… China sees hostilities on the peninsula as damaging to
its economy.
… But China prefers to keep a friendly buffer state on its
border and sees a unified Korea allied with the United
States as a potential threat.
… China is uncomfortable with U.S. “hegemony” in the
world and the Pacific region, but China is by no means
unmindful of the advantages of stable relations with
the United States.
… China probably expects the KFR to collapse at some
point due to the mistakes of North Korea’s leaders,
but prefers that this occur later rather than sooner.
• With regard to North Korea-China relations, the
question that has preoccupied many is whether Beijing can
induce Pyongyang to follow the Chinese model of opening
up. There has been increased speculation on this question in
view of Kim Jong Il’s favorable comments on the Chinese
model during his recent trip to Beijing. While Chinese
support for North Korea appears unconditional, key
Chinese officials have been saying for some time that
outside observers tend to overestimate Chinese knowledge
of, and ability to influence, actual conditions in the North. In
any case, the following considerations appear relevant.

… North Korea is not a huge country with centuries of
experience in managing conflict and disparity.
… Unlike China, North Korea does not have a large
agrarian base which can be exploited to power the
recovery of its industrial sector.
… We have seen no sign in Pyongyang of the kind of
policy debate that preceded policy change in China.
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… Kim Jong Il has long known that the North Korean
economy doesn’t work. If he has not tried to change it,
we can reasonably presume it’s because he is aware of
the concomitant political dangers.31
… Unlike the Communist regimes in power in China and
Vietnam, Kim Jong Il and his comrades have yet to
win their war of national unification and do not have
the same margin for experiment. Pyongyang faces a
much greater threat from Seoul than Beijing faces
from Taipei.
• Russia is also a key third party and could become a
significant supporter of North Korea, but this seems less
likely than for China. The following generalizations appear
safe.

… Russia values its economic relationship with the
ROK.
… Russia is unhappy with the United States as sole
superpower and would like to find a way to assert
itself in the Pacific region.
… But Russia faces westward and, unlike China, sees
the Korean peninsula as thousands of miles from its
vital centers of power.
• North Korea sees Russia, and even China, largely as
lost allies. China, however, is an important source of
economic help, and both are occasional suppliers of
weapons. Pyongyang would not expect military support
from either except in the case of hostilities between China
and the United States over Taiwan.
• Russian President Putin’s recent visit to Pyongyang in
mid-July 2000 after talks with Chinese President Jiang
Zemin in Beijing appears to be part of an effort to recover
Russian influence and counter U.S. dominance in the
region. Russia was seen as a marginal player in the region
when the peninsula reemerged as a major issue in
Northeast Asia. Moscow was completely excluded in
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negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear development and the
four-way talks on the peninsula. The 11-point communiqué
issued by Putin and Kim Jong Il at the end of their talks on
July 20 appealed to the international community to oppose
the U.S. plan to build an anti-missile system.
If this appeal is to succeed, however, Putin needs to find
a way to resolve the problem of North Korea’s missile
development program. According to Russian news media,
Kim Jong Il told Putin that North Korea will stop its missile
development program if other nations provide the North
with rocket boosters for space exploration.32 However, U.S.
Defense Secretary William Cohen has expressed doubt that
North Korea would abandon its ballistic missile projects in
return for access to a third country’s rocket programs for
“space research” purposes. Cohen and Pentagon officials
point out that during U.S.-North Korea talks in Kuala
Lumpur in July 2000, Pyongyang’s negotiators reiterated
the North’s intention to develop long-range ballistic
missiles. “Our missile policy is to develop, to produce, and to
deploy powerful missiles continuously,” Pyongyang’s top
negotiator said, according to Cohen.33
5. What are our competitors’ and key third parties’ goals
and their strategies for achieving them?
• The primary goal of North Korea (specifically, the
KFR) is survival, i.e., to avoid loss of control over the piece of
territory that has been theirs for more than a half century.
For the time being, this can be interpreted as maintenance
of the status quo, but for reasons already explained, it is
unlikely this can be a long-term solution if it is de-coupled
from total peninsular dominance. Without control of the
whole peninsula, North Korea will become increasingly
dependent on the ROK with increased risk of falling under
Southern control. To stay alive in the near term, North
Korea will selectively engage with the outside world,
reaching out to the European Union and keeping the China
connection healthy, as well as selectively engaging the
United States and the ROK. This has little to do with
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opening up North Korea itself but a lot to do with obtaining
assistance, allowing selective activity in the North by ROK
business groups, and demonstrating to all that Pyongyang
has multiple options. For a long-term solution, however, as
explained earlier, North Korea must find a way to obtain
USFK withdrawal and bring the South under its control.
• The Pyongyang regime has identified the ROK
Sunshine policy, or engagement, as a means of inducing
change in the North. In this respect the policy is seen as a
threat, but the economic inducements that come with the
policy are an important part of the regime’s aid-based
survival strategy. Pyongyang will continue to exploit the
policy for its economic benefits while resisting the kind of
change which could undermine the regime.

6. What is the current state of the competition? What
future states are possible, and which do we prefer?
• At present, there is no apparent internal threat to the
survival of the KFR. No immediate threat appears likely as
long as the regime remains willing to triage the population,
as long as substantial donations from the outside continue,
and as long as Kim Jong Il remains in control of multiple
counterintelligence agencies, whose combined capabilities
amount to a world-class internal security posture.34
• Currently, the North appears to be succeeding in its
efforts to improve its conventional and unconventional
military capabilities. In the last 12 months, North Korea
has done more to arrest a decline in readiness and improve
its conventional military capability than in the last 5 years
combined.35 Ground and air exercises last winter were the
largest in over a decade, and forward deployment has
reached an unprecedented level. The North’s special
operations forces, largest in the world, number over 100,000
and are significant force multipliers, providing the
capability to simultaneously attack both forward and rear
CFC forces. Despite the Agreed Framework and efforts to
engage the North in missile talks, North Korea’s
asymmetric threat is formidable and growing. They
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continue to produce and deploy long-range Nodong missiles
capable of striking bases in Japan. They are also developing
multi-stage missiles with the goal of fielding systems
capable of striking the continental United States. They have
tested the 2,000-kilometer-range Taepodong-1 and
continue working on the 5,000-kilometer-plus Taepodong-2.
North Korea possesses a large number of chemical weapons
that pose a threat to both our military forces and civilian
population centers.
The USFK J2 estimates that the North is self-sufficient
in the production of chemical components for first
generation chemical agents. They have produced stockpiles
estimated at up to 5,000 metric tons of several types of
agents, including nerve, choking, blister, and blood. North
Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and weaponize
biological agents, to include bacterial spores causing
anthrax and smallpox and bacteria-causing plague and
cholera.36 While North Korea has frozen its nuclear
weapons program at the Yongbyon plant, and activity at a
suspicious facility at Kumchang-ni has been forestalled,
nuclear weapons development could well be continuing
without our knowledge at underground facilities elsewhere.
• Pyongyang continues an unrelenting propaganda
campaign against USFK’s presence conducted overtly
through official North Korea news media and somewhat
covertly through unofficial spokesmen, who push the
North’s agenda.
• While it is the official policy of the alliance that USFK
will remain in status quo, the North can be said to have
made headway in a several respects.

… Frictions between USFK and the host society have
increased dramatically due to allegations of a
massacre of civilians by U.S. troops at Nogun-ni in
1950, an accident at the bombing range near
Maehyang-ni this year, and continuing arguments
over the fairness of the Status of Forces Agreement.
While it can hardly be said that USFK is blameless in
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all things, it is nevertheless true that these issues are
made to order for North Korean exploitation, as
Pyongyang’s objectives blend with the nationalistic
emotions of young journalists (who have no recall of
the Korean War) and the natural inclination of the
news media to compete for consumer attention.
… The idea of removing the “Cold War structure” on the
peninsula has become a popular cliché in the ROK.
North Korean spokesmen are very clear about what
this means. Removing the “Cold War structure”
means getting USFK off the peninsula.37 Others who
talk about ending the Cold War structure are often
vague about what they mean, but the formulation
seems to carry the connotation that hostility between
North and South was caused by the Cold War and that
if foreign influence could be removed, reconciliation
would somehow follow. From the historical viewpoint,
this is an odd argument to make since the ROK
actually owes its existence to the Cold War.38
… The notion is gaining ground in some circles that the
“buyout” of North Korea’s WMD must extend beyond
the economic dimension into the security dimension,
i.e., that if we expect the North to reduce its threat to
the South, we must take action to reduce the threat we
pose to North Korea.39
• How China and Japan will react should it become clear
that North Korea has both nuclear weapons and the means
of delivering them is problematic. Of the current principal
players in the Korean scenario only China can be confident
that North Korean missiles will not target them. For
obvious reasons, China would prefer that the North not
have these capabilities, but there are as yet no indications
that China would exert the kind of pressure sufficient to
actually prevent their development. Japan, on the other
hand, can expect to be targeted. Pyongyang clearly wants to
find a way to neutralize United Nations Command (UNC)
bases and staging areas in Japan. Defector Hwang Chang
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Yop has said the North is planning to “scorch Japan” as a
means of doing this. How Japan will react to the threat of
being scorched or to actually being scorched remains to be
seen. It may be argued that Japan will be cowed initially but
then respond by building its own Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) or deterrent capabilities. Either way, to be subjected
to blackmail by Pyongyang will be a new and traumatic
experience for the Japanese, and it is difficult to believe they
will be content to remain helpless in the face of such a
threat.
• The foregoing trends would seem to indicate that, for
the moment, North Korea is gaining ground in the
competition, as they have been able to extract increased
amounts of assistance from outside while improving both
their conventional and asymmetric military capabilities
and carrying on their public relations campaign against
USFK. While these trends seem to indicate that, absent
KFR collapse, North Korea will be an even more menacing
opponent a few years hence, they do not point the way to
escape from the KFR’s long-term strategic dilemma. From
Pyongyang’s point of view, there are still questions that do
not have easy answers. How long can effective population
control be maintained in the absence of economic recovery?
Will economic recovery actually ease the problem of
population control or will it only create new difficulties? Can
Pyongyang continue to extract donations should it become
clear that donations have not been an effective means of
curbing weapons development or ameliorating Pyongyang’s
hostility to Seoul?

7. What major problems, enduring weaknesses, and
other constraints face our competitor(s)? What are their
strengths?
• It will be difficult for North Korea to maintain military
opacity in the face of combined U.S.-ROK-Japanese
intelligence capabilities. These combined capabilities
cannot ferret out everything, but they can divine enough to
enable conclusions on three key questions: whether
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Pyongyang’s hostility to Seoul has really eased, whether
North Korea deployments are basically offensive or
defensive, and whether North Korea is abandoning the
WMD option or pursuing it.40
• Similarly, the KFR will find it difficult to both
maintain and hide its hostile political posture towards
Seoul. The government in Seoul may, of course, elect to
ignore this and allow the general public to remain for the
most part undisturbed in their current threat denial mode.
• The KFR aid-based survival strategy means
continuing and very likely increasing dependence on
archenemies, the United States, the ROK, and Japan.
• Breakdown of the economy and official distribution
system engenders weakening of population control in
regard to movement, economic activity, lifestyle, morale,
and crime and corruption.
• The regime increasingly fears ideological
contamination through an influx of Christianity,
capitalism, and ROK and Chinese popular culture.
• The most enduring, fundamental, and perhaps
incurable weakness is that, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, North Korea cannot undertake the measures
necessary to revitalize its economy and reinvigorate its
society without instituting changes that would deny the
fundamental tenets of the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il system,
with consequences ultimately fatal to the regime. This basic
contradiction applies not only to the economy, but also to
modernizing the entire social mindset, and in consequence
North Korea under the KFR seems fated to remain
multi-dimensionally out of sync with the world at large. To
the extent this defect can be remedied for North Korea
objectively as a country, the regime will be increasingly
threatened. This weakness may not matter very much if
Kim Jong Il should decide on a military roll of the dice.
Otherwise it is hard to see how he can get rid of this
haunting specter.
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• KFR strengths are the opposite face of their
weaknesses. Information control and ideological
indoctrination have up to now enabled the KFR to keep the
population marching in the desired direction and, for the
most part, resigned to the deprivations imposed upon them.
The control systems in place negate political or factional
opposition and give the regime virtually total tactical
flexibility even as strategic and philosophical flexibility are
denied.41

Priority to the military option, almost to the point that
there is no other option, has enabled the regime to maintain
and improve its impressive military posture. Ironically, this
very contradiction works to the advantage of the KFR in two
respects. First, it is the worrisome imbalance between the
North’s economic failure and menacing military posture
which motivates donations from the outside world out of
fear of the “cornered rat” scenario. Second, in spite of this, it
is difficult for many to believe that a country with a ruined
economy can still field a threatening military force. Hence
the contradiction that the North’s military capabilities are
at once feared and underestimated.
8. In any and all cases, what are our time-phased goals
for the competition—both overall and supporting?
• Pyongyang describes our goals as establishing and
maintaining world and regional hegemony and stifling the
socialist way of life in the North. The overall KFR goal is still
to dominate the entire peninsula, as that is the only way to
secure the future of the regime. KFR supporting goals will
be, first, to negate U.S. goals, primarily by keeping their
economy afloat by using their WMD/missile threat to
extract assistance from the outside world. Second, they will
try to force USFK off the peninsula by threatening UNC
bases in Japan and by turning ROK public opinion against
USFK and effectively splitting the alliance.

9. What are our areas of advantage or leverage,
including our enduring strengths relative to the
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challenge(s) that competition poses? What are our
limitations or weaknesses?
• Pyongyang sees the United States as having the
following advantages:

… Rapid force projection capabilities
… Air and sea dominance
… Superior intelligence and battlefield surveillance
… Nuclear weapons
• Pyongyang will also see weaknesses, which in some
cases are the opposite face of our strengths. As the only
superpower, the United States has unrivaled capabilities,
but also unrivaled obligations. Pyongyang will watch for
signs the United States is stretched too thin, too heavily
engaged elsewhere, or politically fatigued and growing
weary of its burdens. Knowing our aversion to casualties,
the North will launch operations designed to maximize U.S.
losses at the outset of hostilities. Pyongyang believes ROK
and U.S. personnel will not be able to match the fighting
spirit of their own Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers.
• Pyongyang sees the ROK as having the following
advantages:

… Vastly superior economic strength
… A larger and healthier population
… A superpower ally
• Pyongyang will also see weaknesses

… A fragile, above-ground infrastructure vulnerable to
artillery and missile attack
… A weak and fractious body politic lacking consensus
on national security issues
… Ideological confusion
… Vulnerability to chemical and biological warfare
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The KFR will see their own advantages as
spiritual—absolute loyalty to the leader, unity, discipline,
and ideological firmness—and material, with a strong
military, both conventional and unconventional, featuring
mass, shock, and relatively unsophisticated but reliable
weapon systems.
10. What basic capacities or core competencies do we
need to develop, sustain, adapt, protect, and plan to exploit?
• North Korea needs to sustain, protect, and continue to
leverage:

… Conventional and unconventional military strength
… WMD and long-range missiles
… Information control, including controls on
permissiveness and liberalism, and maintaining a
firewall against contamination in the form of
Christianity, capitalist ideas, and ROK popular
culture
• For any serious effort to undertake economic reform
and engagement with the international economy, North
Korea will need to develop:

… Understanding of how the capitalist market system
works
… Entrepreneurial skills
… A credible legal infrastructure
… A stable foreign exchange
… Financial and banking expertise
… An internal information system and access to the
Internet
Achieving these capacities will be both difficult and
politically hazardous, as they will open the system to
contamination and entail a measure of autonomy that
conflicts with the KFR political culture.
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• The ROK needs to develop:

… More ground power
… Better protection against chemical and biological
agents
… A better grasp of the nature of the KFR and its
intentions toward the ROK
… A more realistic educational approach to Korean
history in the 20th century
… More attention to alliance management and the need
to defend both the alliance and the ROK democratic
system against internal enemies
… More basic science and research and development
… Corporate and banking reform
11. What strategies can we employ that will permit us to
influence—or even dominate—key competitions and future
trends and events? How will the KFR react to strategies
designed to move it in a direction which would seem to run
counter to the core values of the regime?
• The answer to this question is far from simple;
perceptions of the right answer will vary depending on
whether one advocates an aggressive policy or a
concessionary or engagement policy toward North Korea’s
WMD and the KFR itself. If one believes that concessions in
the form of economic assistance and diplomatic recognition
will induce the KFR to mitigate its hostility to the ROK,
undertake reform and opening, and abandon its reliance on
WMD and conventional military strength, it would be a
reasonable strategy to sustain the regime in such a manner
as to render it increasingly dependent on assistance from
the United States and key third parties, ultimately giving
the United States sufficient leverage to dominate the
relationship.
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If, on the other hand, one believes that such a policy will
not induce the regime to abandon either its hostility or its
menacing array of conventional and asymmetric weapons,
the case for economic engagement is much weaker. In such a
case, one could still argue for engagement, but the
argument would focus more on the aim of preventing war
than on any expectation of dominating the relationship. If
one believes that no amount of economic assistance or
engagement will cause the KFR to abandon its zero-sum
view of the North-South confrontation or to abandon its
priority to the military, to include WMD, the residual
argument for engagement would be that it will in time
contaminate, subvert, and destroy the KFR.
While the current ROK administration describes its
policy toward the North as the “separation of economics and
politics,” it is interesting that, as Nicholas Eberstadt has
pointed out, South Korean and Western proponents of
increased commercial ties between the South and the North
argue that the process will have an ameliorating effect on
Pyongyang’s internal decisionmaking, bringing about a
kind of rapprochement through trade along the lines of
West Germany’s policy of change during rapprochement.42
Eberstadt goes on to provide experiential evidence that,
contrary to common belief, commercial ties with, and even
subsidies from, capitalist countries have done little to
moderate the national security policies of Communist
regimes. The point in any case is that ROK policy is not the
separation of economics and politics, but the pursuit of a
political goal through economic means. This is all the more
apparent when one considers President Kim Dae Jung’s
repeated statements about the need for a USFK presence
even after unification.43
The argument for a more aggressive policy toward the
KFR and its WMD is based on the expectation that
engagement will neither induce the regime to alter course
nor cause it to collapse, but will rather sustain the regime
even as it continues to prioritize its military and improve its
WMD while continuing to inflict the pain of economic failure
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on its population. It is argued that the regime would fail if
the following sources of sustenance could be interdicted:
• Aid from the United States
• Aid from ROK conglomerates
• Cash inflow from Chosen Soren (an association of
pro-North Korean residents in Japan)
• Remittances from Koreans in the United States and
Canada with relatives in North Korea
• Aid from China
• Proceeds from foreign arms sales

Proponents of such a policy also urge the desirability of a
more robust military posture in and around Korea to insure
that Pyongyang will not see a military option as attractive
even as all its other options are running out. With regard to
all of the above, policymakers and advisors will have to ask
themselves whether their policy recommendations stem
from their analysis of the KFR and its likely reactions or vice
versa.
For further discussion of Pyongyang’s likely courses of
action and intention to dominate by missiles and WMD, see
question 12 and the following section.
12. What is the likely range of competitor and third party
countermoves? How might Pyongyang respond?
• Consideration of the track record of the KFR and its
political culture strongly suggests that no amount of
economic cooperation or outright assistance will induce the
regime to abandon the core of its belief system. To endorse
the rational options and mitigate its hostility to authorities
in the South would require North Korea’s leaders to
abandon what amounts to a national mission and to unsay
all they have been saying for more than half a century to
justify their own authority, justify the damage they have
inflicted on the South, and justify the sacrifices they have
imposed upon their own population. As all of this would
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have fatal consequences for the internal viability of their
system, it appears likely they will shun this course of action.
• We lack the kind of data necessary to predict how the
KFR would react should the United States and its allies
attempt a full-court press to interdict the flow of sustenance
from outside. Some predict this would prompt a North
Korean attack. Some predict Pyongyang would resort to
naked blackmail. Some predict increasing loss of population
control leading to cracks in the power structure and an end
of the regime. No one can be sure.
• An aggressive policy by the United States would not
appear feasible without the cooperation of key third parties.
It would require an end to the ROK engagement or sunshine
policy and cooperation from Japan and perhaps from China
as well. Based on what is now known, China would likely try
to make up for North Korean shortfalls due to loss of outside
help, but if the KFR should begin to lose its grip, it is
uncertain whether Beijing could accurately assess
Pyongyang’s needs and respond quickly enough to arrest
loss of control.

The USFK Role and Pyongyang’s Asymmetric
Counter.
From time to time Pyongyang accuses the United States
of trying to stifle the North. While this may not accurately
reflect U.S. intentions, it does reflect the criticality of the
USFK role. If, as we have earlier argued, the only way the
KFR can avoid being on the losing side of a zero-sum
survival struggle is to gain control of the entire peninsula,
and if the only conceivable way they can do that is by force or
the threat of force, then USFK sits squarely astride their
road to survival. One way or another, virtually every
apologist for Pyongyang must sooner or later confront this
obstacle. This is what Kim Il Sung meant by “independent”
unification in 1972. In his November 9, 1999, NAPSNET
piece for the Nautilus Policy Forum, Hwal-Woong Lee, a
ROK Foreign Service officer from 1956 to 1971 and more
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recently a fellow at Korea-2000, a Los Angeles-based
research council on Korean unification, argues that the
Perry Report fails to recognize the long confrontation
between the United States and North Korea, going back to
1953, when the United States fought a war with North
Korea with the intent to obliterate it, and that the North’s
WMD programs are the inevitable result of North Korea’s
need to defend itself against USFK. Lee says Pyongyang
cannot renounce its WMD programs with USFK in the
South pointing guns at them. He argues that if the United
States is serious about peace, it should recognize USFK as a
threat to North Korea and eliminate the threat by
consenting to a phased withdrawal in return for a total
renunciation of WMD programs by Pyongyang. He proposes
“a political arrangement for arms reductions and
non-aggression pledges by the parties concerned.” He does
not spell out the implications of his recommendations for
ROK national security.44
In his November 1999 interview with Mal,45 Pak Yong
Su, Vice Director of the Secretariat of the North’s
Committee for the Unification of the Fatherland, recalled
that in February 1999 Pyongyang suggested high-level
North-South talks based on three conditions: ending
cooperation with foreign powers for anti-North Korean
activities, abolishing the National Security Law, and
guaranteeing the unification movement. These are, of
course, very close to the July 4, 1972, principles, and in both
cases, the first point implies the end of USFK. Pak goes on to
say, “We have no choice but to settle with the United States
the matter of signing a peace treaty and the matter of USFK
withdrawal.” Pak comments only indirectly about the
future of the ROK, observing that a “peace that does not
result in unification is impossible.”
In contrast, the North’s leader, Kim Jong Il, speaks
bluntly and clearly about the South. An article in the
October 8, 1999, Nodong Sinmun46 quotes the “great leader”
as saying,
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If the United States had not occupied South Korea by force, our
nation would never have been divided into two. And if the
United States had not disturbed Korea’s unification, we would
have achieved national unification a long time ago.

The article goes on to explain that the South is a
complete U.S. colony and that the incumbent puppet ruling
group, which put on the veil of the “people,” is nothing but a
group of servants for the imperialists. Therefore, the writer
argues,
As long as the enemy of unification, such as the puppet ruling
bunch, remains in power, the independent unification of our
country cannot be expected. This is one of the reasons the
United States troops that occupied South Korea by force and the
colonial fascist “regime,” which follows them, are cancers that
block our people’s independent unification.

Some find it comforting to regard all this as nothing but
propaganda rhetoric. We would suggest that the familiar
refrain, as above, about the colonial status of the ROK and
the need for USFK withdrawal has been Pyongyang’s
consistent position for a half century. It is unalterable
doctrine, well grounded in reality in that the only end-state
peninsular condition which would be safe for the Kim
regime is unification under the regime itself. Such
unification is indeed blocked by USFK’s presence, as it
defies the imagination how such an end-state could be
achieved except by force or intimidation.
Perhaps the most straightforward presentation of
Pyongyang’s perception of North Korean-U.S. relations and
of the regime’s vision of the relationship of missiles and
WMD to the future of the peninsula can be found in Kim
Myong Chol’s October 22, 1999, Nautilus Policy Forum
piece titled “U.S. Will End Up in Shotgun Marriage with
North Korea.”47 Kim argues that to improve relations with
North Korea, the United States must abandon its
long-standing support for the ROK, maintaining that the
only alternatives are a nuclear arms race or a nuclear war.
He notes that with 12 operating nuclear reactors in the
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ROK, 51 in Japan, and 102 in the United States singled out
as prime targets, it would take the North’s hypothesized
nuclear missile force only a few minutes to wipe the whole of
South Korea and the entire Japanese archipelago off the
world map.
Kim argues that the U.S. demand for renunciation of
missile programs lacks justification and comes too late, as
North Korea has already become a virtual intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) power with a small fleet of missiles
locked on American targets. He observes that American
authorities will have to realize there is no way of evacuating
tens of millions of people from Washington, New York,
Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego before
incoming North Korean ICBMs strike.
Having outlined the dire consequences of war, Kim
argues that American military intervention in the internal
affairs of Korea caused the “Cold War structure” in that part
of East Asia. He says the United States must see to it that its
“Cold War syndromes” are ended, and that means
dismantling the puppet regime in the South and abrogating
all its “anti-Korean laws,” including the National Security
Law. Lest any should miss his meaning, Kim Myong Chol is
absolutely explicit about the fate of the ROK.
It is now time that the ROK prepared itself to leave the stage of
history, as its architect and parent, the United States, is
taking a series of steps to move toward eventual normalization
with the DPRK to end the Cold War. The ROK totally lacks
any Korean national credentials and legitimacy, which the
DPRK alone enjoys as it was founded by anti-Japanese armed
partisans.

He closes with a statement in consonance with that of Kim
Jong Il above and indicative of the North Korean regime’s
core doctrine:
Whichever started the Korean War, had the American forces
not been fully involved, the Korean People’s Army might have
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emancipated the whole of South Korea and achieved territorial
unification with minimum bloodshed.

Kim Myong Chol undoubtedly exaggerates the North
Korea’s current capabilities, but, like defector Hwang
Chang Yop, he has long served the regime and doubtless
knows its mindset. He probably reflects accurately the Kim
regime’s perception of ends and means and the way
Pyongyang’s WMD and missile programs relate to their
desired end-state for the peninsula. He clarifies what
Pyongyang means by the end of the “Cold War structure” on
the peninsula, and this may be no small service in view of
the prevailing tendency to use this term carelessly. Finally,
he reminds us that the North Korea’s notion of legitimacy is
grounded in the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle of the
1930s and 1940s. This idea not only justifies the 1950
invasion, it also defines the identity of the leaders of the
“guerrilla dynasty.” To them, “One Korea” has always
meant their Korea, with the KFR themselves in charge.
Kim Myong Chol’s threatening argument is couched in
the context of nuclear weapons. It might be comforting if
this were all there were to worry about, since fear of an
overwhelming U.S. response might be expected to deter use
of such weapons. But as Richard Betts, Director of National
Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations,
explains, the new and most troublesome threat of mass
destruction would appear to be biological weapons, with
nuclear weapons second, and chemicals a distant third.
Betts makes three points about the new world of mass
destruction. First, such weapons will not represent the
technological frontier of warfare but will increasingly be the
weapons of the weak, of states that cannot compete with
U.S. conventional superiority. Second, the kind of
deterrence and arms control that marked the Cold War are
not likely to be effective. Third, responses that might most
effectively cope with the new threats are not likely to find a
warm welcome. In particular, the response that should have
highest priority, a serious civil defense program, is one that
is apt to be ignored, opposed, or ridiculed, especially as it
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tends to reduce popular confidence in government
reassurances about national security and could have an
undesirable economic impact as well.
The most troubling conclusion for American foreign
policy as a whole, however, is that to reduce the danger of
attacks against the United States it might be necessary to
pull back from involvement in some foreign conflicts, as
American activism to maintain stability provides the prime
motive for such attacks.48 Jane’s Intelligence Review notes
that experience in World War II and the Iran-Iraq War
demonstrates that the political and psychological impact of
surface-to-surface missile attacks far outweigh the physical
destruction caused, observing that,
The subtlety behind a missile’s ability to exert terror is
twofold: firstly, the suddenness or short warning time of an
attack presents a sense of helplessness among civilians . . . and
secondly, the anxiety from the ambiguity surrounding the
type of missile warhead being delivered.49

The threat that biological weapons pose is, of course, in
no way mitigated by widespread reluctance to even
contemplate their effect or by ignorance. As one expert
observes:
One of the side effects of the closing of the American
bio-weapons program was that the United States lost its
technical understanding of biological weapons. There has long
been a general feeling among American scientists—it’s hard to
say how widespread it is—that biological weapons don’t work.
They are said to be uncontrollable, liable to infect their users
or unworkable in any practical sense. . . . The current
generation of American molecular biologists has been spared
the agony of having created weapons of mass destruction, but,
since these biologists haven’t built them, or tested them, they
don’t know much about their real performance
characteristics.50
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The June 2000 North-South Summit.
The big question about the mid-June summit is the
question we have always had about North Korea at each
critical juncture: Is North Korea really changing, or will we
get the same old wine in a new bottle? Only time will tell, but
in view of Pyongyang’s record and in the absence of
compelling evidence, prudence would dictate that our
expectations should be kept low. What seems evident
already, however, is that the summit contributes to both
diminished threat perception and devaluation of USFK,
and encourages a set of trends that are developing to
Pyongyang’s advantage.
While we do not know for sure why Kim Jong Il agreed to
a summit meeting with President Kim Dae Chung,
available evidence suggests three principal factors: (1) his
increased confidence that his aid-based survival strategy
will work, at least in the near term, (2) his perception that
he needed assistance badly and that he could get more, and
get it faster, from the ROK than from any other source, and
(3) his perception that in the Kim Dae Chung
administration he would have a compliant partner in that
President Kim had already talked about revising the
National Security Law, a possible change in the status of
USFK, and reunification based on a confederal system, and
had referred to Kim Jong Il himself as a person with “a
considerable degree of judgment, ability, and knowledge as
a leader.”51
In short, Kim Jong Il may have concluded that forces
sympathetic to Communism and to collaboration with
North Korea were gaining ground in the South and that
Kim Jong Il was in a position to give them powerful
assistance. In any case, the June summit meeting in
Pyongyang has added a new dimension to the competition
and reinforced some of the trends already identified. In the
formal sense, the summit represents a forward step in that,
unlike earlier North-South accords in 1972 and 1991, the
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leaders of the ROK and North Korea in their official
capacities signed the June agreement.
What is striking about the earlier agreements, however,
is that a reading of each might cause one to wonder why any
subsequent agreement covering essentially the same
ground should be necessary. This illuminates one
worrisome aspect of the recent summit. It is, after all, like
past accords, only an agreement in principle, committing
each side to little in the way of specifics. One suspects that it
may ultimately fit the pattern of earlier agreements, when
the first stage was agreement on a set of principles without
specific commitments, the second was disagreement over
correct interpretation of the principles, and the third was
the breakup of the dialogue amid mutual recriminations
and Pyongyang’s accusations that the ROK had betrayed
the spirit of the agreement.
Whether the present case will be an exception due to the
North’s economic plight remains to be seen. The North’s
need for assistance would appear to be an important new
factor, but it is as yet uncertain whether Kim Jong Il is only
after a quick kill prior to anticipated political changes in the
United States and the ROK or whether he is prepared to
manage over an extended period the balance between the
need to obtain outside assistance and the need to maintain
regime integrity.52
In any case, ROK reaction to the summit has been even
more euphoric and unrealistic than the reaction to the
widely hailed “breakthroughs” in 1972 and 1991. In spite of
repeated cautionary statements by President Kim Dae
Chung,53 many have simply taken the summit as portrayed
in the news media at face value, and assume that the North
and the South are finally on the path to better relations and,
ultimately, peaceful unification. This serves to solidify a
kind of threat denial mindset already increasingly apparent
in the ROK over the past decade.
Uninformed about North Korea’s impressive military
exercises this year, many Southerners wrongly assume that
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economic failure has enfeebled the North’s military to the
point that it can no longer pose a threat to the South. Many
see the “threat” as little more than a concoction of previous
authoritarian regimes. Few are ready to seriously
contemplate the horrendous possibility of another war on
the peninsula. Most Koreans have no memory of, and little
education about, the U.S. role in the Pacific War or the
Korean War and tend to see U.S. forces more in terms of
criminal jurisdiction and land issues. Finally, the
pro-Pyongyang element in the ROK is much better
organized and more effective than most South Koreans
realize. This relates especially to ongoing agitation against
USFK and to attacks on “conservatives” who take a cautious
view of North-South reconciliation and advocate retention
of USFK.54 At this point few Koreans appear to grasp that
the anti-USFK campaign is but the early stage of a broader
campaign that will ultimately be anti-ROK.
Even if there were some uncertainty about Kim Jong Il’s
intentions, his gains from the summit are readily apparent:
(1) Increased economic assistance. How much President
Kim Dae Chung may have led Kim Jong Il to expect is
unknown, but according to the Ministry of Unification on
July 6, 2000, ROK economic aid in the first half of the year
was valued at $67.2 million, up 48 percent from the same
period last year; 85 percent of this total was government aid,
including 200,000 tons of fertilizer in the April-June period,
with another 100,000-ton shipment announced on July 26.
(2) Rehabilitation of Kim Jong Il’s personal image, as he
became an overnight news media star in the ROK.
(3) Increasing calls for reduction or withdrawal of USFK.
The campaign against USFK relates to demands for
revision of the United States-ROK Status of Forces
Agreement and to mounting sensitivity to various frictions
between the command and the host society, to include crime
and environmental issues. It is also an issue that tends to
fuse motives and interest groups, i.e., the desire to sell
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newspapers and TV footage, the nationalistic passions of
younger journalists, the prejudices of a xenophobic society
with historical reasons for fear and suspicion of foreign
influence, and the anti-USFK, anti-ROK objectives of
leftists and pro-Pyongyang activists.
Kim Jong Il seems for the moment to have altered his
tactical approach to the problem of USFK. In an interview
on June 30, 2000, with a U.S. based journalist, Kim Jong Il
observed that,
We have been telling the USFK to get out all this time, but . . .
the United States must first change its own thinking. . . . The
United States must itself figure out the USFK problem and
make a bold decision that should substantially assist the
unification of the Korean people.

As Seoul’s Sogang University Professor Yi Sang U has
pointed out, this remark should be seen in the context of an
anti-USFK movement in the ROK that has already acquired
significant momentum. By restraining his rhetoric, Kim
Jong Il, in effect, defends this movement against the charge
that it serves Pyongyang’s cause. Rather than trying to
pressure USFK out, he seeks to let the playing field tilt so
that USFK may simply fall off.55
(4) Increasing ideological ferment and partisan strife in
the ROK. While North Korean news media have stopped
their attacks on the ROK government, they have continued
harsh attacks against what they call “anti-unification”
elements in the South, especially former President Kim
Yong Sam, opposition Grand National Party head Yi Hoe
Chang, and the Choson Ilbo, which appear aimed at taming
conservative forces in the South. These attacks have
sparked tense political disputes in the ROK, with the
opposition accusing the Kim Dae Chung administration of
being overly meek in response to Pyongyang’s attacks.56
Conservatives also complain that in the rush toward
engagement with the North, the accomplishments of an
anti-Communist ROK over the past half century are now
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being cavalierly dismissed even as progressives argue that
preoccupation with what they call “Cold War” divisions will
impede North-South reconciliation. While the charge by one
opposition legislator that there are pro-North Korean
figures in the Blue House may not represent a consensus
even among conservatives at this point, conservatives are
increasingly voicing suspicion that important information
about North Korea and North-South relations is being
withheld and that protecting the security of the ROK may
not be getting its rightful priority. As all sides see these
issues closely bound up with the critical question of who
controls the country after the 2002 ROK presidential
election, the ferment and strife are not likely to subside.
The Policy Dilemmas.
For a realistic hope of fundamental policy change in
Pyongyang it would seem that one must have either a plan
to induce change in the KFR, which seems rather close to a
political mission impossible, or a plan to force the KFR off
stage, which doesn’t look very easy either. Failing either of
these, it would seem that we must take down the
expectation of change as the central case for policymaking.
Whatever inducements we may provide, the reality is that
when we talk about fundamental change in North Korea,
i.e., reform and opening on a significant scale, we are talking
about undermining the regime. We don’t always seem to
understand this, but Kim Jong Il does.57
Since the nuclear issue emerged, we have tried by a
number of means, such as the Agreed Framework, KEDO,58
food aid, the four-party talks, missile talks, and the offer of
normalized relations, to induce positive changes in North
Korea. Despite the freezing of activity at Yongbyon and very
limited North-South economic cooperation, it seems quite
clear that the KFR remains all too aware that opening and
reform will deal it a fatal blow. The reality seems to be that
(1) despite external aid, the KFR cannot fix the economy
without reform and cannot reform without undermining the
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system; (2) the KFR will not bargain away its asymmetric
advantages because they are fundamental to regime
survival; (3) as the problem is one of substance, it will not
likely be fixable by any new and imaginative structural
devices; and (4) the so-called rational choice or soft landing
idea is more of an evaporating hope than a viable policy.
The characteristics of what we may call the “post-soft
landing delusion” phase would seem to reveal Pyongyang’s
dilemma: (1) the more time passes, the more limited are the
KFR’s strategic options; (2) with reform and opening ruled
out, the regime has no choice but to seek aid from the ROK,
the United States, Japan, and Europe, but even if it can
tolerate dependence on its arch enemies in this manner, the
more aid it takes, the less it will be able to cope on its own
with its internal contradictions, so that preserving the
status quo in this manner does nothing to dispel the specter
of failure; and (3) in the meantime, the North’s asymmetric
weapons programs will continue.
The dilemma this poses for us is that while decisive
action to force the North to give up its WMD and missiles
could lead to increased risk of war, or at least the perception
of increased risk, inaction could mean that in a few years we
could face an equally hostile enemy with even more
menacing capabilities.
While it is arguable whether engagement provides the
right environment for ROK economic recovery and buys
time, the question is, time for whom and for what? If our
policy is to offer rewards to North Korea in the hope of
encouraging reform, abandonment of WMD, and
North-South reconciliation, it would seem to have no
prospect of success. There is nothing else wrong with it. It is
certainly morally well grounded, but there seems little
reason to believe that we can turn this tiger into a kitten by
stroking it.
If, on the other hand, the objective is to preserve the
status quo, the problem is that the status quo looks
inherently unstable, as it means (1) continuing KFR
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hostility to the ROK even if the North accepts Southern
assistance, (2) bigger and better missiles and more WMD,
(3) increasing North Korean dependence on outside aid, and
(4) the danger that aid could be suspended at any point due
to provocation by the North or due to a shift in the political
power balance in one or more of the donor countries. This, it
may be argued, is not movement toward resolution but
rather a process of raising the stakes all around the table.59
Both Seoul’s and Washington’s policies have been
attacked as grounded on unrealistic assumptions and as
superficial demonstrations of problem management rather
than actual problem solving. But one gets the impression
that even those who criticize do not really grasp the
difficulty of the problem—the depth, intensity, and
necessity of KFR hostility to the ROK. The problem is not
the inadequacy of the Agreed Framework or the failure of
the four-party talks and engagement. Whatever one thinks
of these devices, they are not the problem, but only
symptoms of the problem.
The conclusion is not necessarily that those who urge
diplomacy and engagement are wrong, and that those who
urge strangulation are right. The conclusion is more basic:
(1) that the regime in Pyongyang is locked on a course from
which it cannot deviate without serious risk of fracture; (2)
that the North’s enormous internal contradictions and the
anomic forces they may unleash mean that any policy, no
matter how well thought out and how carefully crafted, will
have only a very limited ability to influence Pyongyang or to
provide us with a measure of control over events; and (3)
that for better or worse, at some point in the not too distant
future we could again transition from a pattern of
incremental historical change to a moment of convulsive
transformation.
A final word about USFK is in order. As noted above,
Pyongyang frequently accuses us of trying to stifle the
North. We don’t think that way, and North Korea’s force
deployments (and defectors’ reports) do not indicate that
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Kim Jong Il expects attack. Nevertheless the combination of
an increasingly wealthy ROK backed up by U.S. military
power is a threat to the whole Kim family system, because it
tends to confine North-South competition to the economic
dimension in which the ROK is unquestionably superior.
Euphoria in the ROK over the June 2000 summit
(there’s been little media coverage in the North in the
aftermath of the summit) has generated an atmosphere in
which both Korean and American publicists could well come
to view reduction or withdrawal of USFK as necessary to
sustain an unfolding process of reconciliation. Some might
even come to argue that USFK is a barrier to the start of
such a process. If this argument dictates events and should
USFK be withdrawn, we can imagine two sets of judgments
by future historians. If the North-South confrontation
should ultimately be resolved by peaceful means, the
decision to withdraw will, at worst, be seen as an unwise
risk that we nevertheless got away with. If, as seems more
likely in view of North Korea’s continuing military
preparations, a decision to withdraw leads to another
disastrous and heartrending Korean conflict, that decision
will stand out as a piece of spectacular folly in hindsight’s
pitiless gaze.
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published in Seoul.
46. The daily official organ of the Korean Workers’ Party.
47. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is, of course, the
North’s official name. Except where in a quotation, we have used
throughout this paper “North Korea” as synonymous with DPRK.
48. Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,”
Foreign Affairs, January-February, 1998. Betts notes that biological
weapons are apt to be the weapon of choice because they are easy to get,
like chemicals, but have mass killing power, like nuclear weapons. He
cites a 1993 study by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment indicating that a single airplane delivering 100 kilograms
of anthrax spores by aerosol on a clear night over the Washington, DC,
area could kill between one million and three million people.
49. See “Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Geopolitics of
Terror,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 1, 1998. The article noted
that the launch of Pakistan’s Ghauri Hatf-V 1,500-km-range SSM in
April 1998, Iran’s Shahab-3 1,300-km-SSM in July 1998, and North
Korea’s three-stage Taepodong rocket in August 1998 all pointed to
enhanced ability to use force and threats to achieve political goals.
Jane’s also observed that the devastating psychological effect of such
weapons is enhanced if the victim is also suffering military reverses, as
in the case of Iran.
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50. Richard Preston, “The Bioweaponeers,” The New Yorker, March
9, 1998, p. 58. Should Kim Jong Il make the big use-or-lose decision with
regard to his burdensomely expensive but still powerful military
establishment, we might learn a lot more about these performance
characteristics than we would like to know. For an alarming but
realistic treatment of “asymmetric warfare” and “catastrophic
terrorism,” see Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, The Plague Wars, St.
Martin’s Press, 1999. The hugely disruptive impact of biological warfare
in the event of renewed hostilities in Korea and the difficulty the
intelligence community faces in assessing North Korea’s biological
weapons capabilities are covered in Chapter 31, pp. 322-334.
51. See February 28, 2000, interview with Der Spiegel cited in an
article by Professor Yang Hung Mo, formerly of Songgyungkwan
University, in Seoul, Pukhan Magazine, July 1, 2000, pp. 18-23, for an
analysis of Kim Jong Il’s reasons for agreeing to a summit.
52. The announcement on July 25, 2000, that Kim Jong Il has
approved Hyundai Asan’s plan to build an industrial complex in Haeju
would suggest that the latter is more likely.
53. See The Korea Times, July 20, 2000, p. 2, for an article reporting
that President Kim Dae Chung told the Los Angeles Times in an
interview published the same date that
I don’t think there are too many people who are naïve enough
to believe that things will progress relatively easily with the
North.
54. In his Monthly Choson, July 1, 2000, article, ROK Army
Lieutenant General Kim Hui Sang, Superintendent of the ROK
National Defense College, notes that,
On a television talk show a while ago in connection with the
recent summit meeting, several participants, including a
clergyman and a professor, obstinately called for the
withdrawal of USFK, an issue that had nothing to do with the
theme of the talk show. A professor who objected to their
argument was reportedly harassed in his car for about 30
minutes, surrounded by some student demonstrators who
were at the talk show as observers.
See “Leading Figures Should Step Forward Against Pro-DPRK
Instigators,” Monthly Choson, July 1, 2000, pp. 167-171.
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55. See “Kim Jong Il’s Remark on USFK Examined,” Monthly
Choson, August 1, 2000, pp. 62-66.
56. See “More Subdued North Korean Media Still Capable of
Stinging Attacks,” The Korea Herald, July 17, 2000, p. 2.
57. We do not, of course, rule out practical changes such as
incentives for farmers and a shift in emphasis from corn to potato
farming, or a carefully controlled connection to the Internet. We are
talking about fundamental changes, such as abandonment of the goal of
“liberating” the South, which would impact on the core of the belief
system.
58. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,
established as the management structure to oversee construction of two
nuclear power stations in North Korea in accordance with the Agreed
Framework.
59. We are not unmindful of the June 2000 North-South summit,
but Pyongyang’s need for immediate help in the form of energy,
fertilizer, and fuel, and Seoul’s need for vindication of its policies, do not,
at least at this stage of the game, add up to a convincing case for
reconciliation.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NORTH KOREAN VIEW OF THE
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF
STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.
Sharon A. Richardson
Authors’ Note: All too frequently students and analysts of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) view its
actions and intentions from their own individual or
nationalistic perspectives rather than that of the DPRK
leadership itself. This chapter is an imaginary report
delivered by an intimate of the Kim family regime, expressed
in the tone, texture, and rhetorical stance one could
realistically expect of such a perspective. While some of what
is written cannot be proven by hard data, it all lies within the
realm of reasonable possibility. It is our sincerest hope that
this chapter will stimulate discussion and provide the reader
with a modest understanding of our view of the way the DPRK
leadership thinks.

Report to the National Defense Commission:
Development of Strategic Weapon Systems
at the Dawn of a New Century

Introduction.
As the new millennium dawns, we are on the threshold of
a great new era in our 5,000-year history. The death of our
Great Leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, was a tremendous
blow not only to the DPRK, but also to all peace-loving
citizens of the world. Comrade Kim Jong Il has most ably
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carried on, and, indeed, built upon the works of his and the
nation’s father. We are moving from a restrained position to
a more prominent and rightful place in the world. The
leader in the South, Kim Dae Jung, has asked to visit the
DPRK to discuss matters of a wide-ranging interest and we
have complied with his request. Many issues remain
between us and those in the South, but we will proceed with
the meeting. We shall be cautious in our discussions
considering reconciliation and the unification of our
glorious Fatherland and we shall accomplish this without
outside interference.
Chuch’e has given our people the strength to build a
powerful state by our own efforts 1 . Our diplomatic
initiatives are bearing fruit and will provide us with
increasing connections with other nations. New ties will
bring new opportunities, yet we must be aware of the
dangers of falling into economic servitude and dependence
on economic trade with others. We must ensure that we
trade using the principle of equality. We will trade only for
what we need in order to maintain a self-supporting
economy and not become economically subservient to
another country. According to the teachings of our Dear
Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il:
In order to thwart the dominationist machinations of the
imperialists and reactionaries and give a strong impetus to the
people’s cause of independence, the cause of socialism, we must
maintain the chuch’e character of the revolutionary struggle
and construction and sustain their national character.
Preserving these qualities is imperative for the independent
development of the country and nation and for success in
realizing independence for the popular masses. Past experience
and lessons have proved that adherence to the chuch’e character
and national character is the key to success in the revolution
and construction and vital to national prosperity.
Under the wise leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim Il
Sung, our Party and our people have resolutely maintained the
chuch’e character and national character in opposition to
imperialism and dominationism throughout the entire period of
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the revolutionary struggle. As a result, they have achieved an
independent development of the country and nation without
any deviation and have won brilliant victory in the revolution
and construction.

National Security Policy, Strategy and Doctrine.
Long ago our Great Leader Kim Il Sung established the
two eminent underlying principles of our national
security—the survival of the Fatherland, and the liberation
of the entire Fatherland (One Choson). We are resolute and
determined to fight to the death to achieve these two
principles. We openly declare that we will mercilessly fight
against the United States imperialists and all the class
enemies to the last drop of our blood. We will to fight to the
end, and even if we lose and half our people die, they will not
win the hearts and minds of our people.
Our Great Leader Kim Il Sung has likewise given form to
these principles in the national military policies of the “Four
Military Lines” and “Three Revolutionary Forces.”
Reflecting these principles and policies, and with the
guidance of our Dear Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il, the
Korean People’s Army (KPA) has developed a strategy
based upon two principles—the defense of the Fatherland
through total resistance by the KPA and the people to any
enemy, and the complete reunification of the Fatherland
within 30 days of the onset of hostilities.
Our KPA will achieve its goal of reunification of the
Fatherland by combining “two front war” and “combined
operations” utilizing overwhelming firepower and violence
under the banner of “One Blow Non-stop Attack.” As
directed by our Dear Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Il, it will
“Occupy South Korea, All the Way to Pusan, in Three Days.”
The KPA will achieve these noble missions through the
revolutionary strength of its troops fighting with the spirit
of the people. Each KPA soldier is a match for 100 enemy
soldiers as they are filled with the spirit of human bombs,
warriors of guns and bombs, and heroes of self-destruction
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dedicated to the defense of our respected and beloved
Comrade Kim Jong Il and filled with a do-or-die spirit.
It is with the highest sense of duty and honor that the
Second Economic Committee provides the Korean People’s
Army with the tools it requires to fulfill its glorious and
victorious destiny.2
To defend our Fatherland, as well as reunite with our
oppressed kindred in the South, we have been engaged in
the development and production of strategic weapons
systems in four broad areas—missiles, chemical, biological,
and nuclear. We have been successful in our efforts based
upon the brilliant directions and revolutionary spirit of our
Great Leader Kim Il Sung who has taught us that,
We must strongly fortify the KPA with modern weapons and
combat material. We must employ all means to modernize the
weapons and make them more powerful based on the successes
of ultra-modern science and technology. . . . In modernizing the
KPA and developing military science and technology, we must
fully consider the reality of our country with its numerous
mountains and lengthy coastline. . . . We must develop and
introduce military science and technology in accordance with
the reality of our country and correctly incorporate old style
weapons along with modern weapons.

During the past 10 years, our progress has been
meritorious. It has not only provided the KPA with the tools
it needs to deter the imperialist aggressors, but has
furnished the Fatherland with significant diplomatic
leverage. Under the direction of our Dear Leader Kim Jong
Il, we have utilized this leverage to force the international
community to recognize our rightful place. We are now at
the point where the United States, Russia, China, and
Japan dare not formulate any policies for East Asia without
considering our demands. We have also utilized this newly
achieved leverage to manipulate our enemies, especially the
United States, into loosening trade sanctions, providing
economic assistance, and contributing emergency fuel and
food assistance.
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In achieving these objectives we have made several
minor concessions regarding our weapons development and
production programs. Included among these have been the
freezing of the nuclear program at Yongbyon, suspension of
ballistic missile testing, and providing the United States
access to the strategic complex at Kumch’ang-ni. Under the
brilliant direction of our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il we have,
however, utilized these concessions to our great advantage,
while at the same time encouraging the ignorance and
arrogance of our enemies.
As the members of the National Defense Commission are
aware, this last aspect of “encouraging the ignorance and
arrogance of our enemies” was first outlined by our Great
Leader Kim Il Sung in his great treatise on the “Four
Military Lines” 40 years ago. Since that time, it has
remained an underlying principle in our production of
strategic weapons. We allow our enemies to know only what
we want them to know—a very small amount—about our
capabilities, practicing deception, misdirection, and
misinformation in all phases. At the same time we continue
to develop and expand our true capabilities in secret. In
doing so, we foster within their political, military, and
intelligence circles an erroneous picture of our spiritual and
physical strength. This ignorance and presumptuousness of
our enemies can be ranked as one of the greatest successes
of the Second Economic Committee.
As our great nation stands on the threshold of a new
millennium, we are poised to make prodigious leaps forward
in the development and production of strategic weapons
systems. These developments will ensure the security of our
Fatherland and propel our Dear Leader and Chu’che
thought to the forefront of the international community.
Ballistic Missiles.
In accordance with our primary objectives to reunify the
Fatherland while defending it from outside interference
and aggression, our ballistic missile program has become a
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cornerstone. It provides us with the capability to deter our
enemies, deter others who might support our enemies in
attacking us, inflict punishing damage upon anyone who
would dare attack, and dramatically increases the KPA’s
ability to reunite the Fatherland in a “One Blow Non-stop
Attack” when directed to do so by our Supreme Commander
Kim Jong Il. The ballistic missile program has also
increased our international prestige and provided valuable
foreign currency as other nations have sought out our
assistance and missiles as they develop their own
deterrence against imperialist aggression. Most notable
have been our like-minded associates in Egypt, Iran,
Pakistan, and Syria.
During the past 15 years, ballistic missile development
has progressed steadily. Utilizing the spirit of Chu’che, we
have continually increased the range and enlarged the
payload capabilities of our systems. First, we progressed
from the production of simple copies of the Scud to more
capable short-range ballistic missiles such as the Hwasong
5 and Hwasong 6. Next, we developed a medium range
ballistic missile known to the world as the No-dong 1.
Guided by the spirit of chuch’e, we then combined our
existing systems to create an even longer-ranged medium
range ballistic missile known to the world as the
Taep’o-dong 1. This was achieved in record time and far
exceeded the expectations of the world.
At the brilliant direction of our Dear Leader Comrade
Kim Jong Il, we then utilized this system to create the space
launch vehicle to launch our first satellite —the
Kwangmyongsong 1. This same launch vehicle, when
configured as a weapon system, becomes an intermediate
range ballistic missile possessing a range in excess of 4,000
km, thereby providing us, for the first time in the glorious
history of the Korean people, the capability to directly strike
at Alaska, the territory of the U.S. imperialists. Our most
advanced system, known to the world as the Taep’o-dong 2,
has even greater capabilities. Depending upon the size of
the payload this system becomes an intercontinental
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ballistic missile capable of striking at the very heartland of
the United States. This is a glorious testimony to the
strength of chuch’e and the glorious and penetrating
leadership of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear
Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il.
In pursuing our ballistic missile program, we have
developed a production infrastructure that is second only to
that of the United States, China, and Russia. In line with
our Great Leader’s teachings on the “Four Great Military
Lines,” we have dispersed the research, production, and
basing facilities throughout the Fatherland to minimize the
impact of any imperialist U.S. attack. This has also
enhanced our abilities with regard to strategic deception,
misdirection, and misinformation. It is clear that, because
of this most excellent strategy, our enemies do not have a
clear understanding of our capabilities. In fact, their
obsession with the Musudan-ri Launch and Sanum-dong
Research Facilities has blinded them. We will continue to
encourage this.
If pressed, and if critical components are available, we
are capable of producing 5 to 15 ballistic missiles per month,
depending upon the version selected. If required, and with
the financial support of our foreign friends, this capacity
could be doubled within a year’s time to fulfill their
legitimate defensive needs and increase our foreign sales.
During the past 10 years, we have been utilizing a
significant portion of our production capability to
remanufacture and upgrade our older systems to more
modern standards. As a result, our ballistic missile
Type

Number

Short range (old and remanufactured)
Medium range
Intermediate range and space launch
vehicles
Intercontinental range
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500
80
15
5

inventory has remained at a relatively constant level of 600
systems. These can be broken down as shown in above table.
This inventory meets or exceeds the KPA’s requirements
for operations against the Southern lackeys. It does not,
however, meet the projected requirements for operations
against the mainland of either Japan or the United States.
Within 2 years, the current program of remanufacturing
and upgrading older systems will be able to address the
requirement for Japan. The U.S. requirement will,
however, require an estimated 10 years. If, however, our
Libyan or Iranian friends continue to purchase our
longer-range missile systems, they may be induced to flight
test them. This would provide us with data to refine them at
an accelerated pace.
We have faced numerous technical obstacles in the
production of our ballistic missile systems. These have
centered around six critical areas:
(1) general and specialized ballistic missile design
expertise,
(2) guidance systems,
(3) engine development,
(4) warhead and nosecone design,
(5) acquisition of specialized materials and components,
and
(6) financial support.
To date, we have been able to meet our basic needs in
these areas; however, the continued growth of the ballistic
missile program is dependent upon more comprehensive
and long-term solutions. Fortunately, thanks to the
strength of chuch’e thought and the guidance of our Dear
Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, we have been making
significant progress. Under the guidance of Chinese,
Russian, and Ukrainian missile experts, our designers and
technicians continue to develop their own skills. Our
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Chinese neighbors continue their covert assistance to our
missile program, providing education for our people and
critical components and materials. This is especially true
within the areas of guidance systems, satellites, and
advanced warhead design, including decoys and
countermeasures. Our friends in the Middle East and South
Asia also have proven to be invaluable to our ballistic
missile program. They continue to provide us with valuable
foreign currency as they purchase our missile technology
and components, access to western technologies and
components denied us by trade sanctions, and a means to
test our missile systems with low political risks and little
interference from the United States and the international
community. Our cooperation with Iran also extends to their
interests in satellites. Our covert acquisition programs
within Russia and Eastern Europe have produced
important results within the areas of propulsion systems
and acquisition of specialized components.
Looking forward over the next 10 to 15 years, we will
focus upon improving the range to weight capabilities of our
existing systems, improving guidance systems, developing
new warheads with advanced decoy and countermeasure
systems, launching both research (the Kwangmyongsong 2)
and reconnaissance satellites, increasing the survivability
of our missile force by the expansion of hardened storage
facilities, continuing the development of unique launch
platforms (especially those mounted upon rail cars and
cargo ships), and the accelerated development of a
short-range solid-fuel ballistic missile.
Our successes and future plans within the missile
program are tempered by the huge financial burden they
have placed upon us. They have forced us, at times, to make
critical decisions on which paths to pursue. Through
continued foreign sales of missile systems and technologies,
we plan to address this situation and enhance our access to
missile related technologies and components.
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At the political level, under the guidance of our Dear
Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, we will continue to utilize our
ballistic missile program to confound our enemies,
encourage their arrogance, influence the ongoing
international negotiations, and increase the glory of chuch’e
thought and our Fatherland.
An excellent example of how the missile program has
achieved many of these goals in the past was the launching
of our first satellite—the Kwangmyongsong 1—in 1998.
This launch caused great panic and confusion for the U.S.
imperialists, their Southern puppets, their Japanese
toadies, and others in the international community. The
United States had previously believed we would not be able
to achieve such a capability until sometime around 2005.
The possibility that we might follow this with a test launch
of our intermediate range ballistic missile spurred the
United States to diplomatic and political action. They
quickly agreed to lift some trade sanctions if we agreed to a
suspension of further missile testing. This was accompanied
by complete consternation in that country which has caused
it to resolutely consider a national missile defense system.
Our missiles have caused the “mighty superpower” to
consider deployment of a national missile defense that will
be enormously expensive, and, in the end, will fail. This
failure will come on both technical and political levels.
Within the technical realm, there are numerous
rudimentary methods with which to counter the
imperialists’ missile defense system. With assistance from
our Chinese friends, we are at the stage where we can now
introduce these countermeasures into our current
inventory with little or no effect on performance or
degradation of our capabilities. With the implementation of
any of these countermeasures, the imperialists must
expend tremendous financial and political resources to
counter them. If we are careful, we can reveal these new
countermeasures in a phased manner, thereby keeping the
imperialists’ missile defense effort in a state of “catch up” for
many years. More significantly, the U.S. imperialists, once
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again, fail to understand the political nature of our struggle.
While there is little doubt that for the next 15-20 years the
United States has the capability to eventually deploy the
technical means to counter most of our missiles, we will be
victorious if only one out of a hundred of our missiles lands
within their homeland!
Furthermore, the U.S. imperialists’ efforts to deploy a
national missile defense system have angered our Russian
and Chinese friends and their own allies. For Russia, a U.S.
national missile defense system means that it must amend
or abrogate their mutual antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty.
For the Chinese, it means that they would have to greatly
expand their strategic missile forces. In both instances, it
has resulted in the increased willingness of both Russia and
China to share ballistic missile, satellite, and space-related
technologies with us, and has decreased their willingness to
bring political pressure upon us to curtail or suspend our
ballistic missile program. We must expend great effort
politically to both utilize this situation to our advantage and
to increase the friction between the U.S. imperialists and
our Russian and Chinese friends. With regard to its allies,
the United States has stated it will share its new missile
defense technology with them. Those same allies, members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
United Nations (UN) are, however, looking at the United
States with suspicion and distrust regarding the issue, and
rightfully so. As with the friction between the U.S.
imperialists and our Russian and Chinese friends, we
should do everything within our power on the political front
to encourage dissension between the United States and its
allies. If we are successful, this entire issue is likely to result
in the decoupling of the imperialists and their allies with the
end result of a much weaker foe.
All of this consternation comes in response to our
launching a single satellite! Surely, by any means of
measurement, it was a tremendous success as
demonstrated by the great commotion experienced by our
adversaries. It wondrously demonstrates the greatness of
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our national power and the brilliance of our Dear Leader
Comrade Kim Jong Il. As Sun Tzu has taught,
What is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s
strategy;
Next best is to disrupt his alliances . . .
Thus, those skilled in battle subdue the enemy’s army without
battle.

Chemical and Biological Weapons.
Immediately following the Fatherland Liberation War,
at the direction of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung, we
embarked upon the development of biological and chemical
weapons. Although we are a peace-loving people, we were
forced into this unfortunate situation by the barbaric use of
these weapons against us during the war by the imperialist
United States. Since that time, the wisdom of this decision
has been repeatedly reinforced as the United States and its
Southern lackeys have continued to threaten us with the
use of these cruel and inhumane weapons.
Progress within the chemical weapons field advanced
slowly due to the need to rebuild the nation and care for our
people. Through the selfless sacrifice of our people and the
strength of chuch’e thought, we produced our first
experimental chemical weapons during the late 1950s and
early 1960s. By the late 1960s, pilot production of several
chemical agents had commenced. Since that time our
chemical weapons program has unceasingly improved, and
our chemical weapons production capability has now
matured. We currently possess the capability to produce a
wide range of chemical weapons, including the feared
binary weapons. Chemical weapons are a vital weapon in
the KPA’s great inventory for both victoriously triumphing
over any interfering aggressors and ensuring the
reunification of the Fatherland under the banner of “One
Blow Non-stop Attack.”
In his treatise on the “Three Revolutionary Forces” our
Great Leader Kim Il Sung declared,
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The Korean Workers’ Party and the Korean people will make
every effort to strengthen their solidarity with the peoples of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the future as in the past and
will positively support their struggle against colonialism and
imperialism.

In line with this direction, during the 1980s we began
exchanging chemical weapons technology and weapons first
with Iran and then Syria and Libya. Most recently we have
expanded these exchanges to include Pakistan. These
activities have provided us with valuable foreign currency
and access to technologies denied us by the onerous
sanctions unfairly imposed upon us by the imperialist
United States and their flunkies in the international
community. Our efforts to covertly obtain chemical warfare
research and technologies within the former Soviet Union
have proven to be unorganized but moderately successful,
but they have also proven to be very expensive. Future
efforts will have to weigh the value of what we can covertly
obtain against the limited financial resources we are able to
dedicate to this mission.
In pursuing our chemical weapons program, we have the
directions of our Great Leader’s treatise on the “Four Great
Military Lines.” We have dispersed the research,
production, and basing facilities throughout the Fatherland
to minimize the impact of any imperialist U.S. attack. They
are thus hardened and redundant. As with the missile and
nuclear programs, dispersion has also enhanced our
abilities with regard to strategic deception, misdirection,
and misinformation. An unfortunate aspect of this is that
we must continue to work on our chemical weapons program
in secret and publicly deny any such capabilities. The
wisdom and validity of this strategy of deception is apparent
by the wide range of estimates of our chemical capabilities
by the United States. We will continue to encourage this.
We are currently capable of producing a wide variety of
chemical agents including: adamsite (DM),
chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene malononitrile
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(CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H or HD),
phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA),
and V-agents (VM and VX). For a variety of operational and
technical reasons, we have concentrated upon mustard,
phosgene, sarin, and the V-agents. Since the production of
soman (GD) requires the use of pinacolyl alcohol, which is
currently produced by only a few companies around the
world in extremely small amounts and has no commercial
uses, we would find it inconvenient to import this chemical
without arousing suspicion. During the past 10 years, we
have begun production of binary agents and, with the
assistance of technologies gathered in Russia and China,
have begun working on third generation chemical agents.
These agents, due to their greater safety of handling in
transit and longer period of stability in storage, greatly
enhance the KPA’s capability to distribute them utilizing
highly-trained and dedicated reconnaissance and sniper
troops and intelligence operatives.
Our annual production level for chemical weapons has
varied considerably during the past 10 years due to the
natural disasters and economic hardships we have suffered.
These hardships have likewise affected our production of
other chemicals and especially fertilizers for agriculture. On
average, we have produced 8,000 tons per year.
Unfortunately, due to a high level of impurities within the
agent stock produced (itself due to the crippling sanctions
imposed upon us by the international community), we have
dedicated approximately 50 percent of this to replacement
of deteriorating stockpiles. Of the remaining 50 percent, 30
percent goes towards building the KPA’s stockpiles, 10
percent for training, 5 percent for research, and 5 percent is
wastage. Under emergency conditions, and if non-Second
Economic Committee resources were made available, we
are capable of producing up to 20,000 tons of chemical
agents a year. If required, and with the financial support of
our foreign allies, this capacity could, in a year’s time, be
raised to 30,000 tons.3
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The KPA’s present inventory is approximately 10,000
tons of chemical munitions, the vast majority of which
consists of 122 mm and 240 mm artillery rockets. There are
also significant numbers of 152 mm artillery shells and
air-dropped munitions for the Korean People’s Air Force. In
addition we maintain an inventory of ballistic missile
warheads to arm 20-25 percent of the total missile
inventory. The KPA currently has approximately 150
chemical warheads for ballistic missiles. This inventory
meets, or exceeds, the KPA’s current requirements for
operations against the Southern lackeys and projected
requirements for operations against the mainlands of both
Japan and the United States.
The vast majority of the chemical weapons stockpiles are
stored within our forward deployed corps and are under the
control of the General Rear Services Bureau and
Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau. Ballistic missile
warheads are under the control of the Security Command
and the State Security Department.
In addition to chemical agents, we produce a wide range
of chemical defense and decontamination equipment and
have organized defensive measures to safeguard the KPA
and civilian populations by training in the use of protective
masks, clothing, detectors, and decontamination systems.
We have positioned Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau
units throughout the KPA force structure. Approximately 1
percent of our military forces is composed of chemical
warfare personnel. We also require periodic chemical
warfare drills in addition to training for our population. In
contrast, the U.S. imperialists show little concern for the
Korean people, North or South. They have demonstrated a
lack of concern by distributing approximately 14,000 gas
masks to Americans in the South. This distribution clearly
is an insufficient countermeasure to our skill and ability
aimed toward carrying forward the revolutionary ideas of
our leader. This careless response is a testament to the
effectiveness of our strategy of strategic deception,
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misdirection, and misinformation. We will continue to
encourage this attitude amongst our enemies.
Of all our strategic weapons programs, the research,
development, and production of biological agents has
progressed the slowest and is the smallest in size. The
reasons for this are both varied and simple. Foremost is that
we do not possess the biomedical research facilities or
capabilities available to the superpowers or many nations of
the industrialized world. Given the limited capabilities of
our medical system, the use of biological weapons, at best a
precarious endeavor, has the potential to be more
dangerous to us than to the Americans and their Southern
lackeys unless used on their soil. Finally, there is no need for
vast biological agent production facilities. The nature of
biological agent production is such that the few
fermentation/brewery facilities that we have earmarked for
conversion to biological agent production, if needed, will
easily exceed all possible KPA requirements. Our current
laboratory level production facilities are sufficient for our
current research and weapons inventory requirements. Our
inventory includes: anthrax (Bacillus anthracis); botulism
(Clostridium botulinum); cholera (Vibrio cholera 01),
hemorrhagic fever plague (Yersinia pestis); smallpox
(Variola); typhoid (Salmonella typhi); and yellow fever. At
this point, our research with genetic engineering and some
other bacterial and viral strains is less well developed than
ideal.
At present, our most potent and effective biological agent
is the smallpox virus. We can, to some degree, control the ill
effects by vaccinating our population, while the balance of
the world basks in the false security that this disease has
been eliminated worldwide and remains unvaccinated. The
disease kills one-third to one-half those infected and
debilitates others during the infectious phase. While a
person is contagious, he may infect 10 to 50 people. The
effectiveness of smallpox, as well as our other biological
weapons, lies within our ability to employ them outside the
Korean Peninsula utilizing the KPA’s highly trained and
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dedicated reconnaissance and sniper troops, as well as
intelligence operatives, to covertly distribute them into our
enemies’ homeland. This method of delivery is by far the
most effective since the agents will be removed from the
Korean Peninsula.
Although the majority of our biological warfare
program’s research and development is located within our
universities and medical research facilities, key testing
facilities and production components are located on islands
within the West Sea and in hardened underground facilities
throughout the Fatherland, respectively. This has been
done deliberately and in line with the directions of our Great
Leader’s treatise on the “Four Great Military Lines.” The
wisdom of this strategy is apparent in the almost complete
lack of knowledge concerning our biological warfare
capabilities by the United States. On occasion, imperialist
propaganda has alleged that we use those accused of
transgressions against the state as subjects in our biological
warfare research. These are lies; all test subjects have been
volunteers, willingly giving of themselves for the glory of
our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, chuch’e thought, and the
Fatherland.
Since the 1980s, in line with our Great Leader’s treatise
on the “Three Revolutionary Forces,” we have been
exchanging biological weapons research and technology
with Iran, Libya, and Syria. These activities have provided
us with access to technologies denied us by imperialist
United States and the international community. Our
attempts to covertly obtain useful biological warfare
research and technology within the former Soviet Union
have so far proven unsuccessful.
Looking forward over the next 10 to 15 years, our
chemical weapons program will focus upon improving the
quality of chemical agents produced, conversion of
stockpiles into binary agents, and increasing the quality
and quantity of chemical defensive equipment available to
the KPA and civilian population. We will expand our
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research into third and fourth generation chemical
weapons, building upon our own research, and combining it
with technology gathered in Russia and China. Within the
biological weapons field, our focus will be on the general
upgrading of KPA and civilian biomedical research
capabilities, research into the development of more effective
agents and vaccines, and research into weaponization of
biological agents (included within this plan is the
development of an effective ballistic missile warhead). We
will continue to expand both our overt and covert efforts to
acquire advanced biological warfare technology from Russia
and China. With regard to both programs, we will continue
our efforts to recruit a small number of critical foreign
nationals to assist our scientists and researchers. These
plans, however, will have to be tempered by the realities of
our ongoing financial situation.
It is the sincerest desire of our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il
and the Korean people that the Korean Peninsula become a
chemical and biological weapons-free zone. Unfortunately,
this is dependent upon the actions of the imperialist United
States and its Southern lackeys. Despite public statements
and the signing of international agreements to the contrary,
they have continued to develop and stockpile chemical and
biological weapons for use against us. Until our enemies
cease and desist from threatening the peaceloving Korean
people, the Second Economic Committee is dedicated to
providing the KPA with the most modern and effective
chemical and biological weapons.
Nuclear.
No other nation in the world has lived under the threat of
a nuclear war longer then has the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. This threat has presented itself both
directly against us from the imperialist warmongering
United States, and indirectly through its threats against
the peaceloving people of China and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. Although the nature of these threats
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has changed with the end of the so-called Cold War, it still
remains and may worsen in the future as both the DPRK
and China assume their just and long-denied positions
within the world community. For these reasons, we have
followed the wise and brilliant direction of our leaders Kim
Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, who, in the most pure spirit of
chuch’e thought, have directed that the research,
development, and possession of our own nuclear weapons
are of paramount importance to the Korean people.
During the late 1950s, and under the greatest secrecy,
we began to take the preliminary steps towards our goal of
producing nuclear weapons. While our friends within the
Soviet Union and China helped us with basic nuclear
research capabilities, they would not provide us with the
knowledge we required to produce nuclear weapons.
Therefore we were totally dependent upon the guidance of
our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and chuch’e thought.
Gradually, as the years passed we developed a basic nuclear
research capability during the 1960s. We expanded this
slowly during the early 1970s. During the late 1970s, even
though we did not possess fissile material or sophisticated
weapons designs, we established a nuclear weapons
program and initiated the design for a nuclear weapon.
During the early 1980s, we concurrently initiated a wide
range of nuclear programs designed to provide us with the
technical expertise and fissile material we required to build
an arsenal of weapons.
Our scientists had narrowed the production of fissile
material to two methods—uranium enrichment through
electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and plutonium
extraction through chemical reprocessing. We initially
pursued both; however, this proved to beyond our limited
financial and technical capabilities, so we concentrated on
the production of plutonium. The EMIS effort proceeded,
but at a much reduced level and as a fallback position. By
the end of the 1980s, in a demonstration of iron will and
chuch’e strength, we had achieved a working nuclear
weapons design. The production of fissile material,
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however, had lagged behind due to technical limitations,
financial considerations, and natural disasters. During the
early 1990s, overcoming all obstacles and in a glorious
testimony to the insightful wisdom of our Great Leader Kim
Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, our scientists
collected sufficient plutonium from our pilot reprocessing
facility and assembled the Korean people’s first nuclear
weapon. It was a glorious moment in the history of the world
and a testimony to the majesty of chuch’e strength.
Regrettably, as a result of the traitorous acts of a few
weak-spirited, impure individuals, we were unable to hide
all our efforts from the snooping American imperialists and
their stable boys in the United Nations. During the early
1990s, tensions between our nations rose dangerously, and
we headed toward war. Through the completely penetrating
perspicacity of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear
Leader Kim Jong Il, and the preeminence of our negotiators,
we avoided a cruel and costly war for the Korean people and
forced the most powerful nation in the world to sign the
Agreed Framework with us on October 21, 1994.
The sheer brilliance of this negotiating effort is apparent
only to those faithful to chuch’e thought. On the surface this
agreement is humiliating to the Korean people and
decimates our ability to produce nuclear weapons—the
imperialist Americans’ greatest fear. In exchange for the
construction of two light-water reactors (LWRs), we agreed
within the framework to suspend operations of the 5
megawatt (MWe) reactors and the Radiochemistry
Laboratory at Yongbyon; halt construction of the 50 MWe
and 200 MWe reactors at Yongbyon and T’aech’on;
dismantle these and several other facilities by the time the
LWR project is completed; come into full compliance with
the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA); and permit the safe disposal of the
fuel rods from the 5 MWe reactor. The United States
oversaw the creation of a new organization—the Korean
Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—to construct
the two 1,000 MWe light-water nuclear reactors by 2003. In
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compensation for the loss of electrical production from the
50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, it agreed to provide us with
heavy oil (at a rate of 500,000 tons annually) until the first
LWR was completed. Additionally, the United States
agreed to upgrade its relations with us. The half-witted
insipid Americans were euphoric and boasting to the world
of their victory over us. This ignorance and
presumptuousness can be ranked as one of the superlative
achievements of chuch’e thought.
The reality of the situation is, however, quite different,
attesting to the illustriousness and genius of our Great
Leader Kim Il Sung’s treatise on the “Four Military Lines”
40 years ago. Therein he directed that we practice
deception, misdirection, and misinformation in all phases of
our production of strategic weapons. Yes, we agreed to
abandon—at great financial cost—our reactors at Yongbyon
and T’aech’on and the Radio Chemistry Laboratory at
Yongbyon. This, however, has by no means halted our
production of fissile material and nuclear weapons.
When we realized during our negotiations what we
would have to “surrender” to the ignorant Americans, we
took appropriate steps to continue the production of fissile
material and nuclear weapons. The EMIS program, which
had been proceeding in complete secrecy at a slow—but
successful—pace, was assigned the highest priority and
resources were quickly transferred to it. The pilot chemical
reprocessing plant—which had been placed in caretaker
status with the opening of the Radio Chemistry Laboratory
at Yongbyon—was reactivated, and we initiated a program
to expand the capacities of the few small research reactors
located throughout the Fatherland—which the snooping
American imperialists and their washwomen know nothing
about.
We also tripled security and secrecy at all our nuclear
weapons related facilities; redoubled our efforts to covertly
acquire nuclear materials and technologies from our friends
within the former Soviet Union and China; and expanded
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our nuclear weapons design team so they could accelerate
their design of an enriched uranium weapon without
sacrificing their ongoing work on refining plutonium
weapons.
In pursuing our nuclear weapons program, we have
covertly developed a research and production infrastructure
that is second only to that of the superpowers. In accordance
with the “Four Great Military Lines,” we have dispersed our
nuclear research and production facilities throughout the
Fatherland. As indicated above, concerning the American
perceptions of the 1994 Agreed Framework, this dispersion
program has enabled the Korean people to achieve a grand
level of strategic deception, misdirection, and
misinformation with regard to our nuclear weapons
capabilities. In fact, their obsession with the facilities at
Yongbyon, Kumch’ang-ni, and the LWR continues to blind
them. We will undertake every effort to encourage and
reinforce this.
During the past 10 years, we have produced and
acquired enough fissile material to make some 5 to 12
nuclear weapons. The actual number of weapons has
constantly fluctuated as we add to our stockpile of fissile
material and as bomb designers continue to refine the
efficiency of their designs. In addition to these factors,
changing KPA and National Defense Commission
directives have, at times, called for the development of
larger yield weapons, which naturally require greater
amounts of fissile material and result in an overall lower
number of weapons. At present, our nuclear weapons
inventory consists of the following.
Type

Number

Plutonium implosion
Enriched uranium
Experimental devices

3
4
2
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This inventory does not meet the KPA’s requirements for
operations against the Southern lackeys, which call for
10-20 nuclear weapons in the 30–60 kiloton range. Neither
does it meet the projected requirements for an additional
10-20 nuclear weapons in the 30–60 kiloton range for
operations against the mainland of both Japan and the
United States. If pressed, and if critical components are
made available, we are capable of re-engineering this
inventory into approximately 20 smaller nuclear weapons.
This, however, still does not meet our overall requirements.
With our growing ballistic missile capabilities we possess
the ability to employ this limited arsenal of nuclear weapons
throughout the Korean Peninsula and most of Japan with
our crude nuclear warhead. We do not currently possess a
workable nuclear warhead for our systems that can reach
Alaska, Hawaii, and the United States mainland.4
We have faced numerous operational and technical
obstacles in the development and production of our nuclear
weapons. The most significant has been the production and
acquisition of fissile material. This obstacle almost attained
critical nature with the signing of the 1994 Agreed
Framework. Through the ingeniousness of our Great
Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, we,
however, avoided the crisis and developed new covert
sources for fissile material production. These sources have
slowly expanded during the past 6 years. If our current
nuclear relationships with Pakistan and others continue to
develop favorably, we could possibly double our inventory of
fissile material in the next 10 years.
Additional operational and technical obstacles have
centered around seven critical areas:
(1) general and specialized nuclear weapons design
expertise;
(2) nuclear warhead design for our long-range ballistic
missiles;
(3) acquisition of specialized materials and components;
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(4) financial support;
(5) the need for an extremely high level of secrecy;
(6) safety; and
(7) the political inability to field test our core weapons
designs.
To date, we have been able to address most of our basic
requirements; however, the continued development of the
nuclear weapons program is dependent on more
comprehensive and long-term solutions. The safety record
within the nuclear program has proven to be difficult to
stabilize as is evident by the significant number of workers
who have experienced serious radiation illnesses and the
small number who have died due to quality control issues
and human error. While this is regrettable, our workers
continue to be highly motivated and willing to make strong
sacrifices to persevere with this important work and the
development of the decisive weapon. In the end, we will
continue to prevail. We must, however, improve safety. Our
most critical requirement—the testing of our core weapons
designs—remains unfulfilled. Our developing relations
with Pakistan have, however, provided us with extremely
valuable technical information with which to evaluate our
designs. It is conceivable—and we are working toward this
goal—that in the future, with favorable political conditions,
the Pakistanis will test a weapon designed to our
specifications.
To address other critical areas, we have attempted to
hire Chinese, Russian, and Ukrainian experts. These,
however, present a serious threat to the secrecy of our
nuclear weapons program. To date, the few that we have
hired have shown no desire to return to their home nations.
Our Chinese neighbors continue their low-level, covert
assistance to our nuclear program by providing education
for our people and some critical components and materials.
This assistance must be closely monitored, because it, too,
may compromise our secrecy. Our friends in the Middle East
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and South Asia also have proven to be invaluable to our
nuclear weapons program as they provide us with access to
Western technologies and components denied us by trade
sanctions. Beside Pakistan, our cooperation with Iran also
extends to their interests in nuclear weapons. This,
however, remains at a low level.
Our covert acquisition programs within Russia and
Eastern Europe have proven to be moderately successful
although extremely expensive due to the inexperience of the
personnel we dispatched, the sophistication of the criminals
in Russia, and joint United States, Russian, and European
Community efforts to prevent the sale of nuclear related
technologies or specialized equipment and fissile material.
Despite the extreme expense, we will carry on these efforts.
Probably the single greatest obstacle to the continued
growth of our nuclear weapons program is the immense
financial burden it has placed upon the Fatherland and the
Korean people during these past 10 years of natural
disasters and economic hardships. With the resolute and
fatherly guidance of our Dear Leader Kim Jong Il and faith
in chuch’e thought we have, and will continue to, overcome
this onerous obstacle as well.
During the next 10 to 15 years we will focus on improving
the sophistication, reliability, and yield of our nuclear
inventory and increasing our stockpiles of fissile materials
and nuclear weapons. Our goal is to have 30 nuclear
weapons in the 30-60 kiloton range by 2015. We intend to
develop more reliable nuclear warheads for our ballistic
missiles, develop a nuclear warhead with advanced decoy
and countermeasure systems for our long-range ballistic
missiles, increase the security and survivability of our
nuclear weapons production infrastructure, and continue
development of active and passive nuclear defenses for the
KPA and Korean people.
With regard to increasing our stockpiles of fissile
materials, we are reevaluating our previous efforts,
particularly within the area of gaseous diffusion. Using our
107

own naturally occurring resources and a gas centrifuge, it is
possible to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for
weapons. The U.S. imperialists waste far too much energy
to produce 90 percent highly-enriched uranium for weapons
when a satisfactory device can be made with a smaller
percentage of enriched material. From 5,000 kilograms (kg)
of natural uranium, we could produce about 250 kg of
enriched material if we were to use the standard of the
imperialists, but this would require 1.5 million
kilowatt-hours of energy. Using the concentration
technique and our own resources, in accordance with the
principles of chuch’e, we have the capability to produce a
suitable quantity of nuclear weapons.
For the future, the AVLIS method that requires laser
technology shows great promise since its advantage is a
much lower energy requirement. However, obtaining the
equipment is the more difficult aspect. We may be able to
secure what is necessary through technology exchanges.
The production facilities can be secreted underground to
prevent spying from the heavens.
Under the dazzling guidance of our Dear Leader
Comrade Kim Jong Il and a resolute belief in chuch’e
thought, we have achieved what the Americans, their
Southern lackeys and stooges in the United Nations, and
even the world, had thought impossible—the production of
sophisticated nuclear weapons. We now, for the first time in
the history of the Korean people, possess the ability to inflict
torturous and untold damage upon the homelands of our
enemies. Absolutely the most glorious aspect of this
crowning achievement is the fact that our intractable
enemies have no idea of our magnificent victory.
While this current state is fraught with tremendous
danger, it also presents immense opportunities. Seeing our
difficulties, the United States and its lackeys believe that
we are in an inferior position. They see what they want to
see rather then what is really there. Guided by our Dear
Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il and armed with chuch’e spirit,
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we have achieved a level of strategic deception,
misdirection, and misinformation with regard to our
nuclear weapons capabilities that is unparalleled since the
days of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. We must, at all
levels, encourage this ignorance and arrogance of the
United States.
Recommendations.
Recommendations to secure our future and continued
sovereignty, as well as to strengthen our position in the
world and ensure the continued development of our
strategic weapons systems, consist of initiatives in a
number of diverse, yet related areas.
• We must above all remain true to chuch’e thought and
the guidance of our Great Leader Kim Il Sung and Dear
Leader Kim Jong Il.
• We must continue “encouraging the ignorance and
arrogance of our enemies” as outlined by our Great Leader
Kim Il Sung in his treatise on the “Four Military Lines” 40
years ago. We must allow our enemies to know only what we
want them to know by practicing deception, misdirection,
and misinformation at all levels and in all phases of our
dealings with them. In doing so, we maximize both our
spiritual and physical strength and foster their ignorance,
presumptuousness, and arrogance.
• We should vigorously continue research,
development, and production of ballistic missiles. These will
provide us with the capability to strike deep into the
heartlands of our enemies with impunity, shattering their
will to retaliate. The mere existence of our ballistic missile
program serves to cause division amongst our enemies and
forces them to spend billions of dollars over the next 20
years on research and development of missile defense
systems that possess only the poorest of chances in partially
neutralizing an attack.
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• We must continue research, development, and
production of chemical and biological weapons at their
present levels. This will enable us either to respond in kind
to a U.S. attack or to achieve a devastating surprise in a
“One Blow Non-stop Attack” to reunify the Fatherland.
• Our nuclear weapons program must continue in the
utmost secrecy. These decisive weapons provide the Korean
people with ultimate means of ensuring the survival of the
Fatherland and the dissemination of chuch’e thought.
• We must expand our foreign military sales of
equipment and arms—especially strategic weapons, which
provide the greatest profit. If we must temporarily refrain
from the sale of entire systems because of some tactical
diplomatic maneuvering we should aggressively pursue the
sale of technologies underlying our strategic weapons
systems.
• We must continue to expand and diversify our
diplomatic initiatives by pursuing our own policy of
“engagement.” This will reduce the focus on the United
States and its influence, and demonstrate that we will not
be controlled by outside imperialists—including the United
Nations.
• We have proceeded with the meeting with the
Southern puppet leader, Kim Dae Jung. This permits
dialogue and allows us to gain understanding of those who
may seek to control our actions. It will likely continue to
provide significant financial rewards.
• We must continue to seek our nation’s removal from
the U.S. list of “states that sponsor terrorism.” This will
provide us with a superior diplomatic position within the
world community which we can exploit to increase our
economic stability.
• We must press for the complete removal of all the
onerous and unjustifiable sanctions imposed upon us by the
imperialist United States and its lackeys within the United
Nations. This will enable us to engage in trade relationships
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that are advantageous to us without sacrificing our
commitment to the revolution.
Pursuit of these recommendations will lead us toward
reunification of the Fatherland under the framework of
chuch’e thought without sacrificing our precious integrity.
I sincerely hope these recommendations meet with the
approval of the National Defense Commission and
especially Comrade Kim Jong Il, under whose resplendent
guidance and benevolent teachings it may be accepted and
implemented.
All hail Kim Il Sung, all hail Kim Jong Il, may the
brilliance of chuch’e thought shine throughout the world.
Your humble servant,

Chon Pyong-ho
National Defense Commission
Defense Industry Policy and Inspection Department
ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 3
1. For an explanation of “chuch’e,” see chap. 2, endnote 16.
2. The Second Economic Committee is the organization with overall
responsibility for weapons procurement, development, and sales within
the DPRK.
3. The United States and ROK currently estimate that the DPRK is
capable of producing 4,500 tons of chemical agents in peacetime and
12,000 tons in wartime.
4. The United States estimates the DPRK possesses 11–13 kg of
weapons grade plutonium attained from the discharge and reprocessing
campaign during 1989–90. ROK, Japanese, and Russian estimates
differ—being 7–12kg, 16–24kg, and 22 kg, respectively. The differences
reflect different assessments of the multiple reprocessing campaigns
during 1989-91. Estimates of the DPRK nuclear weapons inventory are
based upon the level of weapons design technology and quantity of
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weapons-grade plutonium it possesses. The U.S. Department of Energy,
in January 1994, reported that, depending upon technology used, as
little as 4 kg of plutonium would be sufficient to produce a nuclear
weapon. With the 11–13 kg of weapons-grade plutonium that the DPRK
is estimated to have extracted prior to signing the 1994 Agreed
Framework, it could have 1–3 nuclear weapons. If the fuel from the
May-June 1994 refueling of the 5 MWe reactor were to be reprocessed, it
would provide enough plutonium to manufacture 4–5 additional
nuclear weapons. If the Japanese and Russian estimates of plutonium
inventory are more accurate—being 16–24kg, and 22 kg
respectively—the DPRK could possess an additional 1–3 nuclear
weapons. If the DPRK’s level of technology is higher than currently
estimated, it could produce nuclear weapons with quantities of
plutonium as little as 1.5–3 kg. If it achieves this level of technology, its
nuclear weapons could be double current estimates. The possible
acquisition of fissile material from Russia, Pakistan, or elsewhere would
significantly increase the DPRK’s nuclear weapons inventory.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LAST WORST PLACE ON EARTH:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA

Jack Rendler
In most of the world over the past 40 years, a
government’s legitimacy, even survival, has become
dependent upon respect for the fundamental rights of its
people. Just 20 years ago, the stability and integrity of a
government were measured by how well it could control its
citizens; today, the very need to exert such control is a
hallmark of instability and desperation.
But since 1961, the people of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) have been denied contact
with the rest of the world. And they have been denied even
the most basic of their human rights. Since 1990, despite
harsh conditions and consequences, as many as 500,000
North Koreans have escaped their homeland.1 Between
1995 and 1998, North Korea lost three million of its 26
million people to famine, food shortages, and related
disease.2 The DPRK may have the only government in the
world that is willing and capable of simultaneously
repressing its citizens and starving them.
An understanding of the human rights conditions
prevailing in North Korea is essential to grasping the
worldview of the governing elite and to appreciating the
conditions endured by the people of North Korea. And such
an understanding is crucial to developing a long-term
strategy for dealing with North Korea.
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Overview.
Gathering data on North Korea is notoriously difficult.
Anyone with the intention of researching anything will be
denied entry or will not see much. The government of the
DPRK does not allow international inspection; it does not
respond to inquiries from independent human rights
organizations; it does not report to United Nations (UN)
commissions, as it is obliged to do. There is no one place
where an independent, comprehensive review of human
rights in North Korea can be found. This article
summarizes what can be said from the sources available.
North Korea has ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, and the four Geneva
Conventions. The DPRK therefore owes its own citizens
and the world community a commitment to the provisions of
those documents.
But the government of the DPRK regards international
human rights, particularly individual rights, as alien and
illegitimate. With the exception of the ruling elite, all of the
people of North Korea have been deprived of their basic
human rights. It is said that the paramount leader, Kim
Jong Il, is the only free North Korean.3 The government
keeps the world from North Korea and the citizens of North
Korea from each other.
Those who are assumed to be disloyal to the regime are
arrested, imprisoned, tortured, starved, and executed.
North Korean citizens do not have the right to propose or
influence a change of government. The government forcibly
resettles politically suspect families. Religious practice is
confined to state-sponsored Christian and Buddhist
services. Travel within the country is severely restricted,
and attempting to leave it is likely to result in beatings,
imprisonment, and, in some cases, execution. A
government human rights commission does not respond to
requests for information or investigation.4
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The governments of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and the Russian Federation are delivering North
Korean refugees to DPRK authorities against their will, in
clear violation of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951).
Dissidents who have successfully fled report widespread
crime and a constant struggle for survival. Members of the
armed forces are reportedly stealing food, livestock, and
household utensils. Hundreds of thousands are moving in
search of food, despite official restrictions.5
Human Rights Inside North Korea.
The DPRK currently holds at least 200,000 people for
political reasons.6 It is estimated that about 400,000
prisoners have died in the camps since they were
established by Kim Il Sung in 1972.7
Such prisoners may be held in any one of a variety of
facilities: detention centers, “No. 69” labor rehabilitation
centers, juvenile centers, maximum security prisons,
relocation areas, and sanitoriums.8 “Reeducation through
labor” means forced labor, usually logging or mining, under
brutal conditions. Entire families are detained because of
supposed political deviation by one relative. Families,
including children, may be imprisoned together. Under the
concept of “collective retribution,” children are punished for
the political sins of their parents, denied education, and
socially ostracized.9
In a 1988 report by the Minnesota International
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Asia Watch,
No. 69 labor rehabilitation centers were found to exist in
nearly every city and county, each center containing
between 100 and 200 people. The same report cited the
existence of 12 to 16 labor camps with a population of 500 to
2500 in each camp.10
Amnesty International has said of these people:
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Many of those named in this report are “forgotten prisoners,”
whose fate remains unknown after decades of official silence.
Some of those named may have died in prison. Others may still
be detained, after 30 years or more. Some of the prisoners were
last seen alive in 1990, others have not been heard of for
decades. Amnesty International is concerned that they may be
prisoners of conscience, arbitrarily imprisoned in violation of
international human rights standards.11

DPRK laws do not prohibit torture, and most political
prisoners are tortured. Methods of torture include
whipping; humiliations such as public nakedness; severe
beatings; electric shock; force-feeding water, then jumping
on the prisoner’s abdomen to make the water come out
again; and prolonged periods standing on ice outside in
winter. A common method is called “the airplane,” where
prisoners are hung upside down, spun, and beaten.
“Punishment cells,” constructed so that a prisoner cannot
stand up or lay down, are used as a consequence for
breaking prison rules. Many prisoners have died from
starvation and illness.12
There are more than 47 provisions in the Penal Code
which call for the death penalty, including “crimes against
state sovereignty” and “crimes against the state
administration.” Prisoners are executed in public,
sometimes for offenses as trivial as petty theft, occasionally
in front of large crowds which include young children.13
The government detains and imprisons people at will.
There have been “disappearances”—people taken from
their homes and sent directly to prison camps.14 Judicial
review does not exist, and the criminal justice system
operates at the behest of the government. The Public
Security Ministry decides who will be punished; the
Ministry of State Security decides on the penalty. The
accused is entitled to representation, but the lawyer’s
primary role is to persuade the accused to confess.15
All forms of information are controlled by the
government. Indoctrination is supported by neighborhood
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associations and schools at all levels.16 The opinions of all
North Koreans are monitored by government security
organizations, and electronic surveillance is used in many
private homes.17 Radios available to most North Koreans
receive only government broadcasts; loudspeakers in
gathering places broadcast government programs. Mass
demonstrations have been staged involving as many as
500,000 people. All organizations in North Korea have been
created by the government; independent public gatherings
are not allowed. The General Federation of Trade Unions is
used to monitor the political opinions of workers. The
government monitors telephones calls and mail; telephones
are not equipped to receive calls from abroad. Listening to
broadcasts from abroad is forbidden.18
Apart from a few Buddhist and Christian services
sponsored and monitored by the government, all religious
activity is discouraged. There is no artistic freedom; all art
must gild the myth of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.19
The government of the DPRK divides the entire society
into three classes: core, wavering, and hostile; there are
further subdivisions based on an assessment of loyalty to
the regime. The regime classifies 27 percent of the
population as hostile, and an additional 45 percent as
wavering” As a result, approximately 15 million people are
denied access to decent education, employment, housing,
and medical care, and they get less to eat. Children are
denied adequate education and are punished because of the
loyalty classification of members of their family.20
The government has forcibly relocated hundreds of
thousands from Pyongyang to the rural areas, including
people with disabilities or deformities. 2 1 The UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child has found that the
DPRK denies its children basic rights, and pursues “de facto
discrimination against children with disabilities.”22
The government of the DPRK does not allow freedom of
movement. Leaving the country is considered treason,
punishable by long prison terms or execution. Government
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regulations and practical difficulties make travel within
the country all but impossible. As a result, most North
Koreans live, work, and shop in self-contained housing
units.23
Perhaps the most damaging human rights violation by
the DPRK is its deliberate withholding of food and medical
care from millions of people. Since 1995, floods, droughts,
mismanagement, and the end of food aid from the Soviet
Union resulted in severe food shortages and famine. From
1995 to 1998, several thousand children died each month.
Researchers from the World Food Program, the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the European
Union found that 62 percent of children under 7 years have
stunted growth; international assistance is feeding almost
every North Korean child under that age. UNICEF has
estimated that about 80,000 children are likely to die from
hunger and disease, and 800,000 more are suffering from
serious malnutrition.24
The DPRK has refused to allow human rights and
humanitarian aid organizations to assess the full extent of
the crisis. In September 1998, Medecins Sans Frontières,
the largest aid group in North Korea, pulled out because of
government interference in the distribution of food and the
suspicion that food aid was being diverted to the military.
Other independent nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have reported that food was being distributed on
the basis of loyalty to the state, effectively leaving out those
most in need.25
With a negative economic growth rate over the last 10
years, famine, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
North Korea has been forced into a position of submitting
to negotiation in exchange for food. American demands to
inspect suspected underground nuclear weapon
construction sites were met by North Korean insistence on
$300 million in cash and food aid for the privilege. U.S.
recovery of the bodies of Korean War MIAs was halted
when North Korea demanded new humanitarian
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assistance, including construction of factories. In mid-June
2000, North Korea announced plans to ask donor countries
for $250 million to relieve hunger and to attain
self-sufficiency in food production.26
Refugees.
Article 47 of the Criminal Code of North Korea states:
A citizen of the Republic who defects to a foreign country or to
the enemy in betrayal of the country and the people . . . shall be
committed to a reform institution for not less than 7 years. In
cases where the person commits an extremely grave offense,
he or she shall be given the death penalty.

The vast majority of North Korean refugees are located
in the Northeast provinces of the PRC; several thousand are
in the Russian Federation. Estimates of the total refugee
population in the PRC vary wildly, from the 10,000 reported
by the Chinese government to the 300,000 estimated by
local NGOs. The most rigorous field surveys suggest a
number of 140,000 to 150,000 North Korean refugees in
China.27
The border between North Korea and China stretches
850 miles and offers many opportunities for a safe crossing.
Most crossings happen on winter nights over frozen rivers.
Most refugees cross the Tumen River; some cross the Yalu
River or through the forests around the Changbai
mountains. People usually travel in small groups of two to
five; some cross by paying commercial carriers or by bribing
North Korean border guards.28
Most refugees seek protection and housing from the
Korean-Chinese communities in the Yanbian
Korean-Chinese autonomous district. Others (slightly less
than half of the total refugee population) live in the three
Northeast states of Liaoning-sheng, Jilin-sheng, and
Heilongjang-sheng.29
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Some may find shelter and assistance with relatives or
acquaintances, and ethnic Koreans unknown to them often
provide food, medicine, and small sums of money in return
for performing household chores. Many of these people go
on to perform work arranged by these hosts.30
The vast majority of refugees in China (perhaps 95
percent) left North Korea in search of food and are unwilling
to return until the food supply and distribution improves.31
While North Koreans may be driven to China by hunger, the
government of the DPRK regards them as traitors for
leaving; their return means political persecution.
Most refugees are single adults between the ages of 18
and 30, with no dependents. They are likely to be from
shattered families that have lost at least one member to food
shortage or famine. Most are from urban areas, although
refugees from rural areas and areas far from the border are
increasing. Few refugees have been in China for more than
2 years; some return to North Korea with food; others have
been forcibly repatriated.32
The men are usually laborers with a high school
education; they perform the kind of work no one else will
do—cutting rock, mining, moving human waste. Women
work in restaurants, do housekeeping, attend to patients;
they also work in “entertainment,” from which they are
often forced into prostitution. Many are able to stay in
China by virtue of marriage to a Chinese national. Some
women are married by introduction, others are sold by
human traffickers; some escape, but most stay on in order to
be fed.33
Perhaps as many as 50,000 North Korean refugee
women have been sold by Chinese criminals to Chinese
purchasers, many for the purpose of sexual slavery. These
women frequently become the victims of confinement and
sexual abuse. Unwanted pregnancies often result in poorly
performed abortions; proper follow-up care is rarely
possible.34
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Most refugee children are male, over 10 years old, who
have lost at least one parent. Most roam around and beg for
food or money, sleeping in streets and public squares. Very
young children cross the border in groups and stay together
as they move from village to village. Such groups are easily
detected and returned; about half the North Korean
children in China have arrived and been returned two or
three times. All of these children exhibit profound physical
and psychological damage.35
Chinese police have markedly increased expulsions of
North Koreans; the number has more than doubled this
year to about 2,000 per month. In January, the United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) granted refugee status to seven North Koreans,
but China sent them back anyway. The PRC does not permit
the UN or other international groups to investigate
conditions on the border, although China is party to treaties
that should permit such investigation.
North Korean refugees arrested in China are sent first to
a Chinese detention camp or prison where they remain for a
week to a month. In April 2000 about 100 North Koreans in
a detention center in Tumen rioted and held guards hostage
to protest China’s program of forced repatriation.36
Refugees are returned to North Korea where they are
interrogated at an intelligence agency office at the border.
They are then sent to a detention camp near the border, and
from there to another detention center in or near their
hometown. An intelligence agency office in the region of
their hometown determines punishment.37
They are then sent to one of four places: home, labor
camps, prisons, or camps for political offenders. Women,
children, and the elderly are usually “re-educated” in their
home areas through 3 to 7 days of violent language and
beatings. Young people over 16 are most often sent to labor
education camps. Those accused of smuggling or trafficking
receive prison terms ranging from 1 to 15 years. Those
accused of meeting South Koreans are sent to camps for
121

political offenders. All detention and imprisonment are
accompanied by wretched conditions, beatings,
ill-treatment, and torture.38
There are approximately 6,000 North Korean refugees
in camps in the Russia. They come largely from logging
sites run by the DPRK in the Khabarovsk and Amur regions
of the Russian Far East. Most were sent to work legally, but
left the sites with the intention of not returning to North
Korea. Some made their way illegally into Russia directly or
from China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, loosened
controls resulted in higher numbers of North Korean
workers leaving their sites for other parts of Russia.39
At the larger sites there appear to be two prisons, one for
criminals and one for political offenders. Political
infractions include criticizing North Korea and challenging
camp authorities. Food is inadequate; discipline is severe
and includes ill-treatment such as shackles and leg
weights.40
Russia is pursuing a policy of tolerating North Korean
refugees without granting them refugee status or living
permits. Refugees must still fear being arrested as illegal
aliens by Russian law enforcement, as well as apprehension
by the North Korean Public Security Service. North Korean
agents also pursue people who have helped the refugees.
North Korean security forces, sometimes on the territory of
the Russian Federation, have executed apprehended
refugees. The prospect of being returned to North Korea has
led some refugees to desperate acts: perpetrating crimes in
order to be sentenced to Russian prisons and committing
suicide.41
South Korea has a policy of accepting and assisting
refugees from the North. Despite this, there are fewer than
1,000 refugees in the South, fewer than 120 in Seoul.42
There are several reasons for this: the stigma attached to
South Korea in the minds of North Koreans; the likely
danger to family members remaining in the North; the
increased time and procedures for acceptance; and the
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long-term record of difficulty for refugees in adjusting to life
in the South. The vast majority of refugees (perhaps 90
percent) would rather stay in China than live in South
Korea.43
Strategy and Action Recommendations.
In the past year, North Korea has taken a number of
steps toward ending its isolation. Diplomatic relations were
resumed with Italy in January, and with Australia after a
lapse of 25 years. Similar overtures have been made to
Britain and Canada. On May 29-31, Kim Jong Il made a
secret visit to Beijing (his first since 1983) to meet with
Chinese President Jiang Zemin. Jiang is likely to visit
North Korea before the end of the year 2000. U.S. and North
Korean officials have been engaged for 6 years in a series of
talks on tracing U.S. soldiers missing in action during the
Korean War, and on North Korea’s civilian atomic power
plants and intentions regarding nuclear arms manufacture.
Similar meetings are taking place with Japan. The DPRK
has agreed to allow Hyundai of South Korea to develop a
tourist facility in the Diamond Mountains, for $906 million
over 6 years. North Korea showed a likelihood of
participating in ASEAN meetings on defense and strategic
issues in Bangkok in July 2000, and the DPRK has
expressed interest in joining the Asian Development
Bank.44 Reuters reported that Kim Yong-nam, president of
the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, would
represent North Korea at the UN Millennium Summit in
September.45
• The open countries of the world, especially Japan, the
United States, and South Korea, should seize this opening
to extend their ties with the DPRK. Such contact, over the
long term, offers the best chance of bringing change to the
government and to the people of North Korea. At the same
time, there must be a greater sense of urgency for improving
the human rights of the people of North Korea.
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• The United States should pursue a strategy of
securing constant improvement in the human rights
performance of the DPRK.
Development and
implementation of such a strategy should be accomplished
in conjunction with other open countries important to the
leadership of the North Korea: Japan, France, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and Australia.
• The basic message of negotiations should be: We can
do business with you, but it will be a good deal easier if you
would undertake the reforms necessary to assure respect for
human rights. In negotiating with the DPRK on human
rights issues, the United States should maintain the
forward position: economic favor should follow political
reform; the rights of the North Korean people should not be
held hostage to an endless series of economic demands.
• Relevant North Korean officials, especially the
Ambassador to the UN, should have the opportunity for
frequent contact with the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
• Offers of international humanitarian aid should be
made, but should be contingent upon independent
monitoring of its distribution. Such aid should be given
in-kind rather than in currency.
• The UN should take primary responsibility for
long-term monitoring of the human rights situation in
North Korea, and in areas of China and Russia adjacent to
the North Korean border. Priority should be given to
arranging a meaningful fact-finding mission by an
independent, international human rights organization.
• The Secretary General of the UN should make it clear
that, since the DPRK has ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adherence to its
principles is not a casual consideration.
• The World Trade Organization and other
international trade and labor groups should make it clear
that forced labor of any kind is unacceptable. The World
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund should make
future loans contingent upon measurable improvement in
the protection of human rights.
• At a minimum, the government of North Korea
should:

… make a meaningful commitment to implementing the
rights and procedures guaranteed in the North
Korean Penal Code;
… amend Article 47 of the Criminal Code to bring it into
conformity with international standards;
… ensure that no form of torture occurs anywhere;
… provide the information about individuals, groups,
and prisons requested by human rights groups;
… discontinue the harassment, imprisonment, and
ostracism of North Korean refugees abroad, and
returned refugees at home.
• The PRC is the key on the status of refugees. The
UNHCR should press the DPRK to fulfill its obligations
under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, accord displaced North Koreans in China refugee
status, and press the PRC to protect and provide for North
Korean refugees in China. The government of the RPC
should alter its policy of forced repatriation of North Korean
refugees, and adopt guidelines consistent with the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Chinese
government should provide special protection and support
to North Korean refugee women and children, and act to
prevent the sexual slave trade on the border.
• Russian authorities should bring an immediate end to
North Korean Public Security Service (PSS) operations in
Russian territory. No North Korean workers who are at risk
in the DPRK should be forcibly returned by Russia. Russian
authorities should take responsibility for preventing
ill-treatment of North Koreans at all work sites.
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Conclusion.
For peace and freedom in East Asia; for continued
rapprochement among the United States, the PRC, and
Russia; and for further reduction of nuclear weaponry, a
stable and secure North Korea is essential. A regime is
stable and secure only when its assumption of legitimacy is
matched by its protection and promotion of fundamental
human rights. Kim Jong Il’s regime must be regarded as
fundamentally unstable. The economy is so ruined that
North Koreans flee to China to seek a better life. The people
suffer famine and a chronic shortage of food. Military
spending and priority cannot be sustained. The entire
citizenry is repressed, and political prisoners are held in
vast numbers.
The Economist recently remarked:
To contemplate North Korea is to stare into the abyss. There are
those who argue that if North Korea fails to reform, its regime
will collapse. Others retort that, on the contrary, collapse will
follow directly from reform. Probably both are right.46

One of the greatest ideas of the philosopher, Confucius,
regards the nature of power. He said that there was only
one legitimate purpose of power, whether you use it as a
leader, a parent, or simply a human being—to work for the
well-being of the powerless. Confucius believed that any
other use of power constituted an abuse that would result in
the loss of power.47 Work to secure human rights for the
people of North Korea is good policy: politically,
strategically, and morally.
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CHAPTER 5
CHINA’S GOALS AND STRATEGIES
FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Eric A. McVadon
Author’s Note: Before the notable spring 2000 summits in
Beijing and Pyongyang,1 China’s policies and practices for
the Korean Peninsula had slipped into the background.
American attention and media reporting China’s regional
goals and strategies had been justifiably dominated by the
tensions across the Taiwan Strait and their implications for
the United States. The “Taiwan problem” is, as Chinese and
American leaders have repeatedly stated, the likely cause for
hostile military actions between China and the United
States. The divided Korean Peninsula, jutting southward
from China’s northeast coast and blocking (with the Russian
Far East) China’s access to the Sea of Japan, has fortunately
lost the status of a prime problem likely to kindle hostilities.
Encouraging initial views of the summit meeting between
the North and South Korean leaders has, for many Koreans
and others, replaced fears of war with euphoria—whether
warranted or not. This development, at least with respect to
the Korean Peninsula, should not, however, diminish
interest in China’s intentions and actions concerning its two
important Korean neighbors and the implications of China’s
policies and strategies for the United States. Indeed, it now
seems all the more likely that changes on the Korean
Peninsula will be the catalyst for revision of the architecture
of Northeast Asian security.
This chapter will examine the People’s Republic of
China’s (PRC) aspirations and actions with respect to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the
Republic of Korea (ROK). Primary sources for this section
are Chinese officials, military officers, specialists from
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strategic studies institutes, scholars, and practitioners who
have diverse knowledge and experience in China’s security
concerns in Korea. These sources are not secretive or
guarded; they readily discuss China and Korea. Chinese
positions, goals, and strategies will be analyzed; the
implications for Beijing, Washington, Seoul, and others will
be explored. Chinese motives, as they apply to a changed
Korea and to the United States, will be examined. Prospects
for reconciling divergent American and Chinese regional
security philosophies, focused through the lenses of the
existing regional security situation and likely change on the
Korean Peninsula, will be explored. Taiwan and its
reunification or other outcome deserve the attention they are
currently receiving, but Taiwan will probably be only a
sideshow in the bigger arena of Northeast Asian security in
the coming years. Korea is likely to be the center ring for the
main performance that will help shape security relations
among the major regional players.
HOW CHINA VIEWS ITS RELATIONS WITH THE
KOREAS
China justifiably prides itself on its nicely balanced
relations with both North Korea and South Korea, arguably
(and convincingly so) a better balance by far of
comprehensive relations with the two Koreas than that of
any other nation.2 For much of the last decade, Beijing was
perhaps the only capital to have normal working relations
with both Koreas,3 a situation that only now appears to be
changing as other important nations move to improve their
relations. Russia, for example, has very recently begun to
mend its frayed ties with the North; Australia and Italy
have established formal diplomatic relations; and Canada
has recognized Pyongyang. Talks to that end with Japan
continue. Yet China recently demonstrated its preeminent
position with North Korea when the latter’s President Kim
Jong Il chose Beijing as his first foreign destination,
conducting the stunning, secretive visit just 2 weeks before
he was to hold the historic June 2000 initial meeting with
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his South Korean counterpart.4 China’s uniquely balanced
links with the two Koreas are especially noteworthy in light
of the vast differences between the North and South and
between the two relationships.5 Additionally, China’s
positions and policies for the Korean Peninsula are not well
understood or may be widely misperceived, offering the
prospect of discovering a number of surprises, large and
small.
China and the DPRK.
“We wish that the North Korean people . . . will continue to
achieve victories in the process of building socialism with
Korean characteristics and in seeking peaceful reunification,”
Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said at a press
briefing in September 1998. In referring to the then recent
confirmation of Kim Jong Il as the North Korean leader, he
was quite reserved, even taciturn, saying only: “Chinese and
North Korean leaders in the past had a tradition of exchanging
visits and we hope this tradition will continue.”6

This somewhat cool official statement was made less
than 2 years ago after North Korea’s parliament,
unexpectedly meeting for the first time in 4 years, named
Kim Jong Il as head of state. At that time, Kim was also
reelected (first elected in 1993) chairman of the powerful
National Defense Commission, with parliament terming
that position the “highest post of the state.” These events
were transpiring in the wake of North Korea’s surprising
launch several days before of the solid-fuel, three-stage
rocket that flew over Japan on August 31, 1998. They
illustrate the difficulties and uncertainties that plague the
PRC government as it determines how best to treat the
DPRK. Now, as we have seen, Kim Jong Il has visited China
for the first time in 17 years, his first visit there as North
Korea’s leader, and his first visit in that capacity to any
foreign country.7 There was in Beijing a hospitable
reception, but there were still indications of Chinese
uncertainty about Kim and his policies and about North
Korea and where it is headed. Those issues are an
133

appropriate place to start an examination of China’s view of
the Korean Peninsula—and the PRC’s outlook and
attitudes, as suggested, are not lacking in surprises.
The Concept of North Korea as a Buffer State. Among the
unexpected discoveries is the diversity of Chinese views on
the matter of North Korea as a buffer state. The idea that
North Korea is a valued socialist and authoritarian buffer
between China to the north, and the military forces of the
United States and the ROK and the capitalist and
pluralistic influences of South Korean society to the south,
is much more readily and widely accepted in Western
academic and military circles than among Chinese
academics and strategists. Some Chinese thinkers call the
concept of a strategic buffer anachronistic, yet another bit of
debris left over from the Cold War. Others deny that
attention is given to the buffer concept in Chinese thinking
about the Korean Peninsula. Still others describe the buffer
idea as a concept that has little validity at present, even if it
was a more vital factor in earlier years.
There are stronger views: The buffer concept is
abhorrent to some Chinese because it implies both that
South Korea is at least a potentially hostile power,
something Beijing does not wish to dwell upon (or even
contemplate), and that Beijing might somehow be obligated
to Pyongyang for mendicant North Korea’s service as a
strategic buffer against hostile intrusions of various sorts.
Further, the buffer idea runs counter to the precept of
nonalignment, a notion Beijing wishes to foster concerning
its relations with the two Koreas. One active and
well-informed Chinese official said that in several years of
talks between China and South Korea, in which he had
participated, the buffer concept was never discussed,
including in private and preparatory discussions among the
Chinese delegations.8
Another view is that emphasis on the buffer concept has,
for good reason, waned during the last decade. The
establishment first of strong trade relations and then
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diplomatic relations between China and the Republic of
Korea was a strong factor in diminished emphasis on the
concept; this was reinforced recently by other favorable
actions by Seoul—as perceived by Beijing. Notable among
these were President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy
toward Pyongyang and the South Korean Ministry of
Defense decision not to participate with the United States in
the development and ultimate deployment of theater
missile defense (TMD) systems, both occurring in early
1999. Now there is the apparent easing of North-South
animosity during the summit meeting of the Kims. Chinese
thinkers, who give weight to these particular developments,
see the ROK in a new light: as simply a bilateral alliance
partner with the United States and not so much as part of a
de facto collective security network comprising Japan, the
United States, and the ROK—a concept deeply troubling to
Beijing. For some, this brings a measure of contentment
that makes it seem ludicrous that a buffer state would be of
value in this changed political geography.
Capping all this is a sense of assuredness among the
Chinese that nothing is about to happen to take away the
buffer—whether they acknowledge its value (or feel it
necessary) or not. Any form of reconciliation or reunification
on the Korean Peninsula is viewed by most Chinese
specialists as many years away, maybe a decade or more, so
imminent demise of the buffer (acknowledged or not) is not a
fear. In this vein, there is a conviction on the part of most
moderate Chinese thinkers that the United States would be
highly unlikely to move its military forces north of the 38th
parallel even after the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is
dissolved, and that, as we shall see, it is not necessarily a
great Chinese concern if U.S. forces were to remain on the
peninsula.
Laying out these various Chinese views is not meant to
imply a sweeping consensus that the concept of North Korea
as a valuable friendly buffer state is a dead idea. It does
imply that the concept is at least no longer central to general
Chinese thinking about the future of the Korean Peninsula.
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At a minimum, Beijing has, as revealed in the various views
described, conditioned itself at least to the eventual demise
of this buffer between its highly industrialized Northeast
and objectionable influences or forces emanating from the
southern half of the peninsula. And even now the view
among important Chinese thinkers has moved very far from
general acceptance of the need for such a buffer or its central
applicability to Chinese strategic thought concerning the
two Koreas, as was clearly the case in earlier years. The
concept of a Korean buffer does, however, survive in another
form: The Korean Peninsula, taken as a whole, is viewed by
Beijing as a buffer between China and an increasingly
dangerous and active Japan.9 It is significant that the
current buffer of import to Beijing is not one between it and
the combination of South Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance
but rather between China and the combination of Japan and
the U.S.-Japan alliance.
DPRK Receptivity to Economic Reform: A Parable of the
State of the Relationship. Pyongyang has a reputation for
refusing to accept advice on how it might reform its dismal
economy, even disregarding advice given in a gentle, Asian
way by Beijing. The Chinese have tried to demonstrate by
example, rather than finger-waving and lecturing, that
North Korea has much to learn from China. Put another
way, Beijing has created opportunities for Pyongyang to
become familiar with Chinese economic reforms and other
domestic changes.10 It has often seemed that this effort was
largely futile.
This popular conception, that Pyongyang just
stubbornly ignores good Chinese advice and examples, is
not, however, the whole story. China, indeed, continues
delicately promoting economic reform for North Korea, and
North Korea truly is often quite unreceptive, if not wholly
intransigent. Among the reasons is that North Koreans
believe that China has become largely capitalist and
pro-American. The Chinese model, as a consequence, does
not seem to Pyongyang generally applicable to staunchly
communist North Korea.
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Two years ago, nonetheless, noteworthy, if not sweeping,
change began. There is now decreasing resistance in
Pyongyang to China’s gentle hints about the advantages to
be gained by reform in North Korea. Pyongyang has
recognized that all successful countries have opened to the
outside. More specifically, in 1999, North Korea obliquely
acknowledged the success of China’s economic reform—an
important step away from stubborn resistance. Pyongyang
now permits farmers to have the combination of small plots
of land and small farmers’ markets where the products of
these plots may be sold. This is tacit acceptance of the advice
China has sensitively proffered, advice offered in the form of
recounting Chinese experiences, not in the form of demands
or threats to cease support. During President Kim Jong Il’s
recent visit to Beijing, he reportedly stated that China has
scored great achievements in its reform and opening to the
outside world and that its comprehensive national power is
being improved and its international status is rising as well.
All that, Kim said, demonstrated that the policy of reform
and opening to the outside world, which was initiated by
Deng Xiaoping, is correct, and that the Korean party and
government support the policy.11 These were striking words
that received little outside attention; however, these strong
statements, implying at least that Chinese reforms might
be employed in North Korea, were not repeated in the North
Korean press reports of Kim Jong Il’s visit to Beijing.
To be specific, it should be noted that China had not
previously been altogether ignored by North Korea as a
source of advice and example in confronting economic
issues. Pyongyang had, for example, accepted in earlier
decades essentially the verbatim version of China’s statute
governing the operation of special economic zones and the
use of foreign direct investment. More broadly, Pyongyang
has learned to some degree how to do economic reform, some
of it learned from China, and yet maintain internal political
stability. North Korea, nonetheless, has, at least until now,
considered it essential in its careful, gradual reform process
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not to follow the path of ideological doom down which China
has strode—as Pyongyang sees it.
That is the greater lesson reflected herein. The former
closeness between the PRC and the DPRK, “as close to lips
as teeth,” has been replaced by a pragmatic, even critical
and quite selective, approach toward each other. Beijing
seems purposefully to have sought the visit by Kim Jong Il
both to make it clear to all that its influence in Korea was
second to none and to influence the outcome of the imminent
North-South summit. Although some closure seems to be
occurring now, there remains the earlier tangible evidence
of a gap between Beijing and Pyongyang: Beijing chose in
1996 in the United Nations Security Council to back
condemnation of the North Korean submarine intrusion
incident in South Korea. Pyongyang initially objected to
Chinese participation in the Four Party Talks. Rumors were
rampant that Chinese officials simply did not like Kim Jong
Il personally, despite their close relations with his father.
As the president of a prestigious Chinese think tank said
in March 2000, China no longer treats North Korea as a
disadvantaged comrade but rather as a brother. This means
that the “costs of the evening” are shared, that China picks
up the tab less and expects a relationship with Pyongyang
more on the basis of relations between normal states.
However, China provides help when needed in an
understanding way.12 (In another vein, a Chinese specialist
on North Korea noted that Beijing has little choice now but
to accept and work with Kim Jong Il; it is apparent that he
has consolidated power and is running North Korea.) This
dancing together—but not too closely—has derived not just
from the obvious national differences in size, population,
wealth, and geopolitical circumstances, but also from the
most salient difference, namely, that China’s leaders have
elected to make fundamental changes in the precepts
underlying communism for China and the Chinese
Communist Party. Those changes remained anathema to
North Korea’s leaders. It is not yet clear whether the
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May-June 2000 Kim visit to Beijing has removed this
barrier.
Pyongyang: Both an Irritant Rubbing Against China’s
Northeastern Underbelly and a Thorn under Tokyo’s and
Washington’s Saddles. There is no doubt that one of the
most prominent characteristics of North Korean leadership
and its approach to international relations is what might be
termed “the three o’s”—obstinacy, obduratness, and
obstreperousness. It is occasionally overlooked in the West
that Beijing must also put up with its share of these
obnoxious North Korean qualities, to add yet another
o-word.
Although Beijing did not share during the early years of
the last decade the deep pessimism about the DPRK’s future
prevalent in many Western capitals, North Korea was
increasingly acknowledged by Beijing as a potential
economic, political, and social disaster. And this profoundly
troubled country borders on an important, already
economically troubled, region of China. What is sorely
needed by China there, across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers,
is a stable and prosperous neighbor. Furthermore,
Pyongyang, as has been described, has not been receptive to
Chinese advice on reform or, for that matter, to Chinese
advice, example, or urgings in most other areas. As has been
revealed by many Chinese who have dealt with North
Koreans, Beijing finds it very difficult to communicate with
Pyongyang, and when it does try to communicate, the
outcome is often misunderstanding or either intentional or
inadvertent misinterpretation. So Pyongyang and all of
North Korea are more than an irritant to China; North
Korea is one of China’s most difficult and unpleasant
problems to manage. Putting it in the nicest way he could, a
Chinese official said, “The Chinese goal is to keep North
Korea reasonable and to keep it from being a
troublemaker.”13
One of the most troublesome specific problems is the
matter of North Koreans fleeing the poverty and famine, or
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near-famine, pervasive in many areas near China.
Estimates of the numbers of those who have a fled across the
border into China and settled there, those who make brief
forays for food or to earn a bit of money, and those who are
turned back, vary greatly with the source. The numbers are
likely much higher than the estimates of tens of thousands
offered by Chinese authorities. In any case, China is
managing these aspects of the immigrant and refugee
problems and may even have increased the forcible
repatriation of refugees in preparation for Kim’s arrival in
Beijing.14
Most Chinese who study or deal with these problems
have not believed and do not now believe that North Korea
is on the brink of collapse or even that there is an impending
lesser calamity that will send hordes fleeing northward.
They, instead, tend to see North Koreans as even more
resilient than were the Chinese during their very trying
periods of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the
Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. In other words,
Chinese observers believe the North Koreans are
accustomed to making do with very little and tolerating a
very abusive and ineffectual central government—that the
North Koreans are and will continue to be survivors. So far,
over half a decade of very great North Korean misery, they
have been right.
Nevertheless, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and
its adjunct, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), are said by
responsible sources to have made contingency plans to block
a refugee flood into China and to manage the problem to the
extent feasible. The need to plan for this contingency is
troublesome to Beijing for two reasons that might not be
obvious. First, it is a factor in considering how to dispose its
armed forces and, specifically, a constraint on the freedom
to redeploy forces, something that could become a pressing
concern if China wants to move forces southward to bring
heightened pressure to bear on Taiwan or to cope with
internal or external threats posed in China’s far northwest
or southwest. Even under present circumstances, China’s
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top military authority, the Central Military Commission
(CMC), may well be keeping group armies and other units in
Northeast China, in proximity to the border with North
Korea, that it would prefer to have moved to the east coast
facing Taiwan. Second, if there arises a crisis of significant
proportions in North Korea, a CMC decision to move
blocking forces into position to stop refugee flows may, to
avoid the appearance of a precursor to an invasion, have to
be distinguished for an international audience from a move
into North Korea, as discussed more fully later in this paper.
Beyond these problems, there is, of course, the
fundamental issue of whether and how China could and
should cope with the practical and humanitarian problems
likely in a North Korean calamity—problems that may
dwarf the experiences the world witnessed in the exodus
from Kosovo, for example. The PLA and PAP are used
regularly in China to aid in dealing with natural disasters,
especially the devastating floods and earthquakes that
plague China. However, neither of these forces is trained in
managing thousands or hundreds of thousands of
non-Chinese with whom they, for the most part, do not have
a common language and whose needs will be very difficult to
meet.
If China is busy enhancing PLA capability along these
lines, it has been silent, even secretive, about the endeavor.
The odds are very high that the methods employed by the
PLA and PAP to handle very large numbers of refugees,
should such a situation develop, will be rudimentary and
even cruel if measured against the norms of worldwide
agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
dedicated to such efforts. Beijing is highly unlikely either to
admit to the world the scope of the problem and its inability
to cope or to permit prompt intervention by others
experienced in handling refugee migrations. It is also not
likely that many Chinese officials are deeply concerned
about that potential problem, not because they are heartless
but rather because China is constrained by limited
resources, is short-sightedly sympathetic with Pyongyang’s
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current demands simply to return those who flee (so as to
deter further flight), and is focused on Taiwan and perceived
internal dissidence. Beijing is content to relegate the
collapse of North Korea to the category of problems with a
low probability of occurrence. Few, if any, in China see that
a grotesque mishandling and mismanagement of refugee
hordes from North Korea could be, for China’s international
repute, the Tiananmen debacle redux.
Pyongyang: Useful Device to Keep Washington and Tokyo
Off Balance? There is, however, another aspect of North
Korea’s penchant for being obnoxious. Some Western
observers wonder if Beijing, although having, itself, to
contend with North Korea’s bad conduct and unreliability,
does not to some extent relish the fact that Pyongyang keeps
Washington and Tokyo reeling as well—and that American
and Japanese leaders are far more preoccupied over this
“rogue state” than Chinese leaders. This, however, is
another of those views more widely held in the West than
among Chinese specialists. As one astute Chinese official
associated with a body under China’s State Council put it:
“One hears talk of using Pyongyang’s obstreperous behavior
to keep Washington off balance, but in fact the concept has
no utility and has not been used in practice. Putting a
different slant on the issue, he said that there is some
validity instead to the concept that Washington needs
Beijing to deal better with Pyongyang and other
(unspecified) troublemakers.15
Other Chinese who have to deal with North Korea are
too concerned with the essential effort to keep Pyongyang
from acting up to think that encouraging mischief or worse
by Pyongyang could be useful in this overly clever way to
best Washington. They also are concerned that such tactics
might backfire with resultant undue hazard to China’s
direct interests or regional stability. One Chinese official
said first that it does not seem necessary for China to use
North Korea as a burr; North Korea surely does not need
encouragement in this regard from any country. In his view,
North Korea already creates too many troubles. Moreover,
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he concluded, there are, as things stand, enough problems
between the United States and China; why produce more
through uncontrolled methods involving a somewhat
erratic North Korea?16
With respect to Sino-American relations, Pyongyang’s
current utility to Beijing lies, for the most part then, in
playing on the American conviction that Washington can be
aided in dealing with Pyongyang if China is pulling in the
same direction or at least not tugging the other way. But the
United States and Japan are opening up to North Korea,
and Pyongyang is at least sporadically receptive, even
reaching out in recent months. As Tokyo and Washington’s
connections to Pyongyang become more frequent and
numerous and grow stronger, Beijing will be left largely
with just the negative side of bad North Korean
behavior—worrying about how to keep Pyongyang under
control. This aspect to PRC-DPRK relations was certainly a
central component of Beijing’s calculus in having Kim visit
prior to the North-South summit.
To put a finer point on all this, Beijing sees specific
aspects of Pyongyang’s behavior as counterproductive
rather than as useful in keeping Tokyo and Washington off
balance. For example, in the eyes of most Chinese
specialists, North Korea is seen as an excuse (and a weak
excuse by Chinese reasoning) for the United States and
Japan to cooperate on the development of TMD systems
that are primarily intended to contain China. Similarly,
North Korea is among the countries that give great impetus
to the American effort to persuade or coerce Moscow to
modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Thus
Washington can, because of North Korea’s ballistic missile
program, make a rational case for national missile defense
(NMD) efforts that Beijing sees as curbing China’s crucial
nuclear deterrent.
Pyongyang is often trying to Beijing even when trying to
be helpful. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s surprising
announcement, after his unprecedented visit to Pyongyang
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in July 2000, that North Korea would abandon its ballistic
missile program if it received assistance from other
countries in “peaceful space research”17 might have seemed
helpful to China’s crusade against NMD. However, a
Chinese official spokesman was forced to say shortly
thereafter that China knew nothing of the remarkable, yet
enigmatic, proposal Putin had apparently extracted from
the Kim on this, the first visit to Pyongyang ever by a Soviet
or Russian leader! Chinese leaders, apparently nonplussed
by both the announcement and its circumstances, have been
silent on its likely validity or utility in China’s campaign (in
concert with Moscow) against U.S. NMD. President Putin
called President Jiang Zemin only after he had completed
his trips to Pyongyang and then to the G-8 meeting in
Okinawa to belatedly tell him of the assurance he had
received from Kim Jong Il that North Korea would cease its
missile program if it received outside help in space
exploration.18 To make matters more trying, the Russians
announced on the day of the Putin-to-Jiang call that Kim
Jong Il would soon make another trip abroad, an extended
visit to Russia by train, thus seeming to upstage the brief
trip by Kim to Beijing a few weeks earlier.19
PRC-DPRK Military Relations and Arms Sales. North
Korea’s armed forces, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), at
the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century lost its
longstanding primary source of support, the Soviet Union.
China was a significant source of military equipment,
especially ballistic missiles and related technology in
earlier decades, when it was trying to woo Pyongyang away
from Moscow.20 There was also a later interlude of intimacy
between Pyongyang and Beijing right after the events at
Tiananmen in 1989. North Korea, almost alone in the world,
was supportive of Chinese actions to suppress the notorious,
televised uprising in the heart of China. Then in the 1990s,
North Korea’s isolation became greater than ever, when
rationally it would seem North Korea was more needy of
Chinese aid and support. Instead, other factors came to the
fore. The development by Beijing of close ties to Seoul,
144

starting with economic ties and culminating in diplomatic
relations in August of 1992, and China’s tendency to
substitute its practical interests for ideological
considerations were among the factors that came into play.
Related to these, Beijing wanted to have its cake and eat it
too: to maintain appropriate relations with the KPA while
cautiously establishing ties with the ROK armed forces. Put
another way, the PLA has felt that it must maintain
relations with the KPA to balance or offset the Chinese
military’s improving relations with the South Korean
military—specifically to preclude paranoid Pyongyang’s
overreacting to these improving PRC-ROK links. This has
not been an easy thing to carry off.
Nevertheless, this development was less disturbing to
Pyongyang (or at least they made less of it) than might have
been the case. This is, in significant measure, because of the
unavoidable need for North Korean leaders to focus on their
country’s severe economic plight, the desperate
requirements for other-than-military aid, and, indeed, on
the very survival of North Korea as a nation and society.
Beijing was pleased to operate in this way; it enhanced
China’s ability to claim the moral high ground, to point out
that it provided very little in the form of military aid to
Pyongyang while Washington supplied Seoul with large
amounts of weapons and military equipment and stationed
tens of thousands of troops on South Korean soil. So both
capitals, Pyongyang and Beijing, were sufficiently satisfied
(or at least distracted or content) not to press unduly for a
more robust PLA-KPA military relationship.
This is not to suggest that there were no arms and
technology transfers, and that North Korea has not made
significant requests from time to time during the last
decade. According to a senior PLA Navy officer, deceased
(1995) Marshal O Chin-u, then North Korea’s leading
military figure,21 at one time requested more of what were
then China’s top warships (termed Luda-class destroyers in
the West) and submarines than the PLA Navy had in its
three fleets combined. Other exaggerated requests led
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Chinese military officials to conclude (and sometimes
weakly joke) that North Korea was asking for a great deal in
the hope of getting even a little—possibly an indication of
the distance between the two militaries rather than
evidence of close cooperation.
A noted South Korean expert on China’s military
relations with the Koreas suggested a general conviction
among informed observers that China
refrained from providing weapons to North Korea in the
1990s—even if the possibility that a small amount of weapons
parts and military technology made its way to North Korea
cannot be ruled out.22

Reflecting at least ambivalence among the DPRK’s
leaders toward China’s potential to supply military aid, this
South Korean specialist quotes the very high-ranking 1997
defector from Pyongyang, Hwang Jang Yop:
Since Kim Jong Il [the current DPRK leader] does not rate
China’s military capability highly, North Korea has not
introduced weapons or the technologies for developing weapons
from China.23

It is impossible at present to say if such statements were
made (or convictions held, if that was the case) because they
were altogether true or, instead, as a consequence of
Pyongyang’s pique at Beijing for the snub of recognizing
Seoul, even if relations with Pyongyang were not
interrupted.
It can be said that visits at the very highest levels
ceased.24 Nevertheless, other senior government officials
from the DPRK and PRC, including the foreign ministers of
each country, exchanged visits after formal recognition of
the DPRK’s declared foe, the ROK, in August of 1992 and
before the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s long-ruling
“Great Leader” in July 1994. These visits also included
delegations of very senior military and naval officers.
Indeed, it is striking (and seemingly significant) that a
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much higher degree of military aid from the PLA to the KPA
did not stem from this series of visits, ranging from senior
officials and officers down to working-level military
exchanges. The personal relationship with Kim Il Sung may
have been an important factor, for after his death 6 years
ago, the pattern of visits changed markedly, with a notable
decrease in frequency and the rank and stature of the
officers and officials, plus the presence of a tone of
symbolism and ceremony rather than one of serious
working exchanges.25
PLA officers privately reported in the late 1990s that the
KPA has grown more reclusive, secretive, and seemingly
independent. For example, PLA Navy officers have not been
welcome to go on board North Korean navy ships provided to
Pyongyang by Beijing in earlier years. This suggests not
only a distance between the services of the two countries but
also a desire by the KPA forces not to be embarrassed by the
poor materiel condition and degraded operational status of
the transferred ships and equipment. PLA officers say that
the exchanges between the two militaries have become
largely mundane or perfunctory. Because of the DPRK’s
limited financial resources (despite the apparent outright
purchase in 1999 of formerly Russian MiG-21 fighter
aircraft from Kazakhstan in 1999), Chinese officials have
said, Beijing has resorted to a policy of making only minor
transfers of equipment and provision of training free of
charge. This has included, for example, spare parts,
ammunition, and the training of naval engineers.26
Interestingly, PLA officers go to some lengths to portray
these transfers as innocuous, emphasizing, for example,
that training is provided to “technical branch” officers and
not combat units. A 1996 PLAN ship visit to North Korea
was carefully described as nothing more than a minimal
celebration of the 35th anniversary of the nearly defunct
PRC-DPRK friendship agreement.27 Chinese officers and
officials portray the military relationship as stagnant and of
little consequence, noting that communications by phone
and other routine means are not conducted. When pressed,
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one senior PLA officer did say that the full details of the
relationship were known only by the most senior Chinese
military officers, that neither side wished to publicize the
relationship or draw attention to it.28
All this interesting and revealing, if incomplete,
evidence suggests that China is likely supplying minimal or
moderate (at most) military aid and doing it in ways and
forms tailored to serve Beijing’s national interests, with
apparent limited concern about DPRK needs.29 Beijing is
pleased to keep the nature of the relationship and the
specifics of transfers opaque, at least in part because it does
not want to put up with the “supervision” of the
international community, especially Washington’s
predictable views, concerning what China does for North
Korea’s armed forces. Concealment of the interesting
details is also of value in preserving a good tone in relations
with the ROK; the fewer specifics Seoul has to digest the
better.
However, before waxing ecstatic about the lowly state of
PLA support for the KPA, it should be recognized in the
West that this level of cooperation and supply is probably
sustainable essentially indefinitely and conceivably could
facilitate concealment from international notice the scope or
types of equipment. China is not, in this military
relationship, prone to suffer from “donor fatigue” or
constantly in danger of incurring international sanctions.
China does not see support of the KPA as a short-term
endeavor, reflecting Beijing’s longstanding view of the
probable long-term persistence of the current North Korean
regime and its armed forces.
China and the ROK.
Over the last 2 decades, Beijing’s policy toward the
Koreas has evolved from one of viewing the Korean
Peninsula as a single country suffering under illegitimate
division, through a period of accepting as a practical matter
the existence of the two countries, and now to the current
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recognition that, both in practice and with respect to
international law, there are two Koreas. The Cold War era’s
sharp focus by China on ideological considerations has all
but dissolved, and in its place there are the clear outlines of
rational economic policy: acceptance by the Chinese leaders
of South Korea’s amazing success and North Korea’s
abysmal failure—and trying to make the most out of the
former and cope with the latter.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that many
influential figures in Beijing have realized the overriding
value of China’s economic progress and prowess and
concluded that China’s regional security and
comprehensive national power are served much better
thereby than with the erratic modernization of the PLA.
This evolution in Beijing’s policy toward the two Koreas has,
of course, favored China’s relationship with the more solid
and prosperous Seoul rather than strengthening its links to
a needy and perverse Pyongyang.30 It is interesting (if not
precisely pertinent) to note, in this regard, that Beijing’s
economic and diplomatic ties to Seoul are far more solid,
numerous, and important than Washington’s recently
improved but still tenuous links to Pyongyang—a
development in these international relationships that not
many experts would have forecast 20 years ago.
In the eyes of most observers, Beijing, with the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROK in 1992,
made clear its choice between Pyongyang and Seoul.
Doubtlessly, the concept of nicely balanced relations
between the two Koreas is important to China both at a
practical level and as a source of pride in Beijing’s
diplomatic prowess. Nevertheless, Seoul has won out and is
Beijing’s preferred Korean associate. Beijing, of course, does
not make public proclamations stating this in so many
words, but the combination of pragmatic economic
considerations and the prevailing Chinese forecast of the
long-term outcome on the Korean Peninsula have made the
choice of Seoul over Pyongyang a practical imperative.
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China is striving (successfully) to position itself to (1)
gain the maximum economic benefit for the time being, (2)
ensure the best possible relations with the particular Korea
that is virtually certain to come out on top in the long term,
and (3) sustain brotherly relations and a measure of
influence with the other Korea virtually certain to remain
on the bottom. Put another way, Seoul, from Beijing’s
perspective, fully deserves careful cultivation as an
economic partner. Beijing enthusiastically courts Seoul
because of a very strong desire, even need, to pursue the
great advantages, economic and diplomatic, to be gained
from that burgeoning relationship. Pyongyang is
undeserving but must not be ignored. The North Korean
government’s proclivity toward the role of troublemaker
and the potential of the country, intentionally or
inadvertently, to be a source of serious problems for China
means that Beijing ignores or shuns the antics of the North
Korean leadership at its peril. All these factors seem
reflected in China’s role in getting Kim Jong Il to visit
Beijing before the North-South summit and then basking in
the euphoric post-summit glow and in its implicit role as a
facilitator of radical improvement in inter-Korean relations.
Beijing insightfully envisioned good economic relations
with South Korea very early; significant indirect trade
existed between China and South Korea by 1979. Beijing’s
early hope or vision for the relationship has, indeed, come to
pass and, significantly, has weathered the Asian financial
crisis of the late 1990s. Annual two-way trade between the
ROK and PRC approaches $25 billion,31 and total South
Korean direct investment in China is also very substantial,
already having exceeded $2.6 billion by 1996.32 In recent
years, the ROK became China’s fourth most important
trading partner; China was the ROK’s third most important
trading partner. Comparable ranks are forecast for the
current year.33
Beyond these impressive statistics there is the
additional factor that South Korea has tended to invest
heavily in China’s Northeast, a rust-belt region where
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investment is particularly needed. South Korea has also
made well-directed and welcome investments in the Bohai
Gulf region including Shandong Province and the Tianjin
area. In addition to the value to China of ROK trade and
investment, South Korea has, from the outset, needed these
investment opportunities in China, thus leading both
countries to ensure that economic factors take priority in
their relationship. Moreover, this almost single-minded
emphasis by Beijing on China’s economic development has
reinforced a desire for the sort of stability on the Korean
Peninsula that is essential to China’s national economic
progress.
However, economics and who comes out the winner
between the two Koreas are not the whole picture in
Beijing’s view of South Korea. The other important Chinese
foreign policy consideration is that of precluding the
development of close relations between South Korea and
Japan. Beijing is concerned, for example, about recent
moves by Seoul toward closer ties with Tokyo, most notably
recently warming military relations between ROK forces
and the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF), including
prospects for basic military exercises. In September 1998
the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency and
the ROK Minister of Defense agreed to regular meetings
between senior officers of their naval forces and the conduct
of annual joint exercises. Although the exercise conducted,
lasting less than a week in August 1999, involved rescue
operations at sea and not combat operations, this first-ever
exercise between Japanese and South Korean naval forces
aroused concern in Beijing.
Interestingly, advance arrangements were made for this
same month, August 1999, to have the ROK minister of
defense make a first-ever visit to Beijing, and the PRC
minister of defense agreed during the visit to a first-ever
visit to Seoul to take place in 2000. It has not been possible
to discern if this flurry of “first-ever” events involving the
defense ministers of the ROK and PRC was an effort to
ameliorate concerns in Beijing about ROK military contacts
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with Japan (as seemed to be the case) or whether there was
a measure of coincidence. In any case, the ministers of the
two 1950-53 Korean War adversaries, China and South
Korea, established regular military relations including
high-level visits on a 2-year cycle.34 Moreover, they
reportedly talked in January 2000 about the prospects for
periodic meetings at their level and exchanges of visits by
senior military officers as well as reciprocal port visits by
the two navies and unspecified joint military exercises.
Unquestionably, something has kindled an enhanced
PRC-ROK military relationship.
The broader area of South Korean public attitudes
toward China is also pertinent. While acknowledging the
anecdotal nature of his observation, a leading scholar on
China-Korea issues at a prestigious Chinese official think
tank remarked that in his experience retired South Korean
generals do not hate China—as they well might, given the
adversarial period of the 1950s and the aftermath thereof.
South Koreans in general do not have hard feelings toward
the Chinese, he asserted. Indeed, in South Korean polls,
China comes out often as the favorite foreign country, he
proudly reported, noting pointedly that this is certainly not
so for Japan, a country not liked by the Koreans.35
These anecdotal remarks are substantiated by surveys
of South Korean citizens taken in the mid-to-late 1990s that
illustrate Beijing’s success in obtaining popular support in
the ROK for China’s position as an Asian good neighbor. In
two popular surveys, two and three times as many South
Koreans, respectively, considered Japan the country most
threatening to ROK security as considered China to be the
greatest threat. In three surveys, China, by a margin of
about 10 percentage points over Japan in each poll, was
consistently seen by South Koreans to be more important in
promoting ROK interests. (The United States was judged
more important than China, but by surprisingly meager
margins of less than 10 percent. For example, in the 1997
survey, 41.1 percent judged the United States the most
important for promoting ROK interests, 33.8 percent chose
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China, 21.0 percent chose Japan, and 14.6 percent chose
Russia.) In 1997, twice as many South Koreans wanted to
strengthen relations with China as wanted to do so with
Japan (55.6 percent to 25.3 percent).36 So, in response to a
variety of questions over a period of several years, South
Koreans say they view China more favorably than
Japan—just as the Chinese rather proudly assert to be the
case. Moreover, South Korean affection for the United
States is waning while China’s status in these polls
improves. This is all the more significant both because
younger South Koreans tend to have a more favorable view
of China than their elders, and, as years pass, the overall
trend toward favoring China over Japan and the U.S. has
increased.37
China and the DPRK’s Missiles, Proliferation, and
Nuclear Weapons.
Beijing strives to be on the side of the angels with respect
to Pyongyang’s development of ballistic missiles, nuclear
warheads, and transfers of missile technology to other
countries. There is a tendency for Chinese interlocutors on
these subjects to describe quite fully what China, they
assert, is not doing and to say very few words about what
China is doing. As one mid-level think tank research
professor phrased it, “There is not support, but there is
understanding.”38 This researcher and other Chinese
specialists unhesitatingly point out that, in their view,
North Korea feels understandably imperiled and has
chosen this way to improve its security. Pyongyang feels
threatened by powerful Asian neighbors and especially the
Americans, present by the tens of thousands just across it
southern border and exceedingly well equipped with the
most modern arms, at a time when North Korea is in
undeniably dire economic straits. North Korea is proud, and
tries to make its people feel the government is effectively
protecting them, the researcher went to great pains to
explain. Simply put, as he explained with disarming candor,
missiles are cheaper than airplanes; also, missile programs
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have the proven effect of giving Pyongyang negotiating
leverage in a dramatic way that nothing else could have
done.
A more senior think tanker expressed a similar view
from a different slant: “North Korea does have a different
diplomatic style. It needs the air of crisis and occurrence of
incidents to draw American attention.”39 This same senior
specialist went on to say that North Korea’s development of
missiles is understandable to the Chinese; it resembles, he
said, Mao’s development of nuclear weapons for China. An
isolated and weak country naturally seeks quick and easy
solutions for its security. Missiles, he argued, are indeed
easier to come by than complex combat aircraft and require
less technology to maintain, support, and operate. South
Korea and the United States are powerful enemies;
Pyongyang has had to do something, he concluded.
The Chinese specialists, whose views are described here,
and others who claim knowledge of the matter, dispute
Western claims of recent Chinese support for North Korean
missile programs. In short, their assertions are that China
is at least no longer providing support for North Korea’s
missiles programs and has not done so since the end of the
Cold War. One Chinese specialist insisted that China now
helps North Korea’s missile program with neither
components nor technology; he did, however, confess there
had been exchanges of views.40 He claimed ignorance of
previous instances of the transfer of missile technology or
components to North Korea.41 The associate research
professor was somewhat more candid, saying that the
relationship has a long history and that in the early days the
situation was very different from now.
Contrary to the views of several Western observers (who
assert that Beijing still supports Pyongyang’s ballistic
missile program), these interlocutors all agree that China is
particularly unhappy now with North Korea’s development
of missiles because it gives Japan and the United States an
excuse to develop TMD. A senior member of a think tank in
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Beijing went beyond that, saying that the Indian, Pakistani,
and North Korean missile programs are all bad for China’s
interests. However, he and a well-connected foreign service
officer who has specialized in these matters argued that it is
hard for Chinese to talk to sovereign North Korea about
missile development proliferation issues. Beijing, they say,
cannot publicly criticize Pyongyang on this count given the
overall nature of the relationship.42
When pressed on why Beijing “allowed” Pyongyang to
transfer, over a period of years beginning in the late 1980s,
technology and missiles for Pakistan’s Ghauri and Ghauri 2
missile programs, Chinese specialists deny or dissemble.
They do go so far as to argue that subtle means in private
meetings are the way Beijing feels it must handle
proliferation issues, as the senior think tanker explained
previously. The Chinese Foreign Service officer mentioned
above elaborated, saying that Beijing avoids “instructing”
North Korea in order to be more effective in its influence
across the board. He went on to say that China is not
confident in its knowledge of what Pyongyang has done as
far as the transfer of missiles and missile-related
technologies. Consequently, Pyongyang can simply deny
the allegations because China does not have proof.
Although China’s interests indeed lie in a permanent
cessation of North Korean missile tests, specifically because
Japan will want TMD more strongly in the face of further
tests, China, these specialists argue, finds it difficult to
oppose a sovereign government’s testing of missiles for its
defense (regardless of how provocative to Tokyo and
Beijing). Similarly, Beijing feels it cannot object to the
transfer by North Korea of missiles or missile technology if
these transfers are within the limits of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—which the Chinese,
somewhat smugly, suggest is the appropriate standard by
which Beijing and others should evaluate such conduct.43
Chinese specialists on this matter make two additional
points. First, The Russian connection is important in North
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Korean ballistic missile development. Taepo-dong
technology they assert is basically Russian technology.44
China was not informed in advance of the notorious August
31, 1998, missile launch.45 Second, North Korea, as the
Chinese see it, is not a threat, and clearly not a threat to the
territory of the United States. To label North Korea a
threat, they argue, is to ignore its desperate economic and
social plight and its meager resources that preclude its
building a significant missile arsenal. And contrary to some
Western convictions, the Chinese argue, North Korean
leaders are rational and know it would be suicidal to
conduct a “pre-emptive strike” with its missiles against
Japan or the United States.
Chinese positions on these issues are different but not
diametrically opposed to those of the United States.
Nevertheless, these arguments by knowledgeable Chinese
specialists make it clear that Beijing is, as a general matter,
considerably more sanguine than Washington and Tokyo
about the current situation and prospects for North Korea
with respect to the development of ballistic missiles and the
proliferation of missiles and missile technology to embrace
countries Washington considers rogue states (as of June
2000, termed “states of concern” by the U.S Secretary of
State). Chinese arguments take into account Washington’s
positions and attempt somewhat subtly in most cases to
undermine or weaken the American argument, all the while
avoiding direct confrontation or the danger of having
Beijing labeled by the international community as either
unconcerned with the dangers or blatantly abetting North
Korea’s objectionable conduct. This is another nice Chinese
balancing act, facilitated by the ability of an authoritarian
government to orchestrate its publicly stated positions and
not have them attacked by knowledgeable domestic critics.
Although one cannot be sure of the motives of China’s top
leaders, those who address the issues in public and
privately with Western interlocutors seem convinced of the
merits of China’s “principled positions” and the failure (or
refusal) of Washington to view these matters in the proper
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light. There is a glimmer of hope that Chinese concerns
about the prospective development and deployment of TMD
in East Asia might prompt Beijing to pressure Pyongyang to
curb its Taepo-dong tests and overall ballistic missile
program. As was seen in the July 2000 suggestion that
North Korea may give up its missile program, Russian
President Putin seems to have exercised some of the clout
many think Beijing should apply with Pyongyang—and for
the same reason that applies to Beijing: trying to eliminate
North Korean missiles as an incentive to Washington not to
proceed with development of missile defenses. At least there
is now the reasonable hope that measures to bring about
this result may somehow be applied by Moscow, Beijing,
Washington, Seoul, and/or Tokyo.46 In trying to make such
an argument effective with Beijing, it must be taken into
account that Beijing is already poised to respond that North
Korea is not by any reasonable measure a real threat and
that TMD must be seen in its real light: ultimately an
attempt to neutralize the most effective component of
China’s armed forces, its arsenal of short-range and
medium-range ballistic missiles; in other words, a means to
contain China.
Moreover, Beijing does not wish to find itself (even very
remotely) a part of Washington’s efforts to influence
Pyongyang—and especially not to be associated with
agreement verification activities. China sees great peril in
such a path. When Beijing sees Pyongyang subjecting itself
to intrusive inspections, such as that of the suspected
underground nuclear facility at Kumchangni, and the
inspections related to its compliance with the Agreed
Framework (explained further below), it grows wary that
inspection regimes of that sort might be urged or even forced
on China. The secretive Chinese government and Chinese
Communist Party consider such inspections anathema and
a blatant violation of China’s sovereignty intended to expose
Chinese secrets and weaknesses and take unfair advantage
of backward and developing China.
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The Nuclear Weapons Issue. Always ready with a
“principled position” as a retort (or diversion), Chinese
specialists, when asked about how seriously they oppose a
nuclear DPRK, somewhat surprisingly assert that Beijing
is more concerned about the nuclear tests by India and
Pakistan than is Washington. As one interlocutor put it, the
United States is unduly concerned in East Asia about North
Korean missile tests and a “low-level nuclear weapon
development effort” and not appropriately concerned about
the big threats in South Asia of India and Pakistan, where
nuclear testing is not just an American fear but something
that has actually occurred—many times.47
Chinese analysts of recent Asian nuclear developments
argue that the United States is far harsher in its attitude
toward, and treatment of, North Korea than it is with
respect to India, a real nuclear threat, as they put
it—failing, understandably, to include their nuclear ally,
Pakistan, in the indictment. The Chinese senior think tank
member interviewed in Beijing put it in somewhat more
clinical terms. He pointed out that, contrary to the South
Asian example, North Korea has not tested a nuclear
weapon, although it might well have done so as early as
1994, the year the United States became so concerned about
this prospect and consequently negotiated with Pyongyang
the Agreed Framework. (This document, controversial in
the eyes of many, was designed to halt North Korea’s
nuclear program and was completed in Geneva in October
1994. Its detractors, primarily in the United States, remain
adamant that it is unworkable and doomed to failure—a
failure they forecast is destined inevitably to produce
disastrous results, including a nuclear-armed DPRK.)
China and KEDO. China does not make contributions to
the funding for Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO).48 China’s arguments for failing or
refusing to contribute come in layers. The superficial reason
is that China is both poor and does not want to interfere in
North Korean affairs, with more emphasis on the point that
China allegedly has no money to contribute to the
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program—an argument hard to swallow given the growth of
the Chinese economy over the last 2 decades and the size of
China’s foreign currency reserves. The next level of the
expressed Chinese rationale for nonparticipation is that
China wants to help North Korea in its own way, not
through KEDO. China and the United States, it is argued by
the Chinese, have some common interests in North Korea
but also some differences. Beijing does not want to be
lumped together with Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington in the
way aid and support are provided to Pyongyang. China
wants to be different. The Chinese say they understand
North Korean psychology well (implying that others do so
less well). Beijing knows how, in Asian style, to deal with
Pyongyang and show respect as needed to bring good
results.49
What appears to be the last layer of the Chinese
rationale for not contributing to KEDO puts a finer point on
the argument: As one very authoritative source put it,
China provides very significant food aid to North Korea,
sometimes on concessionary terms. More important, China
meets important energy needs of North Korea through the
provision of coal and oil; oil is by far the most important.
China prefers to provide for these energy needs
independent of KEDO not just because it does not want to be
lumped in with other countries but importantly because
North Korea does not want China to switch to the KEDO
conduit. North Korea does not want Chinese aid linked to
KEDO, apparently implying a fear by Pyongyang of
complications, uncertainty, political machinations, etc.;
and, moreover, North Korean leaders often ask for (and
obtain) concessions and other special treatment.50
So Beijing’s position with respect to nuclear weapons
development in North Korea, is, as has been seen in other
areas, superficially similar but hardly identical to that of
Washington. As with missiles and proliferation, China does
not support nuclear weapon development by Pyongyang.
However, Beijing does not find its interest in precise
coincidence with the international effort under KEDO
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designed to prevent North Korean nuclear weapon
development—and it makes its case for nonparticipation on
the basis of “principled” reasoning. Many in Washington see
Beijing’s positions in a sinister light; Beijing sees
Washington’s positions as simply unenlightened.
The Potential for North Korean Chaos and
Collapse.
Professor Chu Shulong, recognized as a preeminent
scholar on Sino-Korean relations and policies at the China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR,
a think tank closely linked to components of the PRC
government), prepared two lengthy papers in English, one
in mid-1999 and the other late in that year. Both extensively
described and analyzed Chinese policy and attitudes
concerning the Korean Peninsula. Significantly, neither
paper alludes to the prospects for North Korean collapse
and chaos.51 As another Chinese specialist explained in
early 2000, Chinese who concentrate on North Korean
issues have never thought that North Korea would collapse
and now think it highly unlikely, if not impossible, that a
collapse would occur under its current leader, Kim Jong Il.52
Collapse Called an Unlikely Scenario. Chinese, the
specialist said, are firmly convinced that North Korea will
not collapse, and he provided his list of reasons.
1. Chinese who study the issue believe the 1993
assertion of the South Korean Ministry for Reunification
that North Koreans were absolutely loyal to Kim Il Sung
and believe now that North Koreans accept Kim Jong Il as
the “idealistic” successor leader (meaning that the son is the
philosophical and conceptual successor to his father).
2. Kim Jong Il has strong control over the secret police
and the military. There is no strong force to organize the
people to subvert the current regime.
3. South Korea does not want, and therefore does not
promote, rapid collapse of the North. Among the many
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reasons for this is that South Korea is not as wealthy as
West Germany, and North Korea is poorer than was East
Germany. Consequently, the German model is considered
inapplicable to Korea.
4. North Koreans have a very simple life. They can
withstand hardships that might bring about the downfall of
other regimes elsewhere around the world.
5. Americans do not want the rapid collapse of North
Korea and, just as with South Korea, do not attempt to
facilitate collapse. Both countries even take steps to avoid
that outcome. According to the analysis of this Chinese
specialist, were North Korea to collapse, the U.S. Congress
would then ask why U.S. forces should stay in Korea. Then
the Japanese, and especially the Okinawans, would raise
the issue of why they alone in Asia had to endure U.S. troops
on their soil.53
In the mid-1990s, a representative of a prominent
Chinese think tank contended those in Seoul and
Washington who forecast doom for North Korea are
engaged in wishful thinking. He asserted that Beijing has
counseled Seoul that a collapse scenario is something that
should not be seriously contemplated and, further, let it be
known that Beijing would be highly displeased with efforts
by Seoul to promote a collapse—urging instead that Seoul
direct its efforts to reducing tensions and improving
relations. The Chinese who offered this advice to Seoul are,
no doubt, elated with the conciliatory policies toward North
Korea under the current South Korean president, who was
elected in December 1997, and with the apparently
successful June 2000 North-South summit.
When Professor Chu of CICIR, the author of the two
papers cited above, was subsequently pressed in a spring
2000 interview with the author in Beijing, he said he does
not believe any communist country will collapse as a direct
result of economic troubles. China endured great hardship
and did not collapse. East European countries did not
collapse because of a failed economy, he asserted, although
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economic difficulties did push to the fore political problems
that led to collapse. The survivability of communist
countries is very high under economic stress, Chu argued.
Nonetheless, if North Korea’s economic problems increase
greatly, China will go all out to prevent chaos.
North Koreans Seen as Resilient and Tough. Other
Chinese have been more “personal” in their reasoning. They
say simply that the North Korean people, as mentioned
earlier, have proven themselves to be at least as tough and
resilient as the Chinese who suffered the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, both resulting in
large numbers of needless deaths and other extreme
stresses on Chinese society; yet the government did not fall,
and the country did not collapse. Starvation and other
deprivation in North Korea, unlike in other countries of the
world whose people have much higher expectations from the
government and for their own lives, are not likely catalysts
for North Korean collapse or even chaos.
Chinese analysts of Korea have been making this point
for many years and feel the passage of time has validated
their analysis; they simply do not think the subject
currently warrants significant continuing discussion. They
largely consider, a bit smugly, that two points have been
made: North Korea is not on the brink of collapse, and
Americans and others who made the dire forecasts in the
mid-to-late 1990s have been proven wrong. Chinese
scholars and diplomats who discuss North Korea with
Americans recognize that among American specialists on
East Asia the talk of collapse long ago faded away, and that
Americans are looking to other outcomes for which they are
seeking appropriate descriptions and rationale, such as
reconciliation.
North Korean Economic Collapse. But what of a purely
economic collapse or meltdown, somehow lacking a
“political” component? Although China is many times
larger, more prosperous, and more populous than North
Korea, the Chinese argue that they could not at this
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juncture in their economic development reasonably meet
the full North Korean requirements for assistance were the
country completely to collapse economically. This is a
significant departure from the quite confident Chinese
attitude in 1996, despite China’s rather paltry level of
support at the time, that Beijing simply had to make the
decision to go all out and salvage the North Korean economy
if collapse appeared imminent.
As discussed in the section on Chinese views of North
Korea, China is promoting economic reform for North
Korea, but North Korea is stubborn. A Chinese specialist
who had dealt with these issues in the 1990s argued
recently that North Korea should change its policies; it
should not continue indefinitely to depend on foreign aid.
Instead it should provide an environment conducive to
foreign investment; it should reduce restrictions on foreign
investment. He pointed out that North Korea said initially
it would accept investment only from large South Korean
firms, but these are few. Indicating that some positive
movement may be occurring, he said that, since 1999, North
Korea has allowed investment by a few small companies. 54
Chinese exasperation with Pyongyang’s reluctance, or
even refusal, to reform earlier may have waned a bit, but the
signs that might indicate real, fundamental reform in the
North are not compelling. Another Chinese specialist,
working temporarily in Washington, affirmed that China,
concerned about its own economic prospects, now has
diminished capability and greatly reduced will to supply
North Korea with all it needs or wants. China now does only
what it can; not what North Korea wants.
Given Japanese and American reluctance and
constraints, South Korea is the only big supporter of North
Korea and seems to have largely recovered from the Asian
financial crisis that struck in late 1997. In any event,
Chinese leaders do not want to see Pyongyang left without
recourse and tempted to try anything with nothing to lose.
They almost certainly view the visit to Beijing by Kim Jong
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Il, the June 2000 North-South summit, and the promise of
possibly rapidly improving ties between North Korea and
South Korea as highly desirable steps down a path that will
both prevent North Korean economic collapse and also
preserve South Korea as a valued, strong economic partner
for China.55
Reunification? Reconciliation? Integration?
Perpetual Partition?
China objects to being lumped together with those
nations said to favor the indefinite division of Korea. The
views of Chinese specialists are nuanced, and not
identically so. For example, among those with optimistic
outlooks the argument is that Beijing simply does not
oppose Korean reunification. China, in this formulation,
wants peaceful reunification, with South Korea helping to
bring about North Korean reform. The role of China and the
United States should be circumscribed; neither should
interfere but both should provide aid.56
The view generally attributed to the Chinese
government is a bit less optimistic, particularly about the
time frame for possible reunification. The official position is
that maintaining stability and achieving a peaceful
resolution are a higher priority than any early reunification;
or, put a slightly different way, Beijing supports only
“peaceful” and “reasonable” means of Korean
reunification.57 That said, Beijing does not ignore the
(ultimately good) example of Vietnam: Reunification there
caused some problems for China but was generally
advantageous for the Chinese economy—and that was what
counted. There are two goals: (1) for the short term,
permanent peace in place of a temporary armistice
arrangement, and (2) reunification (or possibly
“integration,” as a well-informed official termed China’s
reunification hopes for the two Koreas) for the longer term.
China’s perceived role is to push and encourage these. After
reunification or “complete integration,” China’s role would
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be to maintain a balance of power in the region, a balance
that should include China, Japan, the United States, and
possibly Russia. 58
A Beijing think-tanker offered what might be the most
candid appraisal of China’s position on reunification:59
Beijing’s first priority with respect to the Korean Peninsula
is stability so as to foster China’s continued economic
progress. He pointed out that his home is in Northeast
China, so he also thinks of this in personal terms. Among his
concerns is that instability would equal refugees (as
examined earlier in this paper), likely a very disruptive
factor both economically and socially. China, he argued, has
a carefully balanced policy for the two Koreas that is
specifically designed to promote stability; it is not just a
policy of diplomatic nicety. The second priority is
reunification. Indeed, a reunified Korea may be good for
China, and, indeed, it is appropriate to support and
encourage reunification as an example for a proper outcome
of the China-Taiwan situation. Furthermore, a united
Korea would be a good friend of China as well as an
important economic partner. In further candor, this senior
researcher injected that he does not know what process
might lead to reunification.
There are additional perspectives that warrant mention:
Other Chinese specialists have been equally candid, if more
pessimistic, for the short term, suggesting that
reunification may take decades, maybe 20, 30, or 50 years.
Unlike Taiwan, they feel, there is no hurry. From China’s
perspective, nothing is going so badly awry for China’s
interests in either Korea that reunification is an early
imperative. Those Chinese who are familiar with the use of
the term reconciliation by some senior Americans (with
respect to resolution of the division of the Koreas) do not
recoil at its use. They seem to equate it roughly with the
Chinese preference for the term integration—possibly an
early stage of a process leading to “complete integration.”
For whatever reason, these Chinese do not acknowledge the
proposition, suggested by many outside of China, that their
165

government favors prolonged division of Korea as
something that is in China’s interest.60 They object to what
they term a Western notion that a weak and divided Korea
is preferred by Beijing because a strong and unified Korea
will be a military threat. They look to a strong and
prosperous unified Korea as the best outcome for
China—especially for China’s economy. Although the
analogy is flawed, the reasoning smacks of logic similar to
the American assertion that a prosperous, stable, strong,
and unified China is preferred by Washington over a
country weak, fragmented, unstable, and needy. Just as
many Chinese doubt the sincerity of the American
argument about the characteristics of a preferred China,
many Americans will, naturally, doubt the Chinese
expressed preference for a unified, strong, and stable
Korean Peninsula—eventually.
The Future for American Military Forces on the
Korean Peninsula.
A Historical Glance. Before peering into the probable
future Chinese attitude toward U.S. forces in Korea, a
glance at the past provides valuable perspective and
context. The decades of the 1950s and 1960s and into the
beginning of the 1970s were a period of staunch Chinese
opposition to U.S. forces in Korea. This opposition
originated as far back as the U.S. support of the Chinese
National Party (the Kuomintang [KMT] that fled to Taiwan
in defeat) against the Chinese Communist Party in the
1945-49 civil war. It was mightily reinforced when Chinese
and American forces fought against each other in the
Korean War of the early 1950s and again when the United
States, with its South Korean ally, pursued a policy toward
the PRC of isolation and containment. The remainder of the
1970s and 1980s saw a change of the Chinese position as the
United States and the PRC together faced the Soviet threat.
Chinese leaders were content during this latter period with
the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, despite official support
of North Korean demands for their removal. After the Cold
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War ended, Beijing became ambivalent, no longer pleased
by the American presence but recognizing that some
advantages accrued to China from that presence, not the
least of which was the singular contribution of these forces
to stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. This
stability facilitated unprecedented Chinese economic
growth, although many Chinese observers are reluctant to
acknowledge that benefit of the American military
presence.61
A Note of Realism in China’s Chorus of “Principled
Positions.” It is also useful to understand China’s
fundamental position now, at the beginning of the first
decade of this century, on U.S. forces in Asia. (This means, of
course, in South Korea and Japan, the only remaining
locations for U.S. forces that were in earlier decades spread
much more widely and, in some cases, densely in the region.)
As a Chinese specialist described the position, China
opposes in principle the presence of foreign forces in the
region, but Chinese leaders are realistic. They see that the
countries of Southeast Asia want the U.S. forces in the
region. The Japanese and South Korean governments want
U.S. military forces and bases in Japan and Korea. The
Japanese and South Korean people are uncertain, with
anti-American protests swelling in South Korea. The
political right wing in Japan does not want the U.S. military
on Japanese soil. This right wing movement, however,
advocates making Japan an “ordinary”62 state, with the
final goal of having the United States out of Japan so as to
achieve “full Japanese independence.” Japanese
right-wingers and nationalists together make a formidable
faction.
In light of this, several Chinese analysts, who are
objective and willing to be candid, describe the U.S. military
presence in Japan as having dual tracks: (1) preventing
China from causing a problem; and (2) keeping Japan under
control, preventing a new kind of militarism in Japan, and
keeping Japan developing on a peaceful road. Beijing, they
argue, wants the United States to recognize China’s
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interests in the region and recognize Chinese sovereignty
and territory—including Taiwan. American forces should
not, of course, be employed in ways that contravene these
precepts. Contrary to allegations by others, they assert very
adamantly, China does not want to compete with the United
States for a dominant role in the region.63
Other Chinese interlocutors over the past 4 years have
helped flesh out the details of the Chinese position. Because
of China’s “principled opposition” to the presence of military
forces on foreign soil, government spokesmen when pressed
will consistently and persistently state the obligatory
opposition to troops on foreign soil. However, Chinese
specialists frequently assert that China does not object to
the presence of U.S. forces if their presence is consistent
with the wishes of the people and governments of Korea and
Japan. Some elaborate to the extent of pointing out that this
would mean all the peoples of Korea were the North and
South reunified, but they do not try to explain how such
wishes would be determined or confirmed.64 The point is
sometimes made that Beijing’s more relaxed attitude
toward American military power in Asia is evidenced by the
fact that the issue of U.S. forces in Korea is at the bottom of
China’s agenda of regional concerns, but, in contrast, the
matter is always at the top of Pyongyang’s list. Cited as
further indirect evidence is that, although the Soviet Union
is no longer a threat, Beijing has nevertheless not pressed
for ejecting the United States from the ROK and Japan.
(The likely futility of making such a request, in blatant
disregard for the concerns of Seoul and Tokyo, is ignored by
those who gratuitously make this point.)
What Purpose would U.S. Forces Serve? China Wonders.
There is, nevertheless, an interesting nuance that has crept
into some discussions by Chinese officials actually working
these matters—practitioners, not scholars or think tankers.
These officials press the point that the purpose of U.S. forces
in Korea would weigh heavily in Beijing’s calculus about
how to react to their continued presence after reunification.
If there is no alternative but to conclude that U.S. forces, by
168

the nature and composition of the force or the character of
American pronouncements about that forward-deployed
force, are there to contain or act against China (especially in
a Taiwan matter), then it will be difficult for Beijing to do
anything but strongly oppose the U.S. presence. This
somewhat contorted position might be rephrased as follows:
Beijing would need to be able to conclude that U.S. forces in
Korea were not there to contain China or aid Taiwan;
Washington might take the view that Beijing understands
the United States has no intention of using force against
China—with the unspoken implication that such action
would not be taken unless egregious Chinese behavior
demanded it.65 In other words, both sides might need to
apply their own interpretations and agree tacitly not to look
for contradictions or complications that both sides would
recognize could be found by digging too vigorously—and
imprudently.
One of these Chinese officials recently elaborated this
position in a way that may appeal to Americans, saying that
the Korean Peninsula is “sandwiched” between China and
Japan and also between China and the United States.
Beijing, he said, expects U.S. forces to remain on the Korean
Peninsula to maintain this balance of power, even if other
factors have caused the United States to remove its forces
from Japan.66 It is not so much that these positions
expressed by Chinese interlocutors can or should be taken
at face value. The important thing is that Chinese officials
are openly and candidly discussing with American
interlocutors the circumstances under which U.S. forces
might remain in a unified Korea and not draw the wrath of
Beijing. Certainly, Beijing has no veto on U.S. force
deployment decisions, but there is much to say for avoiding
contentious issues in Sino-U.S. relations, especially as they
apply to American military forces in the region.
China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations division director Chu Shulong wrote last year, “In
the relationship between American alliances, American
military forces in Asia, and Taiwan, the Chinese position
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has been clear and consistent and will remain unchanged in
the future, no matter the state of the relationship between
China and the United States.”67 Chu also wrote in the same
paper, “Certainly it will be the Koreans’ decision whether to
let American troops continue to stay in a united Korea and
whether to keep the U.S.-Korea alliance. Since there are no
indications that China-Korea relations will be troubled in
the future, U.S. troops in a united Korea are unlikely to play
any function against China.”68 In March 2000, a noted
Chinese specialist on security issues concerning Korea said
that Beijing’s attitude toward U.S. forces in Korea depends
on the status of U.S.-China relations. Only Taiwan can
produce a really hostile relationship; there is no other
reason for hostility. China generally does not criticize the
U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula—just
offering occasional criticism of some specific exercises, he
concluded.69
Evidence of a Dramatic, Ongoing Change in Chinese
Attitudes toward U.S. Forces in Asia. The attitudes of at
least some influential figures in China concerning U.S.
forces in Korea have changed significantly in the recent past
as a consequence of the view that the United States has a
new proclivity for abusing its status as the world’s sole
superpower, displaying hegemonism, and acting as an
irresponsible interventionist (all Chinese descriptions of
recent American military undertakings, of course, with the
Kosovo-Yugoslavia air campaign most prominent).70 As a
Chinese security scholar 7 1 who has observed the
phenomenon and was willing to discuss it said,
The Kosovo War [his term] caused a shift in Chinese thinking on
the matter of tolerance for U.S. forces in Asia. China now feels
surrounded by the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances.

He went on to explain that this is not a consequence of
Marxist logic (apparently as some Americans conclude) but
rather is “based on Chinese observation of U.S. words and
actions.”
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He explained further that, as others had told the author,
Chinese see U.S. characterization of North Korea as an
enemy as nothing more than an excuse for such actions as
the development of the Revised Defense Guidelines (for the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) and the development and
eventual regional deployment of TMD. This Chinese
security scholar said North Korea is very weak and surely
cannot project power. In China, the U.S. portrayal of the
North Korean threat is considered a joke. Other Chinese
analysts see improving relations between Washington and
Pyongyang and the plight of the DPRK economy as factors
lessening the potential threat from North Korean ballistic
missiles. The fact that several years will pass before TMD
could become an effective deployed force causes others to
speculate that North Korea may no longer exist by that
time.72 These Chinese specialists are determined both in
their conviction that there is no real North Korean threat
and in persuading Americans of that assertion.
Additionally, the reintroduction of U.S. forces into the
Philippines and the introduction of a U.S. military presence
in Singapore are considered by the Chinese as revealing
indicators of sinister, or at least hegemonic, American
intentions in Asia. All this, together with such things as the
proposed TSEA, the extremely controversial Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act, originated by the very
pro-Taiwan Senator Jesse Helms, under consideration in
the U.S. Congress,73 concern China. The Chinese see in this
ominous combination the makings of future containment,
despite American protests to the contrary. When
Washington talks of a “strategic pause” for the United
States between now and 2010 or 2015, the concept of
preventive diplomacy takes on the appearance of preventive
defense—preventing China from achieving its rightful
place and full potential, as the Chinese see it.
The Chinese security scholar, interviewed in
Washington in late April 2000, went on to explain that this
viewpoint is very popular among the military in China.
Chinese are especially troubled by the U.S. inclination to
171

place human rights concerns over the honoring of national
sovereignty and fear that the United States will use its
“tools” as means to intervene in Asia. The tools, he
explained, are its forces and arrangements in Japan, the
Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, etc. He regretted that
this attitude had developed, pointing out that, although
China publicly opposes foreign forces in any country,
privately China had accepted the status quo of U.S.
alliances in Asia. Among the reasons for the acceptance is
the practical one that there has been no way for China to
change that situation. China wants, of course, to ensure
that Taiwan is not encompassed in these arrangements, he
emphasized. But China, even as a rising power, has not
previously sought to change the status quo. It was apparent
that this rather young scholar was representing a hope
among his peers that the allegedly rising opposition to U.S.
forces in Asia he described, particularly among PLA officers,
would not serve to reverse the longstanding tolerance or
even acceptance in China of the U.S. forces in Korea (and
Japan)—even after there is significant change on the
Korean Peninsula.
So far, this chapter has reviewed and attempted to
provide insights into the Chinese views of its enduring
multifaceted relations with troublesome North Korea; its
newer yet firm and still growing affection for richer and
more stable South Korea; its support of better North-South
relations; its involvement in, and reactions to, North
Korea’s nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and
proliferation activities; its disagreement with collapse and
chaos scenarios; its conservative and patient approach to,
but not rejection of, reunification and reconciliation
concepts; and its possibly surprising tolerance of, or at least
ambivalence about, the issue of U.S forces in Korea now and
in the future.
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SCRUTINY AND ANALYSIS OF CHINESE
POSITIONS, GOALS, AND STRATEGIES;
IMPLICATIONS FOR WASHINGTON AND OTHER
CAPITALS
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to taking stock
of matters reviewed earlier and the related issues that such
an examination raises, as well as attempting to ascertain
the implications for U.S. policy and that of other
governments involved.
China’s Ultimate Goals Concerning the Korean
Peninsula.
One experienced Chinese specialist74 distilled China’s
goals with respect to the Korean Peninsula to a few short
sentences: Beijing does not want to see a Korea hostile to
China or a Korea allied with another country so that the
alliance is hostile to China. China does not want to see a
chaotic Korea. Beijing does not want to see nuclear weapons
on the Korean Peninsula, but it does not give nearly as high
a priority to this issue as does Washington. In this synopsis,
he did not specifically mention reunification. Only in
response to a specific query did he describe the
often-repeated position that stability on the peninsula is the
clear top priority, stability that is essential to economic
growth for China, Korea, and the region. Reunification, as
we have seen, is a second priority, but, as is argued by
virtually all Chinese specialists, China does “sincerely
support” a reunified, reconciled, or integrated Korea,
eventually—with the preferred time frame for ending the
division of the peninsula dependent on the interlocutor but
rarely less than two or three decades.
The Complexities of the Chinese View of Reunification.
Despite the expressed views, Chinese support for Korean
reunification is doubted or denied by many observers
outside China. Some Chinese argue that Westerners and
Japanese are improperly applying their own logic processes
and preferences to Beijing’s thinking—engaging in
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inappropriate “mirroring” and therefore arriving at an
inaccurate result. Possibly it does not matter a great deal
whether Beijing means what its says about reunification. If
Beijing publicly supports reunification, maybe that is as
much as one can hope to know with any certainty. Maybe it
helps even when Chinese suggest that Korean unification
would set a good example for the “Taiwan problem.”
The Chinese Communist Party does not seem to fear the
spin-offs of reunification on which others speculate. The
Chinese are not concerned about the probable eventual
presence of a highly successful, unified, and democratic
neighbor, reasoning, it appears, that if a successful ROK
has had no substantive effect on the PRC, then an expansion
of the example to all of Korea is also not to be feared.
Chinese observers see no importance to the relative timing
of possible resolutions of the problems of Taiwan, Xinjiang,
and Tibet with respect to Korean reunification because
China simply views its own problems in these three areas as
wholly internal affairs, while the Korean issue is now
accepted by China as a matter between two sovereign
states.
One Country, Two Systems—for Korea? Chinese
specialists occasionally discuss the concept of one country,
two systems (as applied to Hong Kong and Macao and
offered by the PRC as the formula for Taiwan) as it might
apply to the Koreas, but they do not do so
seriously—generally seeing it as a concept or application
generated by Westerners unfamiliar with the differences
between the Korean situation of two states and that of
China and its sovereignty issues. It seems more likely that
Chinese interlocutors are chary about applying this
concept, so dear to Chinese mainlanders, to the Korean
situation. Maybe there is a measure of unspoken distaste
among the Chinese for the prospect of Koreans using this
“sacred” mantra, somehow tainting this concept that is so
central to China’s determination to achieve reunification
with Taiwan. Nevertheless, “one country, two systems” is
an apt description of the direction in which the two Koreas
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seemed headed, at least at the conclusion of the meetings of
the Kims (North and South) in Pyongyang in June 2000.
Testing the Truth of Chinese Assertions of Support for
Reunification. The Chinese want the West and the Koreans
to accept that China favors eventual Korean unification,
accomplished peacefully and while preserving stability.
Nevertheless, Beijing persistently, if inadvertently, feeds
the doubts of outsiders. For example, if the reunification
issue is not attacked head-on, addressed very directly, in
exchanges with Chinese specialists, the talk often takes a
turn that seems incompatible with support for
reunification, even as a secondary priority. In other words,
when a related issue is raised, the assumption of
reunification does not necessarily underlie the unwitting
answer.75 Three cases illustrate the point: (1) The recent
increasing talk of China’s treating North Korea as a “more
normal state,” and (2) Chinese specialists’ complaints that
Americans and South Koreans (often American-educated, it
is said pointedly) have at best a superficial understanding of
China’s relations with North Korea, both suggest a mindset
more supportive of preservation of the status quo than
movement toward reunification. These two cases are often
followed up by a third—by the Chinese complaint that the
South Koreans and Americans have no experience with
socialist societies like China and North Korea. Once again,
this seems to display a latent or underlying view toward the
two Koreas that prefers continued division to the prospect of
integration. At least, China is not urgently preparing to
cope with a unified Korea.
Of course, one cannot be sure how Chinese policymakers
and those we assume represent their policies feel “in their
hearts” about this issue. Furthermore, on an issue as
complex and as important to China as Korean reunification,
there are doubtless unresolved internal debates and a
desire to retain flexibility, given the variety of stressful
circumstances that might surround a reunification
scenario.76 Nevertheless, after several years of hearing and
sifting through Chinese views on reunification, I find it hard
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to accept that there is a solid line of misrepresentation by
all, including many who are unexpectedly candid on other
issues and who seem truly to value intellectual integrity.
Consequently, it seems increasingly credible that Beijing
means what its various spokesmen say: Stability on the
Korean Peninsula, with its economic spin-off, far outweighs
Chinese interest in reunification, but China supports
eventual “complete integration” and does not in the long
term either fear the specter of a unified Korea or so value a
socialist brother state or buffer that it would work actively
against reunification. Also, it is understandable that there
is no hurry in China for reunification. One is reminded of the
now largely defunct alarms predicting imminent North
Korean collapse so commonly raised in the West just a few
years ago and roundly jeered (then and now) by Chinese
specialists. That recollection may well bolster the Chinese
feeling that they, once more, have it right on North Korea.
They may be quite confident, even cocky, in concluding that
the reunification process could be destabilizing: that
reunification will be exceedingly difficult and complex,
prone to fail (even if there is much initial good will on both
sides), and is a matter of little, if any, real urgency.
There are also good reasons to believe that Beijing,
indeed, favors eventual reunification and that such talk is
not just a smokescreen to hide a real preference for
continued separation. It is easy to be cynical about Chinese
leaders’ actions and apparent intransigence on this and
other issues. (Many, but hardly all, of them are easy to
dislike, disbelieve, and even despise.) But, trying to look
past the cynicism, Beijing indeed seems to look to the
prospect that Korea, unified a the right time in the right
way, will serve China’s interests in a number of ways and
solve some enduring problems for Beijing, such as the
following:
• It seems reasonable to speculate that Beijing does not
wish to continue indefinitely to supply North Korea with
very large amounts of oil, often at bargain prices—a
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commodity that, since 1993, China itself has to import in
large and steadily increasing quantities.
• Beijing does not want to worry endlessly that the
invaluable South Korean investment in China’s Manchuria,
Shandong Province, and the area around Tianjin will dry up
as a result of South Korea’s resources being redirected to
rebuild and rejuvenate a North Korea whose economy and
infrastructure are left indefinitely to worsen and ultimately
collapse, when joining with South Korea would seem to
preclude such a disaster.
• China’s leaders do not want to tolerate forever the
inescapable concern that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il,
or his successor, will bring to a sudden halt the regional
stability that China has striven so long to preserve, with all
that implies for China’s economic and security situation.
• Beijing entertains the hope that a revitalized northern
half of the Korean Peninsula will some day become an
economic asset to the bordering areas of China, a prospect
that many think laughable now, but a prospect that a
patient and persevering China has elected not to forgo, even
if it takes to mid century or beyond to come to pass. This is a
form of very long-term relief for China’s Northeast rust belt.

What of the Chinese Military? Put bluntly, the Central
Military Commission and General Staff Department would
like to concentrate on the challenge of coping with Taiwan
and avoiding confrontation with the United States—not on
Korean concerns and contingencies. To put a finer point on
these concerns:
• The PLA, for the next 50 years, would like not to have
to fret over (or maybe even actually plan for) every Korean
contingency from blocking huge refugee flows northbound
out of the DPRK to pouring PLA troops southward across
the Yalu River once again.
• PLA leaders, even those who may not remember
clearly the horrific casualty statistics of the 1950s war in
Korea, must find daunting the prospects (even if unlikely) of
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being forced to march south and face the world’s most
advanced military—and having to find out just how much
support hated Japan will provide to ensure embarrassing
defeat for the Chinese they disdain, the Chinese who
constantly tell the world that Japan is the real next threat to
Asian peace and a country ready to produce nuclear
weapons.
Possibly the list of reasons compiled here by the author
has been skewed by listening too long to too many Chinese
specialists, but it does seem that the reasons for China to
favor ultimate reunification, as it says it does, outweigh
those for preserving the awkward and troublesome status
quo indefinitely.
These somewhat optimistic tentative conclusions, based
on attempts somehow to fathom the fundamental Chinese
convictions on reunification, do not mean that Beijing’s
hopes for the future of the Koreas will make Washington
happy and Americans content. It should be remembered
that, although the Chinese expect Seoul to govern a
reunified Korea, they also expect that this unified Korea
will lean much more toward Beijing than is currently the
case. Certainly an integrated Korea, as the Chinese
envision it, would have better relations by far with China
than with Japan. Possibly (eventually) the Sino-Korean
ties, Beijing hopes, could evolve in such a way that Seoul is
more comfortable with Beijing than with Washington:
Asian issues to be managed by Asians, not by Americans.
Chinese Views of U.S. Forces in Korea and the U.S.-ROK
Alliance. A somewhat similar perplexity applies to Chinese
attitudes toward the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance and
residual American forces when Korea is no longer divided. It
is, indeed, difficult to accept at face value that Beijing has
grown tolerant of the presence of American forces on the
Korean Peninsula, as many Chinese specialists assert.
Could it be true now, and might it remain the case, that
Chinese leaders have broadly accepted the stabilizing value
of American military forces in both Korea and Japan, and
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especially in Korea in recent years? If so, will the current
Chinese concerns about what they see as a newly
interventionist and hegemonic Washington erode or
permanently reverse the trend toward tolerance for the U.S.
military posture in Asia? Put another way, are we in the
process of losing something valuable, or was it ever the case
that Beijing was, until recently, at least content with the
presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula (and in
Japan as well)? Given the doubts that exist among
Westerners about the existence of some measure of
tolerance in China for the U.S. alliances and American
military presence in Asia, or even doubt that a debate on the
issue is underway within China, it may be helpful to look
closely at the fresh outlook and forthright but informed
words on the subject of a young, yet widely respected and
prestigious, Chinese specialist, Wu Xinbo:
China’s perceptions of the targets, internal structures, and
functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances have
changed remarkably over time, from extreme hostility to high
tolerance. These changes resulted from the interactions of
such factors as China’s assessment of the world balance of
power, the well-being of its relationship with both indigenous
and outside powers, and the priority of its national policy. The
evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that China
need not view the two security alliances as inherently hostile
to its interests. Under some circumstances they can be
considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing’s attitudes are
often determined not by the two alliances per se but rather by
its perception of the sources of threat to its security and
whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the
threat. On the other hand, given the nature of China’s foreign
policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic love for these alliances.
Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed any
bilateral or multilateral military alliance in the region.
Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality of the
American military presence in the region and tends to see it as
a short-term arrangement rather than a long-term
phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived the
two security alliances as either against China or with China.
In the post–Cold War period, they have yet to be convinced
that the function of the two alliances could be neither.77
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The Chinese Hard-liner’s Dream and the American
Nightmare. It would appear then that, as with the
reunification issue, an internal debate is in progress over
the issue of American forces in Asia; the question might
then be what is the nature and urgency of the debate and at
what level is it being conducted. Beijing fully appreciates
that there is certainly no reasonable prospect that
Washington would withdraw its military forces under
present circumstances. Most countries of the region
continue to urge Washington to maintain its force levels, or
at least capabilities, for the time being. Asian countries
other than China are, indeed, often more supportive (or
demanding) of Washington’s sustaining its current troop
numbers than some American military officers and officials
would like. Beijing has largely come to accept that fact, if for
no other reason than that it cannot see how to change it.
However, major change on the Korean Peninsula (somehow
eliminating the North Korean threat) is often seen as the
catalyst for change in American forces in Asia, and certainly
many in Beijing recognize that prospect. It is appropriate
then, in this context, to try to comprehend the outlines and
various sides of the Chinese internal debate.
The Simple Solution: Americans Out! Hard-liners in
China, especially if the Taiwan problem remains
unresolved, could optimistically (from their perspective)
envision an “easy” solution. Absent a North Korea, or at
least a North Korean threat, there would remain no
rationale for American forces to remain in Korea. The
Korean people, especially young Koreans already
unfavorably disposed toward American forces there, would
expect the Americans to leave or even agitate for an
expeditious U.S. departure. The American people and the
U.S. Congress would no longer desire to support and fund
tens of thousands of troops and the large American military
infrastructure in South Korea, especially if they were
clearly unwanted by unappreciative Koreans. Beijing could,
in this new situation, (without significant peril to the
important bilateral relationship) effectively influence both
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a Seoul that it has worked hard at winning over since at
least the beginning of the 1990s and North Korean leaders
(whatever role they may be playing) it has supported for
decades, urging both to eject the United States. Any
American arguments offered for a new form of American
force structure in Korea tailored for responding to
unpredictable (and admittedly hard to define) security
contingencies likely to arise in the region would, in this
negative environment, sound rather hollow.
As the Americans would then, of necessity, prepare to
leave Korea, China quietly could aid in the movement
almost certain to arise in Japan against U.S. forces and
bases. This movement would be built on objections (and
domestic political fears) concerning Japan’s rather
embarrassing role as the last country in Asia to provide
bases and other support for U.S. military forces. Sooner or
later, according to this hard-line Chinese scenario, Japan
would cease being the sole host in Asia for American troops,
aircraft, ships, bases, training areas, and huge quantities of
military equipment and supplies. The JSDF, it would be
noted especially in China, would cease to benefit directly
from the complementary effects of American presence and
cooperation; resurgent Japanese militarism would be
curbed by severing it from American military support.
Beijing’s concerns would be eased about the arms and
technology transfers that China objects to now and fears
will lead to the continued inexorable buildup of a Japanese
military to be feared in Asia.
China would, in the eyes of some, work to “Finlandize”
this Japan, a Japan they hope would look around and see
that accommodating a benevolent and prosperous,
increasingly modern, and non-expansionist China would
serve its purposes best. There is the hope or expectation that
the unified Korea would be leaning even more toward
China. For the Chinese who think in this way, or something
that approximates this scenario of an essentially forced
American withdrawal from Asia, there is icing on the cake:
If the Taiwan situation remains unresolved to this time,
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that would certainly not continue to be the case for long.
Beijing would feel free to solve the Taiwan problem in the
way it considers best with little fear of American
interference in this Chinese internal affair; or at least that
might be the view of Chinese hard-liners.
A More Sober Chinese View of the Future of U.S. Forces.
The obverse of the internal Chinese argument, that we are
not privy to hear directly, starts right off with serious
questions about the outcome of an attempt at Korean
unification. Might the enormous political and economic
gaps between the two Koreas prove too great, with resultant
widespread unrest or worse in a newly unified country? The
strident and deeply divisive domestic regionalism that has
been such a prominent feature of South Korean politics and
elections would pale in comparison to the North-South
differences that would divide a novel peninsula-wide polity
striving to have democratic elections. For example, bloc
voting by those in the former North Korea would almost
certainly disrupt the pluralism so vital to South Korean
democracy now. In this regard, then, might the next threat
to regional security be a very unconventional one that we
have not envisioned (possibly one reminiscent of the
Balkans in the 1990s). Serious strife may arise as a
consequence of a premature or misguided attempt to bring
the two Koreas together. It is, after all, the Chinese, among
others, who remind those from afar how difficult it might be
to integrate North and South Korea.
Factions could arise in the former North Korea that
would cause difficulties for Seoul on their own or by
summoning help from abroad, both developments that
would seem far less likely or troublesome with U.S. forces
present. There is also the matter that is mentioned little but
thought about a lot: the fear that Seoul may tend to act
rashly or imprudently—something that an American
presence may, even in today’s world, have already
controlled. Would not it be preferable for a large and
calming U.S. presence to continue to moderate any
hot-headed Korean tendencies to be rash or impatient in the
182

tense period as reunification tries to take root and grow?
U.S. forces, and especially their senior leaders, even if not
wholly desirable in Chinese eyes, are at least a known
factor, and their steadfast presence might be an important
element in giving Koreans confidence and adding to
stability in a time of great uncertainty and extreme tension.
Beijing may be happier to have Americans stuck with this
rather sensitive and onerous task than a PLA wholly
untrained in providing either peacemaking or peacekeeping
assistance and not known or trusted by the economically
and socially dominant majority of the population. So
Chinese specialists might envision these demanding
circumstances under which China’s interests are well
served by the enduring presence in significant numbers of
U.S. military forces.
Of course, the crisis scenario might not be internal
Korean unrest. Chinese security scholars who are favorably
disposed to an American military presence, or at least think
about it objectively, recognize that the contingency might be
brought on by new problems in new places: in the very
troubled Russian Far East, or involving a Philippine,
Malaysian, or renewed Indonesian insurgency run amok
and spilling into the sea lanes of the Philippine and South
China Seas, or, simply put, the East Asian security
contingency that we cannot now imagine but will wonder 20
years from now how we could have missed. And miss it we
may (in a favorable sense), if U.S. forces in East Asia serve a
preventive, stabilizing role based on their presence, without
having to fire a shot or launch a missile. Yes, there are a few
Chinese strategic thinkers who do understand that aspect
of American presence in the region—as well as many who
understand that argument but do not agree with the
premises or conclusions.
An Even More Moderate View: No Reason to Object to
U.S. Forces. Looking at the internal Chinese debate on a far
less dramatic plane, Beijing’s highest priority for the
Korean Peninsula and the region, as we have seen, is
stability—save for the Chinese obsession over Taiwan.
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China has, according to many responsible sources, become
quite pragmatic about the U.S. situation in Korea. U.S.
forces in Korea are not directly threatening China. China
has achieved a highly favorable position on the Korean
Peninsula, including notably close and improving relations
with the South, despite the large presence of American
forces there; and the U.S.-ROK treaty is the centerpiece of
security and stability in a place where China most values
stability. To put it simply, American forces have been “part
of the woodwork,” and some in Beijing have come to accept
their presence as normal, nonthreatening, and, most
important, stabilizing. Those who are pragmatic in Beijing,
as opposed to anti-American hard-liners, are much more
inclined to work with the existing security arrangements
and be a responsible part of change—change accomplished
in parallel with the new government of a unified Korea and
with Washington, rather than acting obstreperously in
trying to force prompt withdrawal of American forces.
In this argument, as in that of the hard-liners who argue
for American withdrawal as well as for those who expect the
United States to continue to play a strong role, there is the
Japan factor. Put simply, there is a dark side to the
all-too-plausible sequence whereby the departure of U.S.
forces from Korea leads to ejection or unavoidable American
withdrawal from Japan. Most of those who favor this softer
line of argument are also likely to believe that it is far better
to keep U.S. forces in Japan. These American forces are seen
as a proven restraint; it is far better, from a Chinese
perspective, to rely on that than to hope self-restraint and
an unamended constitution (referring, of course, to Article
9, which precludes possession of war potential) will remain
adequate bulwarks against resurgent Japanese militarism.
This argument concludes that American forces should stay
in Korea so that the matter of Japan’s politicians no longer
finding the presence of U.S. forces tolerable has far lower
probability of arising in the near future.78
So how might the more favorable views in China in
support of continued U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula
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be bolstered by American actions? Presently, in the year
2000, it is the PLA that most strongly argues that the
United States should now be viewed differently, that the
United States and its military forces are no longer to be
trusted and are increasingly tending to tip the scales toward
regional instability. There is an optimistic possibility: If, as
time passes, the United States is seen as no longer prone to
frequent intervention and, for example, Kosovo may have
made the Americans more wary rather than more willing to
use force in such instances,79 the more moderate side in
Beijing will be able to make a more compelling argument. It
is the newly formed conviction by hard-liners about a new
face of American interventionist power that has eroded the
Chinese tolerance and acceptance of U.S. forces in Korea, a
tolerance that had grown out of years of the demonstrated
nonthreatening nature of American military presence on
the Asian mainland less than 300 kilometers from the
Chinese border. It may not be quite as hard to return to that
situation of Chinese tolerance as present circumstances
make it seem, but that is hardly a sure bet.
The kicker in this for the longer term, however, is
Taiwan (assuming an unresolved cross-strait situation at
the time of reunification) and how U.S. forces in Asia are
seen then with respect to Taiwan. It will simply no longer be
possible to make a substantive case in Beijing about
tolerance for the American presence in a unified Korea if
residual U.S. forces there are seen unequivocally as means
to intervene in a Taiwan crisis. Any disposition toward
moderation and pragmatism by Chinese elements instantly
loses its weight when Taiwan gets placed on the other side of
the scale.
The PRC’s Treaty Obligations to the DPRK. A Chinese
specialist on China’s security relations with North Korea
said bluntly, “The treaty with North Korea is not a serious
alliance in any sense of requiring the use of military forces;
it is not a mutual defense treaty.”80 The mutual cooperation
treaty, once seen by many as a commitment by China to
come to North Korea’s aid with military force, is essentially
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a moribund instrument. Publicly, Beijing began clarifying
the absence of obligations under the treaty at least 5 years
ago. In 1995 and repeatedly thereafter, Beijing began
making it increasingly clear it would not use the PLA in
support of hostile action against South Korea by the Korean
People’s Army (KPA). Initially, the formulation ruled out
support if Pyongyang initiated the action. Then it became
clear that Beijing reserved the right to interpret the
obligation (if it could still be called that) in any way Chinese
leaders chose.
Pyongyang, for reasons that yet remain unclear, did not
react noticeably to this snub. North Korea’s leaders did not
vociferously object when Beijing went so far as to deny the
possibility of PLA support even if the South initiated the
attack—as long as Seoul was acting alone, meaning, of
course, absent American complicity.81 Although this feature
of the PRC-DPRK relationship has grown rather stale and
apparently unworthy of notice by the public and news
media, the official public statements made at the time
should not be forgotten. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokesman announced in the latter part of 1995,
“China does not believe the friendship treaty between
Beijing and Pyongyang is a treaty requiring the dispatch of
military forces.”
In early 1997, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxuan (now the foreign minister), in South Korea on an
official visit, said for public consumption that China was not
willing automatically to intervene if North Korea were to
start a war. Tang, continuing, said the PRC-DPRK treaty
was a “dead document.” In May 1997, Premier Li Peng in a
public statement described North Korea as only a neighbor,
not an ally. These stunning statements and the more
stunning silence from Pyongyang in their wake might seem
to signal a rupture in the relationship, especially since
Beijing had previously set the relationship back
significantly by establishing diplomatic relations with
Seoul, still formally declared an enemy by Pyongyang, in
1992.
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It is possible, of course, that Beijing would say one thing
about its intent to use the PLA in Korea and mean
another—or do another when the chips are down. However,
as time has passed, it seems that Beijing may well have both
meant what it said and also used those blunt statements
specifically to deter bad behavior by Pyongyang. Those
statements made it unequivocally clear that the chronically
unpredictable and intransigent regime in Pyongyang would
be committing suicide were it to undertake a military
adventure. Of course, Beijing could be deterring Pyongyang,
pleasing Seoul (and Washington, for those there who
bothered to notice), and still ready to do what it wishes in a
real crisis.
The Search for Status. These developments had the
effect of bolstering the international reputation of a Chinese
government that coveted status as a constructive member of
the community of nations but had to overcome a well-earned
international reputation for taking actions that have been
very harmful to the country, its economy, and the Chinese
people. Although the Chinese government is now once more,
in 1999 and 2000, resorting to actions that most observers
think imprudent (domestic crackdowns and very loud
saber-rattling against Taiwan), Beijing has, nevertheless,
continued to act soberly and maturely in its dealings with
Pyongyang and Seoul. Beijing, not surprisingly, seems to
have fully understood that North Korea’s leaders would put
regime survival above their flashes of anger and displays of
frustration toward the South. Indeed, it is not hyperbole to
suggest that Beijing has certainly made Pyongyang
consider the unvarnished consequences of thinking that
some desperate act might end up turning out well, with the
PLA jumping in and helping greatly to produce the desired
result. The Chinese decision openly to deny military
support for Pyongyang may already have played a
significant role in deterring a military adventure or other
similar exploit by Pyongyang. In that regard, it must be
remembered, North Korea’s leaders have been more than
testy on many occasions since China’s stunning 1995
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declarations (and subsequent repetitions) to the effect that
reckless military actions would not bring the PLA’s help or,
put tersely, that Pyongyang had the ability to start a war
but not to survive one.82
There is the possibility that Beijing has one more,
comparatively moderate, motivation for the seeming affront
to Pyongyang. Beijing not only wants to avoid war on its
doorstep, but also Chinese leaders want to claim the moral
high ground. This could go so far that, after an outbreak of
hostilities, one might find China touting its solid efforts to
avoid war and pointing the finger at Washington for having
provided Pyongyang with a much bigger dose of pressure
and provocation than of understanding and
accommodation. Beijing wants to be perceived as restrained
and measured in dealing with Pyongyang while
Washington is made to appear unforgiving, hegemonic, and
disinclined to appreciate the correctness of China’s decision
to understand the DPRK and its legitimate concerns rather
than to condemn it at every turn.
Pyongyang’s diplomatic outreach (beginning with the
new century and Washington’s double-barreled support for
ROK President Kim Dae Jung’s policy of opening to the
North and adoption of the Perry Report) has dimmed to
some extent the credibility of portraying Beijing as the only
national capital that has in recent years cared about poor
Pyongyang. Seoul and Washington are now jostling Beijing
in the contest to see which can get closest to
Pyongyang—and send the most money in the direction of
the DPRK. Despite these latest efforts, Beijing is probably
still poised, if something goes seriously wrong (big or small,
sooner or later) on the Korean Peninsula, to condemn
Washington for its belligerent attitudes toward China and
Russia, and for provoking Pyongyang. In short, Beijing has
positioned itself to do some name-calling and paint
Washington as the culprit for whatever bad may have
happened concerning North Korea. It is one thing for
Beijing to be right about North Korea, but it is quite another
to combine that with a convincing pronouncement that
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Washington was wrong. That is what Beijing has positioned
itself to do in the eventual battle for the hearts and minds of
a unified Korean people looking for friends—one of these
days.
Chinese Intentions for Use of the PLA in a Korean
Political or Economic Crisis. Most Chinese are also
convinced that Beijing would not order military
intervention even if North Korea collapsed either politically
or economically. Chinese specialists, however, do not give
the scenario much thought, since most do not, as we have
seen, believe the collapse of North Korea is a realistic
concern. When pressed, Chinese interlocutors recite the
reasons why China would avoid using the PLA or other
forces in an intervention role in North Korea. China asserts
it is not inclined to send forces into North Korea because:
• South Korea would react badly. Beijing values very
much its economic and diplomatic relations with Seoul and
exchanges views with the South Koreans even now on such
a situation to help prevent some future crisis.
• There would be a similarly unfavorable American
reaction, and Beijing’s relations with Washington are close
if not good, including important economic relations.83 China
simply could not prudently act unilaterally in doing
something like this, even if it were tempted or felt compelled
to do so; the international repercussions would be
significant. China increasingly cares about its reputation as
a responsible member of the community of nations and its
vital trade and investment ties.
• China does not want to be bogged down in North
Korea; it would be very difficult to find a way to pull out.
“China got out once; the United States is still in South
Korea,” as one Chinese specialist put it.84

Recalling that China did send the PLA into Korea in the
early 1950s, a very knowledgeable and well-connected
researcher explained that the situation today is much
different from the way it was 50 years ago. If trouble arose
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between North and South, China would let the two Korean
sides handle it, probably providing only food and medicine,
he asserted. If the United States were to move across the
DMZ (which he considers highly unlikely under any
circumstances he can imagine), the reaction by Beijing and
the PLA would be highly dependent on the status of
U.S.-China relations. If the relationship were hostile and a
threat to China appeared to be present, Beijing would have
to act. If the relationship were as good as today (March
2000) or better, China would think hard before taking
serious action, he asserted. He anticipates that Washington
and Beijing would, under this circumstance, consult. The
senior researcher added that he thinks it highly unlikely
any faction or rump government in North Korea would ask
the United States for help—adding to his conviction that an
American crossing of the DMZ was not a plausible scenario
for concern.85
Use of the PLA or PAP (People’s Armed Police, now much
larger than in 1989 and under PLA command but still
responsible directly for internal security matters)86 in
Korea as part of a United Nations UN intervention force has
been suggested by some Chinese specialists as at least a
plausible consideration. Chinese willing to discuss this
issue (but not be identified) are of several minds. They
remind that China has not participated in any large-scale
UN peacekeeping operations and would initiate such an
action in Korea with great trepidation. Others point out that
this method, through the device of the UN, would avoid the
serious implications of unilateral intervention and might
make it easier for Beijing to believe that Chinese forces
could be extracted—that an indefinite commitment could be
avoided. Interestingly, among those interviewed, the most
cautious Chinese official was a PLA general officer who
described the possibility of PLA participation in a UN force
as “very sensitive” and re-emphasized the unprecedented
nature of this for the PLA and how likely it was that such
action would be interpreted as essentially a unilateral
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Chinese intervention in Korea—regardless of what the facts
might be.87
Coping with Refugees. There is the additional prospect,
under increasingly dire conditions, of a persistent refugee
flow in very large numbers northward into China. The same
PLA general officer, who expressed such reticence about the
PLA crossing the border and claimed to have been working
on the issue, said unequivocally that the PLA and PAP were
prepared to stop a refugee flow at or near the border with
North Korea and to manage the refugees. He did not
elaborate on how the refugees might be handled or seem to
appreciate how large the numbers might be. It is pertinent
that the PLA legitimately prides itself on being a people’s
army in the sense that it very frequently (many times a
year) provides troops, often in very large numbers, to help
cope with natural disasters in China such as widespread
flooding, as mentioned earlier. PLA accomplishments in
this area are undoubtedly presented in the best light in
domestic (controlled) press reports, news photographs, and
dramatic television coverage (sometimes a bit overdone for
cynical Western eyes).
However, given the frequency and scope of PLA
assistance of this sort, it is noteworthy that no instances of
PLA inadequacy, bumbling, or mishandling of the
humanitarian operations have come to light.88 It can be
said, at least, that the PLA is preparing to handle refugees
and has both the experience and the resources to attack a
moderate-scale problem successfully. The pertinent
question is whether the problem would be so massive in a
collapse of North Korea that any conceivable force would be
overwhelmed.
The Economy, Stupid! Chinese scholars and
practitioners who have analyzed the issue of Chinese
reaction to chaos or political collapse emphasize what they
see as China’s real interests. They contend China will not
foolishly deviate from the priority track of national
economic progress; to accomplish that, a stable peripheral
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environment is needed that surely does not include having
the PLA in North Korea and having the South Koreans,
Japanese, Americans, and others trying to find ways to
punish China for the actions it took and applying all forms of
pressure to force withdrawal of the PLA. Simultaneously,
Beijing would likely be more worried about how to extract
the PLA gracefully (or otherwise) rather than what
advantages might be gained incident to an imprudent
intervention. The head of a prestigious policy institute in
Beijing added the somewhat emotional note that during the
recent commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the war in
Korea, it was evident by the nature of the event and the
remarks made how reluctant Beijing would be to use the
PLA in a Korean intervention yet again.89
These are the Chinese arguments, repeatedly spoken in
apparent sincerity—at least sincerity on the part of those
speaking the words. Whether Beijing is believed or not on
this count, it is significant that the great preponderance of
Chinese discussion of this issue, privately and publicly, is
about what China will not do with respect to intervention on
the Korean Peninsula, rather than what it might do. This
stands in remarkable contrast to Beijing’s bluster about
what it will do with respect to the use of force against
Taiwan, illustrating that Chinese leaders are not reticent in
using the threat of force as an instrument of
policy—something it definitely is not doing in its policy for
the Korean Peninsula. At a minimum, Beijing cannot
reasonably be seen as poised to undertake bold intervention
on the Korean Peninsula.
Another important message, generally unspoken but
clearly implied in all these words by Chinese specialists, is
that Beijing does not wish to see (or be a party to) an
instance of foreign intervention in a sovereign country,
especially a country neighboring China, because of the
example it might give the world about what could come to
pass in Taiwan, Tibet, or some other place China holds dear.
The fear of renewed foreign intervention in China, and all
that Beijing considers to be China, is deep and abiding.
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Taiwan, especially of course, is rarely out of mind for the
Chinese. As one Chinese interlocutor, praising prospects for
the June 2000 Korean North-South summit, could not help
but say, the success of this summit would imply that the
Korean Peninsula is a less dangerous place from the
American viewpoint. Consequently, Washington would be
able to give more attention to the matter of the Taiwan
Strait. That, he said ominously, increases the threat to
China’s security and well-being.90
Policy Implications for Washington, Beijing and
Other Capitals.
China’s Role in a Stable Future for the Korean Peninsula
and the Region. Major change of some sort is expected to
come to the Korean Peninsula, although the timing and
nature of the change remain quite uncertain. Few now
would want to join the large club composed of those who
have confidently made predictions about North Korea and
been proven wrong. Nevertheless, it seems safe to suggest
that the diminution or elimination of the threat posed by
North Korea may be a major element of this impending and
long-awaited change. The North Korean threat, by ground
and missile forces especially, has at least since the end of the
Cold War been proclaimed as the raison d’être of the U.S.
alliances with the ROK and Japan and the reason for the
intense interest in development and deployment of theater
and national missile defenses (TMD and NMD).
Consequently, this change on the Korean Peninsula is seen
by many, including thoughtful Chinese strategists, as a
catalyst for change in the security architecture of Northeast
Asia, or possibly for all of East Asia.
Some might object to calling the existing loose collection
of arrangements in the region a security architecture, but it
is, in fact, a diverse structure of bilateral alliances, strategic
partnerships (or prospects therefor), joint communiqués,
national statutes, unique constitutional provisions, and the
like. Nothing dictates that either the existing or an
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envisioned security architecture have a rigorous or formal
structure. Indeed, it has been argued often that, for this
region, a formal structure resembling NATO is simply not
suitable. Possibly the more interesting and more important
questions are: (1) What can we say about the security
environment in which this framework will function? (2)
What do China and the United States expect or demand of a
new or evolving security architecture?
In answer to the first question, it is simply too early to
forecast what the security environment will be in the
aftermath of some sort of change in Korea. New threats to
peace and stability may take many forms, some that we
understand now and some that we may have trouble
imagining at present. It may be that curbing piracy or
stopping drugs proves to be the major preoccupation, or it
may be, as suggested earlier in this paper, that internal
strife in a country like a unified Korea may require
peacekeeping or peacemaking actions similar to those in the
Balkans that gained such notoriety in recent years. More
likely, the nature of the actual future threat or problem
presently escapes our notice or exceeds our imaginations.
In light of this high degree of uncertainty, it would seem
to most strategists foolhardy to take precipitous action such
as terminating the U.S. bilateral alliances and withdrawing
or sharply reducing the capability of U.S. force levels in the
region—although changes in the missions, numbers,
composition, and disposition seem likely. Furthermore, it
would seem imprudent unnecessarily to take significant
actions that may become essentially irrevocable. For
example, because of various American domestic factors as
well as regional ones, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Asia may be an action that would be almost impossible to
reverse once taken. No responsible government wants to see
a dangerous power vacuum in the region or a rush to fill
such a void, should it occur. Even for the most adamant
America bashers, the United States is the “devil they know”
in the Northeast Asia security lash-up, and there are
adequate constraints on American action to satisfy most
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(but hardly all) of the concerns of those who do not trust
Washington to act with restraint.
In answer to the question about what China wants of the
framework, it is evident, of course, that Beijing’s concept of a
future security architecture would not include as prominent
features U.S. security alliances, and may well favor their
dissolution. Although Beijing has not been in a hurry for the
American alliances to end, there is the long-term view held
by many in China that Asian security problems should
eventually be the exclusive domain of Asian countries—that
the oft-stated Chinese preference for no troops on foreign
soil is more than a self-serving slogan. The central issue,
however, is that China wants its role as an emerging major
regional nation fully recognized.
Beijing rails against what it calls American attempts at
hegemony, and Washington does not want China to assume
a dominant posture. Nonetheless, fear of hegemony, by any
party, must not obscure the fact that China is the largest
and most populous country of the region and that it has
legitimate aspirations for a constructive role in the security
affairs of the region. This conviction on the part of Beijing is
an underlying element of the strategic partnership concept
that China has announced with Russia and advocated as
the way of the future. China does not want to see itself as the
apparent, if unnamed, adversary of alliances in the region
and understandably wants instead to be a part of the
architecture.
As to American requirements for a security framework,
Washington firmly holds that its traditional bilateral
alliances should be central features of any new security
architecture. New importance, however, has been attached
by some American strategic thinkers to what has been
called a “growing pattern of security pluralism.” This, of
course, includes multilateral security dialogues, the most
prominent of which is the ARF (the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum). Many consider
the ARF a talkfest at best and arguably a failure. Whether
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that opinion is shared or not, it is useful, nevertheless, to
mention the ARF in a Northeast Asian context, not because
that body is attempting to tackle problems outside its region
(Southeast Asia) but rather because the ARF is, in fact,
already providing a venue where nations of Northeast Asia
somewhat surprisingly meet and discuss security
matters—such issues as confidence building and
transparency, which might seldom if ever arise naturally
and without direct confrontation in other meetings. This
may demonstrate the applicability of such methods to
Northeast Asia and is most recently illustrated by North
Korea’s joining the ARF session at its July 2000 session in
Bangkok, where the North Korean foreign minister met
with his counterparts including U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright.
There are other multilateral examples: The ROK, Japan,
and the United States have established an official forum for
discussion and cooperation. One of the most significant—if
now somnolent—multilateral forums is the Four Party
Talks involving the DPRK, ROK, PRC, and United States,
something hard to imagine a few years ago. As the U.S.
Department of Defense’s 1998 East Asia Strategy Report
states: “Multilateralism in all its forms will become an
important element of U.S. engagement in the region in
coming years.” Only a short time back, neither Washington
nor Beijing thought well of the concept of multilateralism.
Americans thought multilateralism threatened its
important bilateral arrangements. The Chinese considered
multilateralism as a way for others to gang up on China.
Now, anew, multilateralism is being referred to by some
with disdain, as a concept that was a flash in the pan but
now shows no promise. That may turn out to be the case, but
for now there is no conclusive evidence of that, and,
moreover, there has not arisen a replacement concept that
holds promise. Until that occurs, sticking with multilateral
efforts may be the only promising recourse.
At the end of the last decade, the American vision of
security in Northeast Asia was a network of overlapping
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and interlocking institutions and relationships that
“establish a diverse and flexible framework for promoting
common security in the Asia-Pacific region into the next
century,” to quote the U.S. Department of Defense’s East
Asia Security Report (EASR) once more. Beijing might
ascribe to much of this as well. This is an exceedingly
encouraging vision. For that reason, if no other, it seems
premature to give up hope on multilateralism in one form or
another or a conglomerate of forms as a plausible
component of an evolving security architecture for
Northeast Asia.
Whatever the ultimate solution (or absence thereof), a
central problem is that there are two largely contradictory
(possibly even diametrically opposed) views of the role of
bilateral alliances in the regional security architecture. The
broad concept of security pluralism, whether defined as
multilateralism or not, seems to hold at least some promise
of finding a middle ground, even if only temporarily.
Consequently, the real issue at hand is not to choose one
view over the other but rather to find a way to accommodate
both views of the role of alliances and to make the most of
the emergence of the idea of pluralism.
Among the first steps along such a path might be
fostering the realization that alliances need not have
identified adversaries as their raison d’être and that no
country need be a target of these alliances unless its conduct
makes it so. Put a bit more bluntly, it may be that China
could find the concept of bilateral alliances far less
distasteful if it did not inevitably have to conclude that the
alliances target China. Some in the United States seem to
want to identify China more clearly as an adversary rather
than attempting to avoid such an appellation. There is more
by far to the issue than semantics. It serves no useful
purpose to state how unhappy we are with many Chinese
policies and actions, and vice versa with Chinese
unhappiness toward the United States, if we are not
working positively to avoid an exacerbation of hostile
attitudes.
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It may be useful to present this concept another way, to
turn it on its head: No country which desires to be an
integral part of the security architecture can be seen as a
looming threat to regional security and stability. This will
require a good measure of introspection by all the countries
that aspire to be solid components of a new framework. In
this regard, there are several important questions that we
should ask of ourselves. How does Washington explain what
it sees as its role in a new or modified framework in such a
way that even the detractors, the America bashers in China
and elsewhere, know that the United States does not aspire
to be a regional hegemon and a force bent on containment of
legitimate national aspirations? Does Washington need to
make it even clearer that it sees U.S. interests best served
by stable, open, and prosperous nations in East Asia,
unquestionably including China? How does Japan more
effectively convince its neighbors, including both China
(invaded and brutally occupied by Japan) and a unified
Korea (brutally colonized by Japan for decades), that its
goal is not a militaristic future and domination of the
region?
What does China have to do to earn a place in the
architecture? How might China cut the Gordian knot of the
Taiwan issue? How does it deal with the firm convictions by
others that Taiwan is not wholly an internal issue and that a
peaceful resolution of the problem is the only way that
makes sense? Can the developing confrontation between
Chinese short-range ballistic missiles threatening Taiwan
and theater missile defense be avoided? What are the
ingredients that will make a unified Korea a welcome part of
the framework? What are the appropriate places for
Mongolia and Russia in the new architecture? To the extent
that all are unwilling to address these questions with
candor and a desire to understand the views of other
capitals, the future security framework after Korean
unification will be less strong and less stable.
The future, after Korean unification or some other form
of change on the Korean Peninsula, will bring a new and
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different security architecture for the region. Conceivably,
this may occur quite abruptly; we may have the luxury of a
gradual, evolutionary change; more likely we may have the
frustrations and uncertainty of a sporadic process of steps
forward, sideways, and backwards. This prospect of
development of a new security architecture, at whatever
pace it may take, has great promise and should be
approached with optimism and enthusiasm. However, it is
also a sobering, daunting task, fraught with peril; so it is
appropriate to conclude with a list of reminders of the
various formulas that would likely result in failure to
construct a stable and effective new security framework for
Northeast Asia.
We must avoid these formulas for failure of a new or
evolving security architecture:
• Seeking formality and rigidity in composition and
organizational structure—the fallacy of attempting to form
something like NATO in Northeast Asia.
• Failing to appreciate China’s appropriate place in the
architecture and ignoring Beijing’s views in shaping the
concept.
• Prejudging the outcome on the Korean peninsula; i.e.,
assuming we can forecast the precise form of the resolution
of the Korean problem.
• Waiting until after change on the Korean Peninsula to
lay the groundwork—to consider seriously what will foster a
stable and enduring framework.
• Acting hastily in reconsidering and readjusting
American alliances and forward presence in Asia.
• Failing to find a way to blend the bilateral, the
multilateral, and the “minilateral” mechanisms that all
have roles to play.
• Assuming we can understand and foresee the nature
of future security contingencies that will threaten the
region.
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This is admittedly a daunting task, especially when one
recognizes that no one is in charge and that no one can be in
charge. This has to be an international collegial effort. That
heightens the challenge, but it also, one can hope, heightens
the prospects that the new framework will sufficiently and
appropriately reflect the composition and character of the
region so that it will not be subjected to assaults from a
country that feels it has been shunned or ignored. Hidden in
the Chinese goals and strategies for the Korean Peninsula,
there is great promise for major change, but that promise
must be better understood before it can be realized. There is
good reason to fear that a new framework will be doomed to
instability if it is constantly being shaken by outsiders who
are either trying to break into the structure or trying to
dismantle it. China would be doing just that if we cannot use
our understanding and analysis of China’s attitudes toward
the Korean Peninsula as a good and sufficient lesson to
understand the larger matter of the structure and
participants that can become the diverse, yet essential,
components of a stable new regional security architecture.
None of this is to suggest that making the new security
framework inclusive of all who should be part of the
architecture will be an easy task. However, despite the
extent of the difficulty, it will be easier to resolve these
problems now (and to be ready to apply them as changes
occur on the Korean Peninsula) than to try later to cope with
the inevitable assaults on the framework by those who have
been left out in the cold. The most challenging aspect of
developing a new architecture, one largely and unavoidably
derived from traditional security perspectives, may be to
apply this architecture to a new world of nontraditional
security concerns. But that challenge surely goes far beyond
this examination of China’s goals and strategies for the
Korean Peninsula and what they imply for U.S. policy.
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CONCLUSION
China and the United States have entered the new
century with a divided Korea composed of a crippled North
and a newly economically recovered South. China
anticipates, even relies on, the prospect that the Chinese
economy will benefit significantly from trade and
investment from South Korea. Washington expects that
both China and South Korea will be its important economic
partners. Neither Beijing nor Washington expects North
Korea to move militarily against the South because both
think North Korea’s leaders have too much to lose and
realize that such an action, absent the direct support of the
PLA, would likely mean the devastation of North Korea and
the fall of the Pyongyang regime. Beijing hopes that the
magic of Korean unification or reconciliation may bring a
new view, even in Washington, of a security framework for
the region so that China will be able to become an integral
component in the Northeast Asian security architecture,
and that it will no longer, tacitly or expressly, be seen as a
target of alliances.
Washington might hope that China, reflecting its
positive role as a constructive member of the community of
nations rather than its dark side as a bully ready to
bludgeon Taiwan, would earn its position as a solid part of
the regional security framework. If Washington and Beijing
can reach such an accommodation, the now nettlesome
issue of the continued presence of U.S. forces in the
countries of Asia near China will not be a matter of
consequence to China, or the forces will have been radically
reconfigured or withdrawn because of other factors,
domestic and international.
But no examination, in the year 2000, of China’s
interests in Korea should ignore the crazy Taiwan factor, as
we have seen repeatedly. Taiwan is simply an integral part
of China’s regional security perspectives because Beijing
has refused to rid itself of the obsession with Taiwan, or
Taiwan has refused to accede to Beijing’s generous but
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unrelenting demands—whichever way one chooses to frame
the matter. With the Taiwan issue unresolved, and, worse
yet, volatile, China will not view U.S. forces and alliances in
Asia as innocuous. Moreover, the threat the PLA poses to
Taiwan will inevitably (and correctly) be considered by
other countries as good and sufficient reason for the United
States to maintain a strong, ready military capability in the
region and for China to be the unspoken ultimate reason for
the potent American presence.
If and when the cross-strait issue is resolved
satisfactorily there will undoubtedly be other problems
involving China and the United States. However, for the
time being, the “Taiwan problem,” as Beijing calls it, is
recognized clearly by all except the Chinese as the real
obstacle to China’s aspiration to be viewed as a positive
force in the region. Moreover, China, by its own actions,
ensures that, in the current situation, the Taiwan issue
remains a major complicating factor in devising a new
security architecture for the region, even when the issue
seemed to be China’s goals and strategies for the Korean
Peninsula.
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CHAPTER 6
CHINA’S GOALS AND STRATEGIES
FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Larry M. Wortzel
Like the communist regime in the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), the communist regime in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has one fixed, principal
goal in mind—the survival of a one-party state led by a
communist party. Thus, in both countries, even regime
legitimacy is sacrificed at the altar of its survival.
Given this primary goal, it is no surprise that between
the beginning of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and
the collectivization of its agriculture and industry in 1953,
Rudy Rummel estimates that over eight million Chinese
citizens were starved, beaten, or murdered at the hands of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in CCP-organized
tribunals or other entities.1 Then, according to Rummel,
between 1955 and 1967, during the period of collectivization
and the “Great Leap Forward,” another seven million or so
Chinese were killed in the CCP’s pursuit of its societal
goals.2 After that Great Leap Forward, agriculture and food
production was in such shambles in China that another ten
million people starved to death.3 Through this, supported by
a huge military that produced its own food supplies and a
strong state security apparatus, the Communist Party of
China survived. Therefore, I am extremely skeptical when
senior Chinese army or government officials tell me that
“things are a little difficult in the DPRK, but the people are
tough and can endure hardship.”4
When an official of China’s Ministry of State Security
opines that “he does not believe [that] any communist
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country will collapse as a direct result of economic troubles,”
he or she is referring to the phenomena described
above—where citizens are tools of the government, rather
than the reverse.5 It is for these reasons that the strategies
of the PRC must be critically analyzed. The statements of
Chinese officials must be taken as reflections of the broader
communist party “line” and compared to the demonstrated
actions of China. Moreover, if past actions are any
indication of future behavior, without a regime change in
North Korea6 short-term changes in policy must be assessed
with skepticism and not accepted as representing
fundamental changes in the goals of the Kim regime.
Less than a year ago, in discussing the development of
long-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United
States, North Korea’s Central News Agency claimed that
the U.S. should see . . . [North Korea’s] war capacity and the
changed situation. There is no guarantee of safety of the U.S.
mainland.7

Meanwhile, even when North Korea seemed on the verge
of economic collapse, Chinese officials routinely told visiting
American academic and military groups that “China will
not let North Korea collapse.”8 The unqualified support
given to the DPRK by China, therefore, flies in the face of
statements that the proliferation of missiles and nuclear
weapons on the Korean Peninsula is not in China’s
interest.9
It is important not to ignore facts in the pursuit of
specific political objectives, even when those facts may
indicate that American strategies are failing. Remember
that in the fall of 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright said in an address at the University of Louisville
that “North Korea’s dangerous nuclear program has been
frozen and will be dismantled.” At the end of August 1998,
however, North Korea fired a Taepo-dong missile into the
sea between Japan and Russia.10 Not long after that,
suspicions arose that the North Koreans were working in
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caves near Kumchang-ri to develop nuclear, chemical, or
biological warheads to be mounted on the Taepo-dong.11 The
Kumchang-ri caves were believed to have served as an
underground work complex for up to 15,000 workers.12 With
regard to a propensity to back away from real concerns to
advance a specific policy agenda, a U.S. negotiator with
North Korea, Charles Kartman, told the press that there is
“compelling evidence” that the Kumchang-ri site is
nuclear-related. Two days later, however, Mr. Kartman
backed away from that statement, saying that “strong
information made the United States suspicious” about the
site. In April 1999, NHK Television in Seoul reported that
North Korea was conducting propulsion tests for a
Taepo-dong 2 missile with a range of 3,750 miles.13 Yet,
China continues to tell the Americans sent out to prospect
around Beijing for opinions that China does not support
proliferation, or a hostile Korean Peninsula.14
The preponderance of evidence shows that China retains
good contacts with North Korea; despite what may be
Beijing’s frustrations over a failure by Kim Jong Il to begin
incentive systems in North Korean agriculture,15 North
Korea has:
• added military capability;
• improved its missile systems;
• obtained over $645 million in aid from the United
States while it provided no verifiable access to its nuclear or
biological warfare sites;
• made no changes in its military posture along the
demilitarized zone; and
• cemented its relations with Russia.

All of the foregoing occurred despite the fact that China
does have influence with North Korea:
• In 1996 and 1997 China donated a total of about
200,000 tons of food to the DPRK.
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• The Chinese donated more rice in August 1997.
• At the 70th anniversary of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) on August 1, 1997, the Chinese Defense
Attaché to Pyongyang told the Director of the General
Political Department (GPD) of the Korean People’s Army
(KPA) that the armies, the people, and the communist
parties of China and the DPRK had close links sealed in
blood.
• North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok (Nok), head
of the GPD, responded by saying,
The people and armies of the two countries will remain intimate
brothers and comrades in arms who help and support each other
in the common struggle against imperialism and socialism.

• An official of the PRC’s GPD, Zhou Kunren, visited
Pyongyang again in November 1997.
• In 1998, China sent another 100,000 tons of rice and
20,000 tons of fertilizer.
• The PRC Xiantong Group modernized the
Rajin-Namyang railway line and is making improvements
that will increase rail volume “14 times.”
• Scientific and technologial and hydropower
cooperation protocols were signed between the two
countries in 1998.
• Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Department of the PLA, visited Pyongyang in August 1998,
just before the Taepo-dong launch over Japan.
• China provided 80,000 tons of crude oil to the DPRK
after the Taepo-dong launch, while Japan cut its assistance.
• On June 3-4, 1999, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng accepted
delegations from North Korea. (Note dates.) China gave
150,000 tons of food and 400,000 tons of coke to DPRK (it
could have done nothing, like Japan) which were delivered
in February 2000.
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• Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian and DPRK
Vice Marshal Kim Il Chol met on June 21, 1999.
• Korean Vice Defense Minister Ryo Chun Sok met Chi
Haotian at a reception on August 1, 1999, and explicitly
linked the inviolate territorial integrity of Korea and that of
China with Taiwan.
• Beijing continues to provide hydropower cooperation
to North Korea.
• Kim Jong Il visited the Chinese Embassy in
Pyongyang in March 2000 as part of the Spring Festival
visit, a sign of a certain amount of tributary homage to his
benefactor.

The Kim Dae Jung Visit and the Albright Visit to
Pyongyang.
Beijing’s influence over the North is perhaps best
illustrated by the way that Kim Jong Il visited China on the
eve of his summit with South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung. In my view, China pushed Kim Jong Il to moderate his
positions on family reunification slightly and to soften his
rhetoric, for two reasons. First, Beijing still depends on
investment from South Korea that would stop in the event of
a war between North and South. Second, Beijing can use the
appearance of a more moderate North, with at least an
orientation towards peace, as an argument to undermine
the effort of the United States to move forward with
national missile defense programs and to advocate theater
missile defense programs for its allies and friends in Asia.
Beijing intensely dislikes such programs because they
undermine the PLA’s ability to coerce China’s neighbors,
Taiwan, U.S. forces, and the United States with nuclear and
missile blackmail.
Despite Pyongyang’s failure to change its policy of
harboring fugitive terrorists inside its borders (e.g., the
Japanese Red Army bombers who took refuge in North
Korea), a visit to New York by Vice Foreign Minister Kim
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Kye-gwan to negotiate with the U.S. Government was
followed by a rushed trip to Washington by Jo Myong Rok. A
meeting with President William Clinton at which Jo wore
his military uniform was the culmination of the visit,
although Secretary Albright hosted a somewhat
anticlimactic dinner at the State Department. President
Clinton came close to agreeing to visit Pyongyang after this
meeting in October 2000.
Secretary Albright was dispatched to Pyongyang on
short notice after she announced that she was exploring a
Clinton visit in November 2000, as the President left the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In Pyongyang, during the
week of October 22-25, Albright was maneuvered into a visit
with Jo in the same location as the shrine and statue of Kim
Il Sung, and found herself at a celebration of the Korean
Workers Party. In what proved to be a more embarrassing
moment for the Secretary and the United States, Chinese
Defense Minister Chi Haotian arrived in Pyongyang while
Albright was still in town to celebrate the 50th anniversary
of the entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (the PLA)
into North Korea during the Korean War. Albright was
maneuvered by Beijing and Pyongyang to be in the city on
the anniversary of the battles in which Chinese soldiers and
their North Korean allies were mauling the U.S. 1st Marine
Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and allied United
Nations forces in the area around the Chosin (Changjin)
Reservoir. Chi Haotian noted this while Secretary Albright
was still in Seoul conferring with the South Korean and
Japanese foreign ministers. It would be difficult to find
more concrete evidence of the way that Pyongyang and
Beijing are coordinating on Korean Peninsula and
U.S.-related matters.
PRC Goals.
China has a clear set of goals in its actions on the Korean
Peninsula: maintaining a peaceful periphery to facilitate
foreign investment and the modernization of its arms and
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combat forces; reducing the likelihood that missile defenses
will be deployed in the region; creating a buffer from
financial crises that might retard science and technology
modernization; replacing American alliances with regional
security dialogues; and creating a web of strategic
partnerships as a means to place itself at the hub of
inter-state diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
To demonstrate China’s influence and power on the
Korean Peninsula, one needs only to remember that at the
mere suggestion that “relations with China would be
difficult” the Clinton Administration refused to approve
badly needed air and cruise missile defenses for Taiwan in
1999. When China suggested that “it would not be good for
relations” in 1999, the Republic of Korea opted not to
participate in research even on theater missile defenses in
Asia with the United States. Looking beyond Korea, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional
forum (ARF) was formed as a means to respond to China.
Vietnam is seeking a new form of security relationship as a
balance against China. And the Chinese military industry
managed to supply Pakistan with a nuclear and ballistic
missile capability.
North Korea’s Short- and Long-Term Strategies and
the U.S. Role.
There could be changes on the Korean Peninsula leading
to reduced military tensions and some reform in the North.
Although such changes are more symbolic than substantive
to date, symbolic changes are important as a beginning. The
dilemma for the people of Korea and the United States, as
well as Japan, is to ensure security and stability in the
region while encouraging substantive progress on a lasting
peace and the end of the Cold War. If the Cold War was
about fighting and containing communism then it really is
nearly over. While communist systems are repressive and
economically unsound, regime change in the North is not
the primary goal of the United States and the allies.
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Instead, the goal is to bring North Korea out of its isolation
from international institutions and the international
system of commerce and diplomacy.
From the time of the Korean Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) Agreement and the Agreed
Framework, North Korea seemed to be operating on a
short-term strategy aimed at regime survival. North Korea
operated in the international and regional arena by a
combination of threats involving missiles, weapons of mass
destruction, and arms sales. It blackmailed the West,
particularly the South, the United States, and Japan into
supporting its fuel and food needs. Yet, it made no
substantive changes in its economic system.
A Long-Term Strategy for Beijing and Pyongyang.
After Kim Il Sung’s death in the summer of 1995, there
did not seem to be a distinct change in the long-term
strategy of regime survival and control, and the
maintenance of a closed, communist system. The present
long-term strategy in Pyongyang and Beijing appears to
involve coming to some kind of accommodation with South
Korea, Japan, and the United States that preserves North
Korea as a separate entity and keeps the Korean Workers’
Party in power.
In the economic realm, however, the North appears to
realize that some kind of economic change is necessary.
North Korea will opt for gradual and controlled reform, but
it must resolve or at least seriously consider several critical
issues to make progress. Pyongyang must address:
• The harboring of terrorists from the Japanese Red
Army. They are still given sanctuary in the North.
• The missing people from South Korea and Japan
believed to have been kidnapped by the North.
• The threatening military deployments by the North on
the DMZ.
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• Transparency of the North Korean missile, chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons programs.
• The continuing arms sales by North Korea to other
countries that seek to destabilize the international system.

Notwithstanding these problems, there are some
positive results from the courageous initiative by President
Kim Dae Jung: the Nobel peace prize, which is richly
deserved; and the talks between Kim Dae Jung and Kim
Jong Il, which are critical to ensuring high-level political
direction to future contacts. Meanwhile, the strategy of the
North appears to be gradually shifting. The North still
seeks to maintain a robust military. The North still seeks to
maintain control of the nation by the Korean Workers’
Party. However, North Korea’s economic strategy appears
to be changing as it comes to realize that any economic
development will require some opening to the outside world.
There are some 138 small and medium-size South
Korean businesses operating in the North. Private
volunteer organizations are active in the North, some
involved in establishing “micro-economies” in agricultural
production and marketing. South Korean conglomerates
are participating in economic projects. Nonetheless,
without substantive moves by North Korea to address the
fundamental security issues, we cannot be sure that some of
its recent moves are not tactical in nature designed to bring
in money, food, and economic aid.
North Korea’s attitude appears to be undergoing some
change, which might be due in part to pressure from Beijing.
Like China, the United States has a role in fostering that
change. The United States cannot dismiss China’s influence
over Pyongyang, or be blind to areas where American and
Chinese foreign policies may be at cross-purposes. The
United States must work closely with the allies in the
Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG). The
continued U.S. presence in and security commitment to
Korea is the security architecture and umbrella for
Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.
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commitment has a stabilizing effect. Although reluctant to
admit it, even security planners in Beijing acknowledge
that the U.S. presence keeps historical tensions and
animosities from resurfacing.
Conclusion.
The United States has responsibilities to the region and
interests of its own that make its presence important.
Toward such ends, the United States will encourage the
North to join international financial organizations and
become a full, responsible member of the international
community.
The bottom line for good U.S. policy: continue to trade
with China; maintain a strong, forward-deployed American
military in Korea; keep an active foreign policy in Asia;
provide strong security backing for Kim Dae Jung; and keep
its powder dry.
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CHAPTER 7
JAPAN’S GRAND STRATEGY ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA:
OPTIMISTIC REALISM

Victor D. Cha
The Japanese have always considered the Koreans to be an
inferior race. [Wajima] said that a very elaborate study on the
racial characteristics of Koreans had been prepared during the
war, and that it had concluded that the mental and social
capacities of the Koreans were of a very primitive nature. He
said that this feeling on the part of the Japanese that Koreans
are inferior to a great extent motivates Japanese uncertainty
and hostility in regard to the Koreans.
Conversation with Japanese Official,
19491
An all-out invasion of Japan by Korea is inevitable if Korea is
unified . . . [when it comes] it will be a blitz attack like the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait . . . therefore it is in Japan’s best interests
to help North Korea economically so the Korean peninsula
remains divided as now.
Kenichi Takemura, 19912

Korea is one of the most complex, critical, and yet
understudied of Japan’s foreign policy relationships. While
much attention in U.S. policy and academic circles has
focused on Japan’s future relations with China as the key
variable for regional stability in the 21st century, an
integral part of the security dynamic in East Asia has been
driven by the Japan-Korea axis3 In the late 19th and early
20th centuries, this relationship was a proximate cause of
two major power wars in Asia (i.e., Sino-Japanese and
Russo-Japanese). During the Cold War, the Japan-Republic
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of Korea (ROK) axis facilitated the American presence as an
Asia-Pacific power and security guarantor. And in the
post-Cold War era, outcomes in the Japan-Korea (united or
still divided) relationship are critical to the shape of future
balance of power dynamics in the region and, with it, the
future American security presence. How, then, should we be
thinking about future Japanese relations with the Korean
peninsula? What are Tokyo’s hopes and concerns with
regard to Korea? How do they view the prospect of a united
Korea? Is there a Japanese “grand strategy” regarding the
peninsula?
The conventional wisdom offers a pessimistic response
to these questions. As encapsulated in the epigraphs at the
head of this chapter, this view posits a combination of
historical contempt and geopolitics as auguring poorly for
Japan’s relations with a united Korea, hence compelling the
Japanese in the direction of policies aimed at propping up
the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and
keeping the peninsula divided.
The conventional wisdom is wrong. While such a
pessimistic-realist view is often accepted at face value by
both scholars and practitioners of Asian security, we find
upon closer analysis that outcomes on the Japan-Korea axis
are not nearly as negative as popularly conceived. Japanese
grand strategy thinking, although cognizant of the
variables for competition with the Korean peninsula, seeks
actively to cultivate the potential for cooperation and
preempt possible security dilemmas. This more
optimistic-realist assessment derives from a number of
larger geostrategic and domestic-political trends as well as
from specific policies enacted by Tokyo and Seoul in the last
decade that have improved relations considerably. I begin
with a discussion of the conventional wisdom, followed by
criticisms of this view. I then offer the argument for
optimistic realism vis-à-vis Japanese grand strategy on the
peninsula and conclude with propositions regarding the
policy implications of this strategy.4
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Peer Competition.
The conventional wisdom argues that Japanese grand
strategy is premised on avoiding peer competition with a
united Korea. This anticipated competition derives from
several factors.
Geopolitics. Proponents of this view cite Japanese
concerns about geography and potentially threatening
Korean capabilities. Geographic propinquity has always
made Japan—as an island nation—somewhat uneasy with
its continental Korean neighbor. Should a regime hostile to
Japan ever control the peninsula, it would be strategically
well-situated to threaten Japan. Indeed, historically when
Japan faced external threats to its security, more often than
not these emanated from the direction of the continent via
the Korean peninsula. For the Japanese, then, Korea has
always been the “dagger pointed at the heart” of Japan. This
geostrategic fact will never change.5
Growing Korean military capabilities also concern the
Japanese. The South Korean military through U.S.
assistance and indigenous modernization efforts dating
back to the Yulgok plans of the 1970s has transformed itself
into a highly competent military.6 What was once a poorly
trained and deficient force wholly dependent on the United
States at the end of the Korean war has now become one
capable of defending against most ground contingencies
vis-à-vis the North. 7 Unification would bring an
enhancement of these capabilities. A united Korean
military, the pessimistic realists argue, would possess a
military of nearly 1.8 million with commensurate
capabilities and aspirations to be a regional military
player.8
Hate. Realism dictates that a significant increase in
relative capabilities between proximate states can give rise
to insecurity spirals.9 In Japan’s case these concerns
regarding Korea are exacerbated by two additional factors.
The first is the deep historical antagonism between the two
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countries stemming from the occupation period (1910-45).
Arguments on the Korean side for this anger (in Korean,
han or unredeemed resentment) are well-known. On the
Japanese side, this history manifests itself in a superiority
complex toward Korea inherent in the collective mindsets of
former colonizers. It is also manifested in an “avoidance
phenomenon”—a combination of discomfort and frustration
at Korean attempts to hold Japan eternally responsible for
its history.10
Moreover, this negative historical memory has become
deeply-ingrained in the two peoples’ mindsets through a
variety of formal and informal institutions. Antagonistic
images are passed down generationally through family
folklore, chauvinist histories taught in secondary schools
(on both Korean and Japanese parts), and popular and mass
media-perpetuated stereotypes such that the negativism
becomes a part of one’s identity. This is especially prevalent
on the Korean side, where parts of the Korean self-identity
become constructed in linear opposition to Japan. For
example, the two national holidays in Korea (March 1 or
samilchol and August 15 or kwangbokchol) celebrate
Korean patriotism by specifically resurrecting
anti-Japanese images. The 50th anniversary celebrations of
Korean independence in 1995 were marked by the razing of
the National Museum (the former colonial headquarters of
Japan).11 When the two Korean leaders agreed at the June
2000 North-South summit to hold family reunions, the date
chosen for this symbolic affirmation of a united Korean
identity was August 15th—the date of liberation from the
Japanese occupation.
Because Korean nationalism is anti-Japanism,
difficulties in the relationship remain prevalent despite
seemingly compelling material forces for less friction.12 For
example, despite the string of Japanese colonial statements
of contrition, Koreans remain unsatisfied with Japan’s
“haughty” attitude. Despite the benefit to South Korean
security of the revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines,
Koreans expressed trepidation at the marginally more
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active role Japan could play in a contingency in the region.
While Japanese peacekeeping contributions took place
under severe self-imposed restrictions and far outside East
Asia, Koreans still expressed concerns about renewed
Japanese militarism. Although the DPRK August 1998
Taepo-dong launch was provocative and threatening, South
Koreans took perverse hidden pleasure in Japanese
convulsions over the event. Seen through the lense of
identity, this otherwise puzzling behavior makes sense.
Remaining even mildly neutral about Japan is in essence to
deny a critical part of one’s identity as Korean. Advocating
security cooperation with Japan becomes synonymous with
treason because it would be seen to subjugate Korea to
Japanese domination. This ideational barrier to
cooperation is manifested on the Korean side as a general
state-of-mind as well as domestic-political aversion to
discussions about Japan in a positive light. It is seen by
many as a more formidable obstacle than any other in
promoting cooperation.13
Coupled with the history issue is Japanese concern with
potential balancing dynamics in Northeast Asia. In a
post-unification scenario, the pessimists argue, the
likelihood of a Korea-China coalition that alienates Japan is
high. The end of the North Korean threat will most likely
mean decreased support for U.S. forces in Korea as well as
the end of the overarching security imperative for
cooperation that characterized the U.S.-Japan-ROK
security triangle during the Cold War. As the new united
Korean entity seeks to define its place in the region, it will be
drawn into a closer alignment with China.14 This is (as the
Chinese are fond of saying) the “natural order of things” in
Asia given the pre-20th-century history of Asian
international relations when the Chinese tributary system
dominated (in this sense, the post-1945 order was the
historical aberration rather than the norm). It is also a
function of geography (i.e., what some post-Cold War
analyses of the region have termed continental power
accommodation), 1 5 and a civilizationally-inherent
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bandwagoning dynamic among smaller Asian powers in the
region vis-à-vis China.16 Reinforcing this alignment trend
will be a revanchist nationalism in a united Korea that finds
a natural ally in China against Japan as the two share
similar victimization experiences at the hands of Japanese
colonizers.
Pessimists would argue that examples of this dynamic
are already evident. When China and South Korea
normalized relations in 1992, this rapprochement was
celebrated in the language of restoring what was
historically a “natural relationship.”17 Even before the 1992
reconciliation, Seoul and Beijing were natural allies
whenever an ill-conceived Japanese statement about
history raises problems. The ROK’s decision not to
participate in American-led research on theater missile
defense (TMD) architectures in East Asia (while Japan has)
is in good part a function of Korean desires not to alienate
China.18 Indeed, virtually all of the post-Cold War analyses
of the region assume a consolidation of the China-Korea axis
against Japan.19
Japan’s Purported Grand Strategy: Predatory.
The upshot of these commonly-held assumptions for
Japanese grand strategy is that a united Korea would
possess the capabilities and motivations (revanchist
nationalism) while lacking the impediments (cooperation
based on the U.S.-Japan-Korea triangular alliance) for peer
competition with Japan. For this reason, pessimists argue,
Japan’s long-term strategy regarding the peninsula is a
predatory one—to keep Korea divided and/or not encourage
or facilitate a process of unification. This strategy is
manifest in practices like Japan’s “comprehensive security”
policy. Devised by Masayoshi Ohira, this doctrine
maintained that Japan could provide for its security
through nonmilitary means, which primarily meant
economic assistance for prosperity and stability of the
region.20 Applied to the Korean peninsula, this strategy was
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seen by South Koreans as thinly veiled attempts to keep
Korea divided by Japan’s providing assistance to the North.
Even more directly a reflection of Japan’s purported
grand strategy was the “equi-distance policy” for the
peninsula. Conceived in the early 1970s by then Premier
Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio, this
policy’s rationale was that Japanese security was best
served not by siding solely with the South but by
maintaining equal contacts with both regimes, thereby
fostering a balance of power on the peninsula. Similarly
high-level dialogue during the Nakasone years in the 1980s
was seen as part of the grand plan to keep Korea down.21
Normalization dialogue at the end of the Cold War (i.e.,
Kanemaru mission) and current dialogue are seen in
similarly negative light. Though couched in the language of
economic assistance, humanitarian aid, and comprehensive
security, this is all part of an overall predatory grand
strategy that seeks to aid the North to keep the peninsula
divided and thereby avoid peer competition.
Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom.
Faulty Assumptions. The conventional wisdom is wrong
(or at least questionable) because many of the basic
assumptions informing the view do not stand up well to
more discriminating analysis. For example, while historical
and geographical arguments for a united Korean security
threat to Japan abound, historical precedents for such
arguments are absent.22 While Korea is often referred to as
the “dagger” pointed at the heart of Japan, aggression has
historically come through Korea (by China) and not from
Korea itself. In all likelihood a united Korea would be more
preoccupied with securing its new northern border
(discussed below) and gaining domestic stability than with
entertaining any designs on Japan. 23 In addition,
arguments that Japan would be threatened by a joint
North-South Korean military are unfounded. The two
Korean militaries together might total 1.8 million which
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indeed would be intimidating for Japan. However, in a
unification scenario a more reasonable merger figure for the
two militaries is likely. The appropriate military force
would probably number around 650,000, which is
comparable to current ROK levels.24
Second, while some Japanese hold negative images of
Korea, these do not necessarily derive from peer
competition. The modern-day origins of these images derive
in good part from critical mass news media coverage of
authoritarian ROK politics in the 1970s. Japanese looked
with disdain on the martial-law brutality, political
repression, and human rights abuses, particularly
beginning with the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping in 1973. Then
an opposition political leader, he was abducted from a Tokyo
hotel room by KCIA operatives in what was a clear violation
of Japanese sovereignty by the authoritarian Park regime.
The repressive regime under Park (Yusin system) also
undertook a number of actions against Japanese nationals
and press agencies in the 1970s that nearly ruptured
diplomatic relations.25
Yesterday’s negative media coverage contrasts sharply
with today’s reports praising Korean political liberalization,
economic development, the Seoul Olympics (1988), the
Taejon World Expo, and the 2002 World Cup. Coupled with
this was an almost naive infatuation with North Korea
growing out of the 1970s that was rooted in three
developments: the regional detente spurred by
Sino-American rapprochement; the DPRK’s success as a
member of the nonaligned movement (and the ROK’s failure
to win membership); and the poor state of Japanese-ROK
relations at the time. Among the Japanese left and
intellectuals, there were also views of North Korea as the
true representation of Korean nationalism since the South
remained under the military “occupation” of the United
States.26 The point here is not to deny that negative
history-based images exist, but that there are plausible
alternative explanations deriving from politics to explain
the contemporary incarnations of these biases. Moreover, as
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the origins of these emotions are traced to variables (i.e.,
authoritarianism versus democracy; underdevelopment
versus development) rather than constants (history), then
the argument that these images are unmalleable and
unchanging (assumed by the pessimistic realists) becomes
less credible.
The final point regarding the conventional wisdom
relates to agency. Proponents of these viewpoints on
Japanese grand strategy, ironically, tend not to be Japanese
but Koreans. Hence, these agents are not so much providing
a window on Japanese strategic thinking as they are on
nationalist thinking in Korea. They assign intentions and
preferences to Japan deriving from their own fears and
preoccupations regarding Japan. The results are arbitrary
(and often logically inconsistent) assertions about Japanese
predatory grand strategy that have little empirical validity.
In spite of this, because these arguments are dynamic,
controversial, and “sexy” (i.e., presaging conflict), they often
tend to get published over the more sober, cautionary, and
less sensationalist views. From the Korean side, cognitive
biases are apparent in that any optimistic or conciliatory
views that may emanate from Japan regarding the
peninsula are usually not taken at face value but instead
are seen at best as aberrant behavior and at worst as
duplicitous.27
One illustration of the Korea-bias in the scholarship is
the conspicuous absence of discussion regarding the two
variables most likely to cause peer competition between
Japan and Korea: ROK military modernization and nuclear
weapons. Some observers argue that the ROK’s post-Cold
War military modernization and buildup eschews
conventional ground war capabilities necessary for a North
Korean contingency and instead emphasizes force
projection capabilities such as a blue water navy, ballistic
missile technology, in-flight refueling, and satellite
technology. For example, the ROK Navy recently completed
the first stage of the KDX Destroyer Program which entails
development of 3,200-ton destroyers (KDX1) to replace old
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Gearing-class ships acquired from the U.S. Navy in the
1960s and 1970s. There are also plans for construction by
2006 of nine 4,300-ton destroyers (KDX2) with an operating
range of 4,000 miles, and eventually acquisition of
state-of-the-art Aegis-class destroyers (KDX3) starting in
2010. An active submarine program is also underway. The
ROK’s first submarine program started in 1987 and will
produce 12 new 1,200-ton 209-class diesel submarines (a
joint venture of Daewoo and Germany HDW) by 2001 (nine
completed). The new SSU program plans include
acquisition of six 1,500 to 2,000-ton submarines by 2002.
This would be followed by indigenous production of
3,000-ton submarines in the future.28
This buildup has continued in spite of the acute material
constraints imposed by the 1998 financial crisis, and many
argue that the ROK military in looking past the North
Korean contingency is building to prepare for future
regional conflicts, potentially with Japan.29 Moreover, a
united Korean entity based on current capabilities in the
two countries would undoubtedly have available to it the
options of nuclear weaponization as well as long-range
ballistic missiles.30 These are the variables most likely to
cause security dilemmas and peer competition between the
two countries, but they are never ones cited by the Koreans
(i.e., conventional wisdom).
I do not advocate wholly discarding the conventional
wisdom as there is no denying some elements of truth to it.
Instead, this short exercise raises legitimate questions
about accepting outright this view, because the
assumptions which inform it, if not simply incorrect, are
certainly susceptible to debate. Some of the most
problematic variables that should be talked about by the
Korean side are not being talked about. And there is a
plethora of plausible alternative explanations for evidence
cited by the conventional wisdom as validating the
predatory arguments regarding Japanese grand strategy. I
now turn to developing an alternate interpretation of this
strategy.
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The Fear of Entrapment and Determinants of Japan’s
Korea Policy. Since the normalization of relations in 1965,
the factors that have driven policy toward Korea are more
subtle and complex than simply an overarching desire to
keep the peninsula divided. A key factor I have argued that
is crucial to understanding Japanese strategic thinking on
Korea has been the fear of “entrapment.”31 Deriving from
the literature on alliance theory, entrapment generally
refers to the expectations and anxieties regarding mutual
support that underpin interaction between allied and
aligned states.32 Entrapment occurs when a commitment to
an alliance turns detrimental to one’s interests. It means
being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one
does not share or shares only partially.33
Perhaps more than any other factor, the fear of
entrapment has been the most consistent single driver of
Japan’s Korea policy. Japan and the ROK are not party to a
mutual defense treaty, but this does not preclude the
existence of alignment patterns between the two states. As
a result of their geographic proximity, prominence in the
region, common security interests, and triangular alliance
arrangements with the United States, the two nations
exhibit alignment patterns and de facto security ties that
play an important part in their overall relationship.34 These
informal defense links were first publicly enunciated in the
joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the November
1969 Nixon-Sato summit. Known as the “Korea clause,” it
stated that the security of the ROK was essential to Japan.35
Concurrent with the enunciation of the Korea clause was
the Okinawan base agreement, which stipulated that in the
event of a second North Korea invasion, Japan would permit
the United States unconditional access to bases in Okinawa
for the defense of South Korea.36 These two agreements
constituted the closest approximation to a defense treaty
between Japan and the ROK.
In the context of this triangular security relationship,
Japan’s strategy vis-à-vis the peninsula is informed by
anxieties about becoming entrapped in contingencies that
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were unwanted or would put Japan in awkward positions.
For example, an overcommitment to Japan-ROK defense
ties, in the form of strong support for the 1969 Korea clause,
could lead to formal acknowledgment of the ROK’s
indispensable security contribution to Japan’s defense. In
addition, although the region is relatively stable, an
overcommitment to Japan-ROK defense ties could actually
have destabilizing second-order effects. Strong backing of
the South could create a more volatile situation on the
peninsula by increasing North Korean fears of
encirclement. It could also embolden the South to become
more provocative and intransigent toward the North. The
result in either scenario could be a preemptive lashing out
by the North, the consequence of which could be direct
retaliation against Japan.
Minimizing these entrapment fears serves several
Japanese needs. First, by promoting a stable status quo on
the peninsula, Japan avoids having to contend with a host of
politically difficult domestic issues. North Korean
belligerency as a result of strong Japan-ROK ties would
force Tokyo to contend with issues of rearmament and
reevaluation of Article IX of the constitution. Japan would
also have to deal with problematic issues such as internal
monitoring of a substantial North Korean (Chosen Soren)
resident population, and absorbing the potential outflow of
Korean refugees in the event of a second Korean war.37
Entrapment into relations with the ROK that alienated
communist neighbors would close off potential export
markets, thus adversely affecting Japanese economic
interests, and run contrary to its seikei bunri (separation of
economics from politics) policies. It also would run counter
to the sengo shori post-war vision of reestablishing relations
with all nations Japan had warred with or victimized in the
past.
Second, by refraining from acknowledgment of a direct
Japan-ROK security link, Tokyo avoids becoming
vulnerable to the “bulwark of defense” argument and ROK
demands for “security rent.”38 An additional Japanese
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concern regarding such funds is to avoid Seoul’s continual
use of colonial contrition arguments as leverage to extract
monetary forms of “moral repentance.” Tokyo must also
avoid succumbing to accusations that it withholds economic
funds to stifle South Korea’s rise as a competitor in
Japanese market sectors.39 Finally, Japan must straddle
entrapment anxieties vis-à-vis the ROK with
burden-sharing pressures from the United States. This
pressure often takes the form of calls for Japanese
assistance of South Korean economic development to
promote prosperity and stability on the peninsula.40 In sum,
Tokyo’s entrapment fears center on striking a balance
between providing strong political and economic support for
the ROK, and at the same time abstaining from overt
security ties that would leave it vulnerable to South Korean
demands for security rent or moral repentance.41
Understanding the entrapment dynamic is necessary
because it sheds light on evidence that pessimists often
point to as indicative of predatory Japanese long-term
strategies on the peninsula. For example, pessimists point
to Japan’s reneging on the Korea clause in the 1970s (Sato
in January 1972 and Foreign Minister Ohira in August 1973
made statements backing away from commitments in the
Korea clause and Okinawa base agreement42), as well as the
Tanaka government’s attempts at improving relations with
North Korea, as validation of the strategy to keep the
peninsula divided. However, the alternative explanation is
that these actions were motivated by entrapment fears. In
particular, detente both offered Tokyo opportunities to
capitalize on its seikei bunri policies of expanding economic
contacts with new countries and heightened its desires not
to get entrapped into tight alignments with the ROK. The
latter could (1) undercut the former objective by
unnecessarily antagonizing potential parties, or (2) incite
greater hostility in the region contrary to the new trend
toward conciliation at the time.
The equi-distance policy practiced by Japan in the 1970s
and part of the 1980s was not so much about keeping the two
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Koreas down (as the pessimists argue) as about the more
complex considerations the Japanese had about the
peninsula. The equi-distance policy showed how Japan’s
security concerns on the peninsula were of a more
multidimensional nature than those of the ROK. While the
paramount concern for both was an unprovoked North
Korean attack, Japan was also concerned about South
Korean intransigence that might provoke the North as well
as by a general war arising out of the superpower
confrontation in the region. These disparities in what was
seen as threatening on the peninsula reinforced Japanese
entrapment fears regarding strong ties with the ROK and
informed the equi-distance policy.
During the 1980s, Japan adamantly stated that it would
not negotiate loan agreements with the ROK if the funds
were classified as security-related. Pessimists see this as
evidence of Japanese attempts to avoid enhancing ROK
military capabilities.43 But again, this behavior stemmed
less from predatory peer competition and more from desires
not to become entrapped in “security rent” rationales. And
when Tokyo refused to link historical repentance issues
with economic negotiations, rather than being evidence of
Japan’s aversion to resolving lingering historical
grievances, this more nearly represented the desire to avoid
becoming entrapped into untenable bargaining positions.
There are many more examples that could be cited, but the
upshot is that entrapment fears offer an alternative
explanation of Japanese behavior on the peninsula.
Moreover, if one tracks the consistency of the two
explanations across time, the entrapment variable can
better account for changes in behavior than the predatory
pessimist argument (i.e., there are Japanese policies which
are not explainable by the latter argument but are
explainable with the entrapment variable).44
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Components of Japan’s Long-Range Strategy in the
Post-Cold War Era: Optimistic Realism.
If the pessimists’ argument about predatory Japanese
strategies does not hold water, then what are the
components of a long-range grand strategy? I argue that an
optimistic-realist approach better characterizes Japanese
thinking. This has four basic tenets:
(1) Japan does not oppose unification of the peninsula.
(2) Japan proactively seeks alignment with this entity as
a hedge (balance) against China.
(3) Japan does not fear and therefore seeks to preempt
Korean revanchist inclinations.
(4) Japan seeks to reconstruct the ideational base of the
relationship (i.e. history).
No Opposition to Unification.
Contrary to the view of the pessimists, Japan does not
seek to keep the Korean peninsula divided. Such an
assertion raises the prior question of what exactly Tokyo
seeks in terms of its own national security from the Korean
peninsula. Japan has two key objectives in this regard: (1)
stability; and (2) ensuring that alterations to the status quo
work in Japan’s favor. Regarding the former objective,
although the DMZ remains one of the most heavily armed
borders in the world, where peace is sustained only by the
1953 armistice, an odd form of stability has emerged, one
that on the whole does not disadvantage Japan greatly (or at
least no more so than any of the other major powers in the
region). In this sense, Japan’s needs are met by the known
status quo on the peninsula rather than the unknown
non-status quo option. Tokyo is therefore not opposed to
unification per se; it is in favor of stability—which at
present is provided by the status quo.
But if the two Koreas chose to reunify tomorrow, Japan
would not oppose or impede this unification process in any
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way, and most likely would proactively support it.45 This is
because any other option would defeat the long-term
objective of assuring nonadversarial relations with a united
Korea (2 above). Impeding the process of unification once it
started (as the predatory argument might predict) would
ensure an outcome contrary to Japanese interests (i.e., an
adversarial united Korea). This sort of argument is also
evident in discussions of Japanese aid to North Korea. The
premise of such assistance is not for the explicit purpose of
propping up the DPRK and keeping the two Koreas divided,
but to prevent a collapse of the North or facilitate a regime
transition that would cushion unification’s political and
economic effects on both Seoul and Tokyo.46 While the
impetus for changing the status quo is not likely to come
from Japan, Koreans can be assured that, once they started
the process themselves, Tokyo will be obligated to support
it. This would not be out of affinity, goodwill, or loyalty
(although these factors may be present), but because it is in
Japan’s national interests to do so. Thus, to say that Tokyo
opposes dubious changes to the status quo on the peninsula
but still would support unification are not necessarily
logically inconsistent statements.
Balancing against China.
Japan actively seeks close relations with a united Korea
as a hedge against China. Again, one of the basic
assumptions in the predatory argument for Japanese
strategy is that Japan fears Korea bandwagoning with
China against it; however, this view runs counter to basic
realist logic. South Koreans certainly welcomed
normalization with Beijing in 1992. This marked a
triumphant crossing of the Cold War divide, and an opening
of tremendous economic opportunity. Perhaps more
significantly, however, Seoul welcomed normalization
because in the South’s zero-sum mentality, it amounted to
the ultimate diplomatic coup vis-à-vis the North.47 Along
with Soviet normalization in 1990, Seoul succeeded in
effectively isolating Pyongyang from its two primary Cold
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War patrons. In this sense, the existence of the North
Korean state has acted as a sort of buffer facilitating
unbridled ROK enthusiasm for relations with Beijing.
In a unification scenario, however, this buffer
disappears, and a united Korea faces the prospect of an
800-mile contiguous border with a militarily and
economically burgeoning communist China whose
intentions are not transparent. Moreover, it faces this
situation most likely without the same U.S. security
guarantees enjoyed during the Cold War. In addition,
renewed Korean nationalism as a result of unification may
translate into animosities and suspicions regarding China.
The political mood of a post-unified Korea would be
distrustful of a Chinese government as it stands today. In
particular, once North Koreans realize the extent of their
relative deprivation under Kim Il Sungism, any residual
affinity for socialism that might be harbored in a united
Korea would fall by the wayside. The possibility therefore
arises that the new Korean state might view China with
concern, and might heavily fortify its northern border.
Similar threat perceptions are not unthinkable on the
Chinese side as well. Of all the powers in the region, Beijing
has the most direct stake in the status quo on the peninsula.
As a recent PLA editorial stated,
The Korean Peninsula is at the heart of northeast Asia and its
strategic importance is obvious, to control the peninsula is to
tightly grasp hold of northeast Asia.48

More specifically, as two Chinese analysts noted, loss of
the North would leave China “deprived of an indispensable
security buffer proximate to both the nation’s capital and to
one of its most important industrial regions.”49 A united
Korea presents Beijing with the unwanted prospect of
another noncompliant power (like Vietnam) on its flank, one
with a competing ideological and social system. Moreover,
China would not pass lightly over the security implications
of such a situation. It has already expressed concerns about
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the buildup of South Korean (and Japanese) naval forces,
and such concerns are likely to be heightened in the case of a
united Korea.50 Moreover, if relations between Beijing and
the United States are tense, then the Chinese perception
that the West might utilize Korean unification as a means of
containing China is far from remote.
For these reasons, a lengthy 1992 report on future
peninsular strategies by the Communist Party Central
Committee (CPC) stated that despite Seoul-Beijing
normalization, North Korea was still “China’s Northeast
Asian strategic bulwark.” It stated that the North’s
absorption by the South would have a “devastating
psychological impact” on China, and therefore Beijing’s
priorities center on preventing Korea from becoming “the
route for the overthrow of socialism by peaceful means from
the West.”51 As one specialist noted, for these and other
reasons, the Chinese perception of a united Korea is
therefore far from one of unadulterated optimism:
From a longer-term perspective, China is apprehensive about
potential threats to its interests from a reunified Korea. In the
economic sphere, Beijing is wary of competition from a united
Korean economic powerhouse. Politically, the Chinese are
uncertain about the role that a united Korea might play in the
region and worried that Japan could eventually dominate the
peninsula and undermine China’s growing influence in Korea.
Militarily, the prospect of a reunified Korea with at least a
potential if not an actual nuclear capability is also cause for
Chinese concern. In addition, some Chinese foresee the
possibility that a reunified Korea would seek to reclaim Chinese
territory bordering Korea that both North and South view as the
birthplace of the Korean nation.52

History has shown that states with contiguous borders,
whether intentionally or not, often lapse into competition
driven by security fears.53 In this regard, Japan is fully
aware that the most proximate threat to a united Korea may
emanate from China, not Japan.54 A united Korea does not
have the autonomous capabilities to balance against China;
in addition, in the post-Cold War era, it does not have the
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luxury of certain U.S. security guarantees. Furthermore,
while a united Korea will certainly harbor its share of
animosities toward Japan, this relationship (presumably
between Tokyo and a united government under Seoul)
would still be grounded in the decades of Japanese-South
Korean normalized relations that preceded unification.55 It
would also be grounded in a familiarity bred through
common security ties with the United States for the entire
post-war and Cold War eras.56 By contrast, the cumulative
experiences undergirding a united Seoul-Beijing
relationship would not extend further back than 1992.
Compelled to balance against the more proximate and
unfamiliar threat, Korea could look to Japan with greater
fondness.
In addition, the pessimist’s argument for Japanese peer
competition with Korea fails to acknowledge that Japanese
grand strategy is not made in the vacuum of Tokyo-Seoul
bilateral relations but must be consistent and conversant
with the larger foreign policy picture.57 For example,
Japanese geostrategic thinking in the 21st century faces a
number of cross-pressures and imperatives.58 Japan faces
uncertain relationships with Russia and China (the latter is
where peer competition is likely); imperatives for a more
independent foreign policy and a larger leadership role in
the region commensurate with its economic capabilities;
and the need to move beyond its one-dimensional security
dependence on the United States.59 At the same time,
pursuit of more proactive defense policies must not
contradict constitutional principles; must not disregard
domestic aversion to rearmament; and must not raise
regional concerns about renewed Japanese militarism. A
thriving relationship—not peer competition—with Korea
seems to fit well with these needs. It provides for Japanese
security and regional stability, and at the same time strikes
a balance between a policy not too strong to raise regional
suspicions and incite anti-Japan balancing coalitions, but
not too weak to embolden influence-seeking by China.
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Not Concerned with Korean “Revenge.”
As noted earlier, the arguments regarding Korean
revanchist nationalism are overstated and misfounded on
three points. The first is with regard to intentions—while
Korea has often been referred to as a dagger pointed at the
heart of Japan, aggression has historically come from China
(via the peninsula), not by aggressive Koreans themselves.
The second is with regard to geography—as alluded to
above, a united Korea would be more preoccupied with
threats on its contiguous northern land border than with
any far-flung designs on Japan across the sea. The third is
with regard to capabilities—i.e., arguments that Japan
would be threatened by a joint North-South Korean military
are misfounded since a combined military force would be
greatly rationalized.
One area in which potential security dilemmas do arise
for Japan is future Korean force procurement. This breaks
down along three lines—the extent to which Korea seeks
naval capabilities; the extent to which it deploys ballistic
missiles; and whether it becomes a nuclear power. The
likelihood of any of these is far from remote. As noted above,
naval modernization programs in submarines and
destroyers has proceeded in spite of the 1998 financial
crisis, with Korean intentions clearly to develop competent
regional capabilities. On the Korean peninsula today,
between the two regimes, there exists the capabilities to
field a wide array of short and medium-range ballistic
missiles. Seoul has expressed a clear desire to upgrade its
own missile ranges beyond those specified in the 1979
bilateral agreement with the United States. Finally, DPRK
interests in nuclear weaponization have been clearly
documented. And on the South Korean side, if unification
means a retrenchment of the United States, the two times
historically that the ROK was interested in nuclear
weapons were the two times the U.S. commitment to
Korean security was perceived to be deficient.
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From the Japanese perspective, the key to averting
security dilemmas with Korea over these issues in the
future is to create and maintain as much dialogue and
transparency as possible in the present.60 Rather than
complain about the ROK’s naval modernization plans (as
China has done or as the ROK has done vis-à-vis Japanese
peacekeeping participation and revision of the U.S.-Japan
defense guidelines), Japan has taken the high road,
ignoring third party speculation that the ROK buildup is
directed against Japan, and actively seeking ways to
enhance maritime coordination and dialogue.61 This has
been manifest in an unprecedented increase in bilateral
security activity in the past 5 years including exchange
visits between working level officers up through Joint
Chiefs of Staff chairs and defense ministers, cadet
exchanges, the first-ever reciprocal port calls, and search
and rescue exercises (SAR).62 It is also evident in activities
at the Track II level aimed at creating familiarity and
seeking new avenues of military coordination.63 With
regard to potential Korean nuclear and missile
proliferation, Japan would seek to facilitate to the extent
possible a united Korea’s continued compliance with
nonproliferation regimes (as the ROK does now). Again, the
key point here is that the Japanese response has not been to
complain, accuse, or rally regional support to prevent such
scenarios from occurring (as a predatory strategy might
suggest, or as South Koreans have done regarding certain
Japanese behavior), but a more patient approach seeking to
develop a cooperative foundation upon which to manage any
potential problems along these lines.
Reconstructing History.
The fourth tenet of Japan’s long-term strategy is to
construct a new ideational base for the Japan-Korea
relationship, one that moves away from the current fixation
on the colonial period and historical animosity and gives the
relationship a more positive identity. 64 There are
interesting parallels here with China. As pessimists argue,
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the construction of the Korea-China relationship has been
wholly positive, drawing on a common Confucian heritage
and the history of the tributary system. But who is to say
that such constructions will remain constant over time? As
one observer noted, often-cited Korean resentments toward
Japan seem equally relevant in the Chinese case:
When Koreans get around to nursing grudges, they might
consider which neighbor (Japan or China) saddled them with
Kim Il Sung, which gave the go-ahead for the Korean War, and
which prevented non-Communist unification in late 1950 by
massive, undeclared intervention.65

Traces of this sort of problem were already apparent in
the negotiations leading up to the 1992 normalization
treaty. As a ROK foreign ministry official recalled, China’s
outright rejection of statements expressing remorse or
repentance for the Korean war in the treaty left a sobering
subtext to the fanfare of the moment.66 In addition,
nationalist fervor from a united Korea might also raise
Beijing’s concern about the two million-strong ethnic
Korean community in Manchuria (Jilin province), the
largest contingent of overseas Koreans in the world.
Unification raises a plethora of unpleasant scenarios for
Beijing regarding mass migration or ethnic identification of
this group with the new Korean state. As early evidence of
this, China has already expressed disapproval of former
President Roh’s advocacy of an international community of
Koreans (1989). Sensitivities were also manifest in Beijing’s
harsh charge in 1995 that seemingly innocuous Korean tour
groups to Manchuria might incite secessionist movements
among the ethnic minority. 6 7 In addition, during
normalization talks in 1992, Beijing rejected ROK proposals
for establishment of consulate offices in Jilin, and remains
reluctant to permit ROK heads of state to tour this area
during summit visits.68
A trend that weighs strongly in favor of a positive
reconstruction of the Japan-Korea relations is democracy.69
In particular, the ROK’s democratic consolidation and
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economic prosperity transform Japanese images of its
neighbor. As noted earlier, a good part of the negativism
surrounding Korea in Japan derived from the repressive
practices of the authoritarian regimes in Korea in the 1970s
and 1980s. As Korea developed and liberalized, the change
gradually influenced the Japanese government and general
public to hold more positive images of Korea and Koreans.
One manifestation of this was the Kankoku boomu (Korea
boom) in which Korean language, food, and music
experienced an upsurge in popularity in Japan in the
late-1980s.70 Plans to start Korean language broadcasting
in Japan by the end of the century have also been
implemented.71 A study on the Korean minority in Japan
noted additional ways in which perceptions are changing:
A new image is emerging for Koreans in Japan. This new
image is vibrant, dynamic, and self-confident, backed not only
by growing economic power but by changing cultural
attitudes.72

On the Korean side, as the country embraces democracy
and progresses toward economic prosperity, its enhanced
international prestige (reflected in such events as the 1988
Seoul Olympics, United Nations membership in 1991,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) membership in 1996, and 2002 World Cup with
Japan) fosters a growing self-confidence among Koreans
that reduces national insecurities and xenophobia,
nurturing a less petty, less emotional attitude in dealings
with Japan.
This process of identity change was evident at the
October 1998 summit between Kim Dae Jung and Obuchi
Keizo. It was not evident in the colonial apology, the fishery
zones agreement, the commitment to joint naval exercises,
or the joint action plan, all of which the popular press
focused on.73 These were undoubtedly all unprecedented
material accomplishments, but what were of significance
from an ideational perspective were instead the little things
that went largely unnoticed. In speeches before the Diet,
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Kim Dae Jung spoke of how Koreans were as responsible as
Japanese for putting the history issue to rest and moving
forward. The two leaders called “infantile” the fixation on 50
years of negative Japan-ROK interaction at the expense of
1,500 years of positive exchanges and cooperation. Japan
trumpeted Korea’s successful road to democracy while
Korea lauded Japan’s peace constitution and commitment
to overseas assistance.74 These attempts to reconstruct
history, to emphasize the positive interaction over negative,
to express admiration for the other’s accomplishments,
were not present in past interactions. They represented
subtle but important manifestations of Japanese desires to
change templates and transform the identity of the
relationship.
Policy Implications of Japan’s Grand Strategy on
Korea.
Two questions confront this final section. First, given the
chapter’s interpretation of Japanese grand strategy, what
are the implications for current policy? Second, how
plausible are certain suggested scenarios for security
outcomes in the region involving Japan given what we know
about the strategy?
Engagement with the DPRK. The pessimists would see
Tokyo’s current policy of restarting normalization
negotiations in early 2000 with Pyongyang as well as the
overall engagement strategy with North Korea as
consistent with the predatory grand strategy. In this view,
Japan continues to prop up the North indefinitely with
assistance, couching this in the benevolent language of
engagement and humanitarian aid, but really for the
purpose of averting a reunited Korea.75 I do not believe this
is an accurate interpretation. Tokyo’s engagement policy
with Pyongyang is not informed or motivated by an
overarching desire to delay unification but by a variety of
other less menacing motives. A degree of entrapment
anxieties informs the policy in the sense that Japan still
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seeks to avoid situations in which the DPRK feels so
encircled and isolated that it might lash out.76 Economic
assistance to the DPRK is provided by Tokyo not so much to
prop up the North as to avoid hard landing scenarios that
would have destabilizing repercussions for Seoul, Tokyo,
and the region as a whole.77 Engagement is also a function of
short-term expediency. Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine policy and
the Perry review’s emphasis on trilateral coordination
compelled Tokyo to step in line on the policy in spite of
substantial inclinations to the contrary after the Taepo
dong test flight over the home island in August 1998. In
addition, Tokyo had few other alternatives. A hardline
position after the launch (encompassing the levying of
sanctions and reneging on financial commitments to
KEDO) would have had little effect on North Korea and
would have alienated Japan in relations with Seoul and
Washington.
The likelihood of a positive result in these negotiations is
not good. The DPRK’s refusal to acknowledge (let alone
investigate) the alleged abductions of Japanese citizens
from Japan dating back to the 1970s remains a major
impediment. In addition, a normalization settlement that
entailed large sums of money in the range of $5-10 billion
that essentially served as a bribe to moderate the DPRK
missile threat to Japan would be domestically
unacceptable.78 Perhaps the most useful insight that the
grand strategy discussion offers here is with regard to the
flexibility of Japan’s position on engagement. While the
predatory argument would see Tokyo as wedded to
engagement (i.e., as long as the DPRK is in relatively dire
straits, it would prop up the regime to prevent collapse and
unification), Japan’s grand strategy actually allows for
much greater flexibility. Because this strategy does not in
fact “fear” unification (and would seek to accommodate and
support such a process were it to occur), Tokyo would not be
constrained from shifting away from engagement toward
more coercive or isolation policies if the consensus among
the allies in the region moved in that direction.79
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China-South Korea Relations. Another policy
implication that can be deduced from the grand strategy is
with regard to how Tokyo views Beijing’s actions on the
peninsula. China has certainly had a more prominent role
than Japan in the post-Cold War on peninsular issues.
Beijing participates in the Four Party Talks on the
armistice; it has provided the venue for much of the
North-South contacts, including the ones that led to the
agreement on the June 2000 Pyongyang summit; it played
subtle but important roles in defusing the nuclear crisis in
1994 and in the DPRK missile testing moratorium. Tokyo,
on the other hand, has been largely relegated to a secondary
role, as a financial contributor to KEDO. Japan might
therefore be concerned about the degree to which China
exercises an inordinate amount of influence on the
peninsula.
There is no denying Beijing’s enhanced role in shaping
events on the peninsula, while China-South Korea relations
since 1992 remain on an uptick (as do China-DPRK
relations given the recent visit by Kim Jong Il to Beijing).80
However, while cognizant of this, Japan is not overly
worried. As noted above, this is because of a realization that,
in the longer term, regime type, geography, economics, and
familiarity work in favor of Japan-Korea alignments and to
the disadvantage of China-Korea ones, especially if the
North Korean buffer is gone. The one exception to this might
be economic complementarities on the China-Korea axis;
however, even here the outlook is not nearly as sanguine as
the popular wisdom predicts.81
Other Security Outcomes. Finally, what does the
strategy tell us about Japanese reactions to other security
scenarios in the region? Given the DPRK’s unexpected
resiliency and the June 2000 Korea summit, increasingly
there is discussion of nonzero-sum peace solutions on the
peninsula where the two regimes co-exist rather than
reunite. Indeed the 2000 joint declaration between the two
Koreas expressed explicit agreement between Seoul and
Pyongyang that the common denominator of their
252

respective unification formulas was a long interim period of
coexistence under a “one nation, two systems” vision. There
is nothing a priori in Japanese strategic thinking that would
be averse to such an outcome, but then again it would
depend greatly on the circumstances of this end-state on the
peninsula. If for example, the “one nation, two systems”
solution left two Korean regimes in peace and compliant
with arms control and nonproliferation agreements, then
Japan might favor such stability. On the other hand, if this
end-state came about without substantial moderation of
DPRK military capabilities, then Japan would be no better
off. In other words, if the inter-Korean peace solution deals
only with those things relevant to peninsular security like
DMZ troop reductions and artillery, but does not address
long-range missiles, then Japan would most likely oppose
such an outcome. Tokyo would not oppose the inter-Korean
peace per se, but would be very concerned about another
form of entrapment—in this case, the ROK incentive to take
its newfound peace with the DPRK (i.e., moderation of the
threat of invasion and artillery) and decouple its security
from Japan with regard to missiles or nuclear weapons.
What about the possibility of Japan shedding its
nonproliferation identity as a response to continued DPRK
threats? Or, conversely, what about Japan bandwagoning
with China and the DPRK to mitigate its external threats?
Either proposition is certainly plausible. In the former case,
Japan clearly possesses the capabilities, technology, and
infrastructure to proliferate. In the latter, if one is a fan of
cultural arguments for security, there exist precedents for a
bandwagoning with China in the region.82 The answers to
such questions lie less in Japanese grand strategy on the
peninsula and more in Japanese confidence in the U.S.
alliance. As long as U.S. commitments remain firm, the
likelihood of Japan seeking alternative internal or external
balancing options is low. In other words, the causal arrow is
more likely to run in the direction from a weakened U.S.
alliance to alternative balancing options, rather than from
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alternative balancing options to a weakened U.S. alliance.
As one longtime Japan expert observed,
So long as the United States sustains its existing presence in the
region, Tokyo will undoubtedly maintain its cooperation with
Washington as a core element of its foreign policy. Under
current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that Japan will try
to establish a cooperative system with its regional neighbors in
an effort to free itself from the sphere of U.S. influence.83

Conclusion.
Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the
common assumption has been that Japan’s predatory grand
strategy has been premised on a fear of unification and a
desire to prevent it. At times this has been explicit through
the equi-distance policy of the 1970s or more subtle through
post-Cold War humanitarian aid and economic assistance
policies to prop up the DPRK regime. But a true
understanding of the relevant grand strategy must look for
the continuities in Japanese attitudes toward the
peninsula, not just since 1945 but over the past centuries.
What emerges from this longer-term view are two
constants. First, Japan has always sought a relationship
with Korea that works to Japan’s security advantage in the
region; and second, Japan has always seen Korea policy
embedded in the larger context of the region’s balance of
power. What has changed in the latter half of the 20th
century and the beginning of the 21st century is the mode by
which Japan has sought these objectives. In the past, this
was based on unilateral military domination of the
peninsula; today, it is based on alignment and cooperation
within the context of U.S.-Japan-Korea relations. The point
to be made here is that neither of these objectives logically
dictates Japanese opposition to a unified peninsula in the
21st century.
As this chapter has shown, arguments suggesting such
predatory motives have done so based less on a reading of
the continuities in strategy and more on historical biases
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and enmity. What emerges in the former case is a grand
strategy for Japan not prejudiced against unification, but
actively in pursuit of unification outcomes that work to
Japan’s advantage in the regional distribution of power.
This translates to support for the DPRK not because Tokyo
wants to keep the peninsula divided, but because it wants to
cushion and shape unification in stable directions that
benefit Japan. Moreover, Japan seeks more political and
military cooperation with South Korea not because it is
carefully planning its opportunity to repeat history. Rather,
it is because in the longer term there is a realization that
confidence, trust, and transparency on this axis can only
benefit Japan’s security under virtually all balance of power
configurations one could imagine in the region’s future. This
indeed is a very realist perspective but also an optimistic
one.
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CHAPTER 8
ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES FOR
UNIFICATION1

Marcus Noland
Introduction.
On the Korean peninsula, the world confronts a face-off
between what is surely one of the greatest success stories of
the post-war era and one of the last of a dying breed of
totalitarian dinosaurs. This situation creates fundamental
policy dilemmas of enormous practical and ethical import
for the rest of the world. Judged in terms of the share of
population under arms or the share of military expenditures
in national income, North Korea continues to maintain the
most militarized society on Earth. It produces and exports
ballistic missiles and is thought to possess large stores of
chemical and biological weapons, and possibly nuclear
weapons as well. It invaded the South once and in
subsequent years engaged in state-sponsored terrorism
against the South. Internally, it maintains a personality
cult around the deceased Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong
Il, of religious proportions and has one of the worst human
rights records of any state existent today. A famine has
claimed the lives of perhaps 10 percent of the pre-crisis
population. This is fundamentally a systemic crisis, not a
period of aberrant performance due to bad weather or
unfavorable external shocks, though both have contributed
to North Korea’s current predicament. Yet to paraphrase
Mark Twain, reports of the regime’s collapse have been an
exaggeration, and its durability has confounded numerous
observers.

267

The Kim Jong Il regime presents the United States with
strategic and humanitarian challenges, and its peaceful
elimination would surely be the first-best solution from a
U.S. perspective. Two aspects of that statement bear
elaboration. First, note the use of the term “regime.”
Ultimately, it is the Kim Jong Il regime that presents the
United States with such challenges—not the existence of an
independent North Korean state. Presumably the United
States could easily live with a divided though suitably
demilitarized peninsula. Whether a non-Kim regime would
be viable in the North for any extended period of time is
another matter, and there are reasons for skepticism. But
from the standpoint of logical consistency, we should be
clear that it is the regime, not the state, to which we
fundamentally object.
Second, note the modifier “peaceful.” Obviously, if we
could obtain our first-best solution in a relatively costless
manner, that would be our preferred option. Presumably, as
costs increase, less ambitious outcomes would begin to
appear more attractive. At the extreme, few, if any, U.S.
policymakers would regard total war as an acceptable cost
for the elimination of the Kim Jong Il regime.
These two considerations quickly lead us into the gray
world of choosing among second-bests. I have been charged
with writing a chapter on the economics of Korean
unification. However, as implied in the discussion above,
unification itself could take different modalities and be
achieved through different paths. For the sake of
concreteness, I will focus on two possibilities. In the first,
unification is a protracted, negotiated process yielding some
kind of confederation or “one nation, two systems” outcome.
This is the official position of both the North and South
Korean governments today as reaffirmed in the June 2000
summit.
The other option, of course, is the collapse of North Korea
and its absorption into South Korea along the lines of the
German experience. These two options are neither
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exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive: the two states could
enter into a consensual process of unification and the North
could collapse before this was completed, or one side or the
other could attempt a forcible unification. Nevertheless, the
dichotomy is useful for illustrating some alternative
conceptions of the economic precursors to unification as well
as to its effects.
Consensual Unification.
Both North and South Korea have expressed a desire for
a consensual unification of the peninsula. Kim Dae Jung
has repeatedly indicated his lack of interest in undermining
the DPRK and has instead called for peaceful coexistence.
In his “Berlin Declaration” of March 2000, President Kim
indicated that the South Korean government was willing to
directly support the economic rehabilitation of the North,
and “economic cooperation” was identified as one of the
priorities for action in the June 2000 summit declaration.
The South Korean unification plan is gradual in the
extreme, envisioning a process of unification lasting two
generations. It put forward a plan for federation at the
summit.
For its part, North Korea has proposed a Confederal
Republic of Koryo to be governed by a national assembly
consisting of an equal number of representatives from
North and South Korea.2 The statement in a 1999 meeting
at the Council of Foreign Relations by North Korean
Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun that North Korea could
consider a “one country, two systems” model along the lines
of Hong Kong and China could be interpreted as a signal
that North Korea was open to this kind of engagement.
The announcement in April 2000 that leaders of the
North and South would meet in the first ever North-South
summit stunned the world. While this could be no more than
a tactical move on the part of the North Koreans timed to
extract maximum concessions out of an electorally weak
Kim Dae Jung and pliant Clinton administration, the
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possibility that this represents a significant strategic shift
on the part of a newly confident Kim Jong Il cannot be
entirely discounted.3 Only time will tell. It is hard to argue,
though, that recent diplomatic developments reduce the
likelihood of consensual integration.
In a formal sense, one can imagine a series of
progressively deeper steps of integration that the states
could undertake. Perhaps the first, and simplest, would be
the formation of a free trade area, freeing trade between the
two Koreas but permitting each to restrict trade with third
parties according to their own interests. This would be
equivalent to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in which trade is unencumbered among the
United States, Canada, and Mexico, but each country
maintains its own trade policies with respect to
nonmembers. Even this first step would appear to be far
beyond anything that can be seriously expected in the near
term. The next step would be the formation of a customs
union which would involve applying a common policy to
trade with third parties. This would be akin to the European
Economic Community (EEC).
Economic union would be a deeper form of integration,
permitting the free movement of labor, capital, and goods
across borders, as exists in the European Union (EU) today.
A monetary union would involve the adoption of a single
currency, as is in process in some EU member states today.
A social union would involve the adoption of common labor
and social welfare policies in the two states. The final stage
would be political union and the surrender of independent
claims on sovereignty. The EU has managed to create an
economic union and is in the process of forging social and
political union. Within this schema there are differing
degrees of surrender of local authority to central
governments. Presumably, given the radically different
social and political systems of North and South Korea, any
form of consensual political integration would involve the
maintenance of extensive local autonomy. Indeed, given the
highly centralized nature of the governing systems of both
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North and South Korea, issues of local autonomy and
control would presumably be highly contentious under any
unification scheme.
Coping with the Present. Thus the prerequisites for a
consensual unification would be maintenance of two
independent states and a sufficient degree of convergence of
economic and political practices to make the outcome
plausible. In the case at hand, this means averting a
collapse in the North and generating sufficient reform in the
North’s economic and political system to make some degree
of integration with the South sustainable. The issue of
political change is well beyond my competence, and I will
focus on the economic issue.
In the simplest terms, the North Korean economy no
longer works. It does not generate enough output to sustain
its population biologically, nor, absent fundamental
economic reforms, will it do so in the future. Faced with this
situation, Pyongyang has pursued essentially two coping
strategies. The first strategy has been the pursuit of
“one-off” projects to generate foreign exchange without
affecting the systemic organization of the economy. These
projects would include the Rajin-Sonbong special economic
zone (SEZ) and the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. The
October 1998 agreement between Hyundai and Pyongyang
is important in this regard. First, payments committed to by
Hyundai dwarf anything that North Korea could plausibly
earn in Rajin-Sonbong, and, second, the Hyundai
agreement extends the possibility of the construction of a
new SEZ.
With respect to the former, Hyundai has guaranteed
North Korea $942 over 75 months, with the payment
schedule front-loaded for the first 6 months. (Indeed, the
North Koreans used brinkmanship to extract up-front
payments before the first tour visited Mt. Kumgang in
November 1998.) At $300 per passenger, North Korea
stands to make $450 million per year off the tourism
agreement alone in the admittedly unlikely case that
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Hyundai is able to reach its target of 1.5 million visitors per
year in 2005.4 To put this in perspective, this money, if
properly deployed, would be enough to close the North
Korean food gap and end the famine. Unfortunately, it is
believed that the funds are going into the Macau bank
account of “Bureau 39,” a party organization controlled by
Kim Jong Il, to be used to reward his cronies and prop up his
rule. If this is how the Mt. Kumgang tourism project plays
out, it will amount to a successful version of what
Rajin-Sonbong is not—a regime-preserving hard currency
earner with no real systemic implications for the
organization of the North Korean economy or society.
In this respect, the rest of the Hyundai deal might be
more significant. The agreement also calls for the
development of a second SEZ in Haeju, north of Inchon. This
appears to have far greater prospects than Rajin-Sonbong.
First, the geographical location is far more auspicious.
Second, it has the backing of Hyundai (and presumably the
South Korean government). This is critical both from the
standpoint that it provides the necessary infrastructure
(which Rajin-Sonbong sorely lacks) and carries the
imprimatur of Hyundai (and by extension the South Korean
government). Thus, South Korean small- and medium-sized
enterprises are far more likely to move light manufacturing
operations to Haeju than Rajin-Sonbong.5
The second has been the use of implicit or explicit threats
in developing nuclear weapon and missile capabilities in
order to extract resources from the rest of the world. In this
view, the aversion of a military confrontation with the
United States in 1994 has given North Korea an
opportunity to develop more effective means of extorting
resources from the rest of the world and pushing for
unification on their terms. North Korea’s August 1998
public announcement of its missile exports and its test of a
multistage rocket, and its apparently renewed
nuclear-related activities, perhaps give some indication of
the country’s future course. The marriage of the rocket and
nuclear programs would give the North Koreans impressive
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tools with which to intimidate their immediate neighbors
and create proliferation nightmares for the rest of the world.
The truly frightening aspect of such reasoning is that this
scenario would be a continuation of the status quo.
Ironically, given obstacles to successful reform, such an
externally high-risk strategy might be the path of least
resistance internally to a weak and risk-averse regime.
North Korea could continue to play a strategy of attempting
to extort resources out of the rest of the world, offering to
abandon weapons development and export while continuing
to make clandestine sales. In this regard, recent diplomatic
interchanges potentially represent a major step forward in
stopping the North’s nuclear weapons and long-range
missile programs and in normalizing its relations with the
rest of the world.
In the absence of significant economic rehabilitation,
North Korea will require external support for the
foreseeable future. Yet the world community is unlikely to
continue this support unless North Korea continues to pose
a security threat to its neighbors. Collapse would pose great
risks to international political stability, especially if it were
accompanied by civil war and military intervention by
external powers. Surrounding countries—South Korea,
China, and Japan—and the United States have
demonstrated a willingness to provide this support and
more, for fear of North Korea’s collapse, or, what would be
worse, an internal conflict or lashing out which could put
millions of people in Northeast Asia in harm’s way,
including thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea
and Japan.
The provision of such aid is tied to the existence of this
security threat. If North Korea was simply a country with a
broken economy and 22 million impoverished citizens, it is
extremely unlikely that a multinational consortium would
be pouring in billions of dollars of aid in the form of food and
infrastructural investments. There are plenty of such
countries in Central Asia and Africa, but the rest of the
world does not build them light water nuclear reactors or
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refurbish their electrical grids. Indeed, one could argue that
not even the famine distinguishes North Korea—the
contemporaneous situations in Africa are as bad if not
worse.6 Rather, North Korea’s ability to extract such
resources from the world community is intimately related to
the threat it poses, so that, in this sense, the status quo more
closely resembles extortion than charity. The threat North
Korea poses is its sole asset. It is unlikely to negotiate away
this asset very easily.
Getting from Here to There. All this is to say that
successful consensual unification would require a
significant reorientation of North Korean policy.
Cooperation could be expected to yield economic benefits to
North Korea in the form of enhanced trade and investment,
assistance from multilateral development banks, and
settlement of post-colonial claims against Japan. At the
same time, to obtain these benefits North Korea
presumably would have to forego its current revenues from
exportation of medium-range missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting.
Furthermore, North Korea would have to settle private
claims arising from past international loan defaults were it
to reenter international capital markets. Such a deal could
well involve the alteration or renegotiation of the Agreed
Framework upon which much of North Korea’s economic
interaction with the rest of the world is conditioned.
Fundamental reform of the North Korean economy
would have two profound effects: first, there would be a
significant increase in exposure to international trade and
investment (much of this with South Korea and Japan, two
countries with which North Korea maintains problematic
relations), and second, changes in the composition of output
could be tremendous, involving literally millions of workers
changing employment. 7 Both developments could be
expected to have enormous political implications; or,
alternatively, these implications could be thought to
present significant, perhaps insurmountable, obstacles to
reform under the current regime. Moreover, prospective
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reformers in the North would have to deal with their divided
country situation—something with which the authorities in
China and Vietnam did not have to contend.8
Nevertheless, it is possible that North Korea could
attempt a less ambitious reorientation of its economic
policies and practices supported by help from abroad.9 The
North Korean economy desperately needs two things to
meet the minimum survival requirements of its population:
food and energy. It may well be that the country obtains
enough income through production or aid to attain the
minimum survival basket, but chooses not to do so (i.e., the
regime has a strong preference for guns over butter). Taking
these preferences as given, how much additional income
would the country need to hit the minimum survival basket?
Under current conditions North Korea runs a structural
annual food deficit of around two million tons. The cost of
closing this gap through commercial imports would be on
the order of several hundred million dollars, depending on
prevailing global prices. For the last 5 years, this gap has
mainly been closed through the provision of international
assistance.10 This reflects both North Korean political
interests—why pay for something that can be obtained for
free?—and the political interests of Western governments,
most prominently that of the United States, which face less
domestic resistance to providing in-kind “humanitarian
relief” to North Korea than straight aid to the Kim Jong Il
regime.
In addition to food, North Korea needs energy. It is
reliant on imported oil to generate fuels and fertilizer for use
in transportation and agriculture. Electricity is mainly
generated using coal and hydropower. Generation has been
hampered by difficulties in extracting increasingly
inaccessible and low-quality domestic coal reserves. Beyond
this problem, the power grid (largely underground for
security purposes) is said to suffer from extraordinarily
large transmission losses. The 1994 Agreed Framework
between North Korea and the United States provides for the
construction of two light water reactors and the provision of
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oil in the interim. The problem is that this is essentially a
diplomatic agreement concerning North Korea’s nuclear
program, and does not really address the true needs of the
North Korean economy. From an economics standpoint, it
would be better to renegotiate the Agreed Framework,
scrapping the costly light water reactors and instead
building more cost-effective electrical generating systems,
refurbishing the existing electrical grid, and building the
necessary infrastructure that would allow North Korea to
export electricity to South Korea and China, thereby
earning foreign exchange.11
Nevertheless, if these estimates are correct and the
Framework Agreement as negotiated is fully implemented,
the actual cost of purchasing the estimated shortfalls in
grain and energy inputs, as well as desperately needed
supplies of fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, etc., might not be
very large, less than $1 billion dollars.12 Assuming no more
interruptions in service, the Hyundai-Mt. Kumgang
tourism deal guarantees North Korea nearly $150 million
annually over the relevant period. This is a minimum.
North Korea receives a payment per visitor. If Hyundai
were to fill all the berths on its ships, North Korea would
stand to net approximately $450 million per year—or
enough to cover its grain deficit on commercial terms.
Moreover, other South Korean firms have expressed
interest in similar tourist ventures. If the North Koreans
went through with the other projects in the Hyundai
agreement, including the establishment of a new SEZ at
Haeju, this could generate additional revenues.
For $2 billion annually, one could fix the North Korean
economy sufficiently that it would generate rising living
standards and possibly reduce discontent and contribute to
political stability.13 Around half of this would be for
recurrent flow consumption expenditures, and around half
would be for industrial and infrastructural investments
that could be self-financed through export revenues. Most of
this trade would be with South Korea and Japan, with
China and the United States playing smaller roles—even
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with the United States partially lifting its embargo against
North Korea in June 2000.14 Thus the necessary recurrent
external financing needs would be around $1 billion
annually.
Where could this money come from? There are many
possibilities, but the single biggest potential source of
additional financing would be the resolution of North
Korea’s post-colonial claims against Japan. This issue was
raised by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry
during his visit to Pyongyang last year. The Japanese
government paid the South Korean government $800
million in compensation for colonial and wartime activities
at the time of normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965,
with $300 million in the form of grants, $200 million in
development assistance loans, and $300 million in
commercial credits. The North Korean government expects
similar compensation. Adjusting the South Korean
payment for differences in population, accrued interest,
inflation, and appreciation of the yen since 1965, one
obtains a figure in excess of $20 billion.
An additional issue raised by the North Koreans that
was not included in the South Korean package is
compensation for “comfort women” who were pressed into
sexual slavery during the Second World War. Reputedly,
settlement figures on the order of $5-8 billion have been
discussed within the Japanese government. In comparison,
Yi Chong-hyok, Vice Chairman of the Korea Asia-Pacific
Peace Committee, a Korean Workers’ Part (KWP)
organization, in remarks before a Washington audience in
1996 indicated that $10 billion would be the minimum
compensation. Japan will certainly argue that its food aid
and its billion dollar contribution to the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) should be
counted against this charge. Some have speculated that
Japan will even try to claim credit for the costs of
recapitalizing bankrupt Chochongryun-controlled financial
institutions in Japan. In any event, such sums, properly
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deployed, could go a long way in restoring North Korea
creditworthiness and financing economic modernization.
If North Korea were to accept the Perry review’s terms of
engagement, another carrot that the United States, Japan,
and South Korea could hold out would be membership in the
international financial organizations and the prospect of
multilateral economic assistance. Pyongyang has
periodically expressed interest in joining the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Membership talks have never
made much progress, however, for they have snagged on
North Korea’s unwillingness to permit the kind of access to
economic data and information required for membership in
these organizations and Japanese opposition relating to
unresolved political issues, most notably the alleged
kidnapping of Japanese citizens. Under normal
circumstances, if North Korea were to join these
organizations in the absence of considerable reorientation
in domestic economic policies, it would be unlikely that the
multilateral development banks would make significant
loans.
However, given the political importance of North Korea
to the United States and Japan (influential shareholders in
the World Bank, and the dominant shareholders in the
ADB), one would expect that North Korea might receive
favorable treatment.15 Technical advice and assistance
would really be more important than direct lending
activities, which would ultimately only complement the
activities of private investors. Working from the case of
Vietnam (another Asian transitional economy where the
government undertook rapid economic reforms) and scaling
down the multilateral development banks’ lending program
for the smaller size of the North Korean population, one
projects lending on a scale of $150-250 billion annually. Not
trivial, but not enough to finance even a bare-bones recovery
program. More money might be available if the United
States, Japan, South Korea, and others set up a special fund
for North Korea at the World Bank or ADB. Such a fund
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might be a particularly useful way of politically laundering
Japanese reparations.
It is possible that under some circumstances North
Korea could obtain international financial institution loans
even if it were not a member.16 For example, the World Bank
maintains a special program for peace and sustainable
development in the Middle East through which it makes
loans in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority. It
also has adopted a policy that allows it to assist countries
which are emerging from crises even though they are not
members in good standing of the Bank. This policy was
adopted after the Bank was precluded from lending to
Cambodia because of a debt arrearage problem. The key
attributes in these cases appear to be a cooperative recipient
government and strong support from major Bank
shareholders. Bank staff have also expressed the view
privately that an independent, poor North Korea would
probably be able to access more lending than a unified
middle-income Korea. Either way, the settlement of
post-colonial claims with Japan would dwarf anything
North Korea could expect from the multilateral
development banks.
These developments might be thought of as the
necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for consensual
unification. Even if they were to occur, they would get the
two Koreas only part way down the road. Moreover, these
developments do not necessarily imply progress toward
consensual unification. North Korea could adopt the
minimalist reform program and reject unification overtures
from the South. Indeed, while implementing such a
program, the North might feel compelled to limit discussion
of unification precisely to prevent system overload and a
loss of control.
Collapse.
Of course, although this minimalist reform scenario
appears relatively attainable, there is no guarantee that
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such an outcome will eventuate. It is possible, though
unlikely, that North Korea will not undertake the policy
changes necessary to ensure its own survival, and instead
could collapse and be absorbed by South Korea as was the
case in Germany.17 Such a development could greatly
change the economic calculus on the Korean peninsula.
The relatively cheap minimalist reform scenario
depends on the stability of the North Korean state and the
consequent ability to maintain enormously different levels
of income across the two parts of the Korean peninsula. A
collapse would set in motion economic and political forces
that would make the maintenance of such enormous
disparities difficult, if not impossible, to sustain for any
protracted period of time.
Differences between the German and Korean situations
may be revealing in this regard. For one thing, North Korea
is relatively larger. Its population is roughly half that of the
South, whereas East Germany’s was roughly a quarter of
West Germany’s. Second, income disparities are far greater
across the two Koreas than across the two Germanys.
Although the whole notion of income is problematic in
centrally planned economies, pre-unification per capita
income was probably three to four times higher in West
Germany than in East Germany. In the Korean case, the
ratio is more likely to be on the order of 12 or 15 to 1. Finally,
demographically today the population of North Korea is
younger than the population of East Germany was at the
time of unification. The relatively larger, poorer, and
younger population of North Korea all points to migration
as being a potentially more important issue in the Korean
case than in the German case.18
Indeed, were Korean unification to occur, the
government would face rising expectations among the
populace of the North and a desire to migrate south in
search of better lives. It is possible, though unlikely, that
the government could use the Demilitarized Zone as a
method of population influx control for an extended period
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of time while conditions in the North slowly improved.
However, the political imperative would be to improve
conditions in the North rapidly.
The conventional wisdom is that the Germans made a
fundamental mistake in setting the unification exchange
rate, and considerable economic distress in East Germany
was due to this avoidable error. A more careful analysis
suggests that it was wage policies, a product of German
institutions and political incentives, not the exchange rate
that priced East German labor out of the market. Moreover,
misguided labor market policies were compounded by
mistakes regarding privatization and restitution policies,
as well as competition (antitrust) policies, all of which
combined to greatly reduce the demand for goods produced
in East Germany.19 However, even under a relatively
optimistic scenario of moderate, controlled, cross-border
migration, and rapid convergence in North Korea toward
South Korean levels of productivity, bringing the level of
income in North Korea to half that of the South would
require a decade and hundreds of billions of dollars of
investment—transfers larger in relative terms than in the
German case.20
This would not be pure “cost,” however. Some in South
Korea could arguably benefit in this scenario. Investment in
the North would earn remitted profits to owners of capital in
the South, and the process could be expected to shift the
distribution of income away from labor and toward capital.
At the same time, there would be shifts in the income
distribution among different classes of labor, with the
distribution of income shifting toward higher skilled classes
of labor. Another cleavage would be between sectors
producing internationally traded goods such as
manufactures, and nontraded goods such as construction,
with the nontraded goods sector doing relatively better. The
bottom line is that if you are a South Korean construction
magnate with savings to invest in unification bonds, Korean
unification could be very good for you. If you are a
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low-skilled manufacturing worker, it could be a very
different story.
The question then arises as to what, if anything, can
South Korea, the United States, and others do to prepare for
such a contingency? South Korea’s need to prepare for the
contingencies of unification with North Korea and its need
to strengthen its financial system in the wake of its own
financial crisis coincide. In the event of unification, there is
absolutely no reason to finance the construction of
infrastructure out of current tax receipts. Instead, the
government will want to use both taxes and bonds to finance
unification expenditures. Hence the development of a
robust government bond market prior to unification should
be a priority. A second priority would be the rejuvenation of
South Korea’s flagging privatization program: there is no
reason why the privatization agenda in the North should be
more aggressive than the one that currently exists in the
South.21 Finally, once the current crisis in South Korea is
surmounted, South Korea will want to return to a policy of
fiscal rectitude, and salt away some reserves for this
potential rainy day. A strong government financial position
would both allow it scope for immediate expenditures in the
event, and facilitate the issuance of “unification bonds.”
At the moment of collapse in this scenario, there will be a
critical need for close coordination among the militaries of
the United States, South Korea, and China, since
presumably they will be central to maintaining order,
handling refugee flows, etc. This cannot be overemphasized,
though further discussion is really beyond the scope of this
paper. Once the situation on the ground has stabilized,
longer-run political and economic policies come to the fore.
As indicated earlier, there is an extensive literature on the
lessons for Korea from German unification, and the South
Korean government has devoted considerable resources to
studying this topic.
At the time of unification, the South Korean government
will have multiple (and potentially conflicting) policy
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objectives. On the one hand, maintenance of economic
activity in the North on market-consistent terms will be the
top priority. At the same time, the government should seek
to effect a one-time-only wealth transfer to the current
North Korean population since they will have to adjust to
market institutions with virtually no household wealth.
One can imagine a multi-pronged approach:
• Adopt dual rate monetary conversion. Aim for slight
undervaluation of the North Korean won to maintain
competitiveness, thereby making North Korea an attractive
location for investment. Convert personal savings at an
overvalued rate (effecting a wealth transfer).
• Deed land to the tiller and the housing stock to its
occupants, contingent on maintained use for some specified
period of time.
• Maintain some kind of temporary, emergency,
non-market social safety net in the North.

Having given the land to the tiller, one must confront the
issue of property rights claims by past owners or their
descendants and the more general issue of assignment of
property rights to commercial or industrial assets. Lessons
learned from the experience of Germany and other former
centrally planned economies (CPEs) are instructive in this
regard:
• Avoid the policy of restitution for seized assets.
Monetary compensation for seized assets might be
considered, though even some South Korean analysts have
argued that this would be a mistake.
• Privatize quickly and avoid the cash-on-the-barrelhead model.
• Abolish inter-enterprise debts.
• Emphasize investment, not consumption, transfers.
• Accept assistance from foreigners, including the
Japanese.
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With respect to privatization, the experience of East
Germany and other CPEs suggests that it would be best to
move quickly and avoid the cash-in-advance model, since it
would severely restrict potential buyers. Attempts to
restructure these enterprises before privatization should
also be avoided. That is better left to the market. Inter-firm
debts, which are a legacy of irrational policies under the
centrally planned regime, should be written off. Debt-equity
swaps could be used to pay off external debt and at the same
time create a stake in the viability of North Korean
enterprises for South Korean or foreign firms.
Given these considerations, there appears to be one
institution in South Korea ideally suited for the task of
making North Korea competitive: the chaebol
(conglomerates). Unfortunately, one policy goal (to get the
North Korean economy functioning as rapidly as possible)
and another policy goal (to clean up business-government
relations in South Korea) would conflict. It goes without
saying which one will receive the greater weight. The
chaebol are probably ideally suited for refurbishing the
North Korean economy. However, saddling them with
unproductive North Korean enterprises would have an
econ omic price ( i n ter ms of r ed uc i ng chaebol
competitiveness internationally and possibly encouraging
anti-competitive behavior domestically) as well as a
political one (in the form of the quid pro quo that the chaebol
could be expected to extract).
With respect to the other actors, many of the policies that
one would want to see in place in the case of collapse (North
Korean involvement with the international financial
institutions, for example) are really not contingent on
collapse. Since in the case of collapse one would want to see
the multilateral development banks involved as quickly as
possible, it would make sense to get them involved and
developing some country-specific knowledge and expertise
prior to the event.
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The big money issue would be how to resolve
post-colonial claims against Japan if this had not already
been done prior to collapse. If it were the case that this issue
had not been resolved, it would be essential that Japan and
the government of Korea quickly reach an accord so that
resources could begin flowing into Korea. In the case of the
United States, its role would probably be one of providing
political leadership (a la KEDO) than direct financial
assistance. One could imagine, for example, the United
States leading a multilateral effort, possibly through a
special window at one of the multilateral development
banks, to provide additional financial assistance.
Conclusions.
How this all plays out, indeed whether unification along
either of the modalities examined in this paper is likely in
the near future, depends, at least in part, on the intentions
of the North Korean elite. A necessary condition for
consensual unification would be a willingness of this elite to
countenance considerable reform of current practices.
Today the North Korean elite appears to be split in this
regard. Pyongyang’s hesitant steps toward economic
reform, for example, have a two-steps-forward,
one-step-back character. At the same time, there is evidence
that North Korea is increasing military expenditures, even
while continuing to receive a considerable volume of
international food assistance and enhanced revenues from
the Hyundai deal.22 But the question remains whether its
system-preserving reforms in the form of tourism projects,
mining enclaves, and special economic zones will be
sufficient to maintain social stability and avert collapse.
North Korea could count on a fairly supportive
international environment were it to undertake the kinds of
reform necessary to make the consensual reform path
plausible. The June 2000 North-South summit, Kim Jong
Il’s visit to China, the 1999 visit of former U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Perry, the resumption of discussions
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between Japan and North Korea, and the expected visit of a
high-ranking North Korean official to Washington during
the spring of 2000 would appear to support this
interpretation of events. Yet there is no guarantee that
Pyongyang’s current modest opening is anything more than
opportunistic. History is replete with examples of countries
that did not go the way their foreign patrons desired. In the
case of North Korea, whether the regime is willing and able
to make the necessary changes to ensure its own survival is
still uncertain.
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CHAPTER 9
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN KOREA:
A LEVER FOR PEACE?1

Bruce William Bennett
Many experts on Korea scoff at the concept of
conventional arms control between North Korea and the
Republic of Korea (ROK). From the beginning, it should be
recognized that arms control in Korea is a difficult problem
in part because neither side has much trust in the other.
North Korea worries that the ROK and U.S. war plan for the
peninsula includes a counteroffensive that would destroy
the North Korean regime,2 and might actually be launched
as a ROK/U.S.-initiated attack on North Korea. The ROK
side observes the pattern of North Korean belligerence
toward the ROK, North Korea’s stated objective of conquest
of the ROK, and North Korea’s military preparations, and
worries about a North Korean invasion.
Nevertheless, conventional arms control is a critical part
of the Korean unification process. Arguably, the combined
forces of North Korea and the ROK are so large that they
would be a major impediment to unification, making some
form of conflict more likely, exercising significant influence
potentially counter to unification, and consuming too much
of the Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
If the Koreas are to unify peacefully, conventional arms
control must become feasible somewhere along that
peaceful path. If unification is not peaceful, conventional
arms control performed before the conflict would reduce the
damage suffered by both sides. Nevertheless, arms control
has its risks, such as providing the other side critical
information on defense capabilities and plans. In the end, if
unification by either war or peace could occur within the
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next decade or two, conventional arms control is needed
now; but if unification must wait for the distant future (say,
50 or more years), then conventional arms control can wait
for a part of that time.
This chapter discusses objectives for conventional arms
control and the means for achieving these objectives. It
assesses the military forces on both sides and proposes how
the dangerous aspects of these forces could be addressed. In
the end, arms control of the form proposed herein might not
be possible in Korea; if it is possible, it will undoubtedly take
many years. Thus, arms control should not be viewed as a
quick fix to the conventional military problems in Korea,
but rather as a part of the long-term reconciliation process.
Indeed, given the power of the North Korean military,
conventional arms control in Korea will be an indicator of
the progress toward peaceful unification. Still, any progress
may occur in very small steps that frustrate those seeking
rapid resolution of the Korean separation.
OBJECTIVES FOR AND CONSTRAINTS ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
Before examining Korean military forces and specific
options for arms control, it is important to identify
objectives for and constraints on arms control. This section
describes both the general objectives for arms control and
some specific objectives that are important for Korea both
now and in the future. It also looks at some of the
constraints that might limit arms control efforts in Korea,
and suggests some principles for addressing these
constraints.
General Objectives.
Arms control has traditionally been associated with
three general objectives: (1) to reduce the costs of military
forces in peacetime, (2) to reduce the chances of future war,
and (3) to decrease the damage that war would cause. Each
of these has potentially important roles in Korea.
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With regard to the first goal, both North Korea and the
ROK spend a considerable amount of money on their
military forces. In 1997, North Korea had a defense budget
of nearly $5 billion, or about 27 percent of its GNP.3 In 1999,
the ROK had a defense budget of nearly 14 trillion won, or
about 2.9 percent of its GDP.4 Arms control reductions in
force structure by both sides would decrease these costs,
particularly assisting North Korea in fulfilling the needs of
its population and its economy. Even a reduction in the ROK
military budget could be usefully moved to other services in
the ROK.
The threat of large, capable forces launching an
offensive across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has been a
consistent concern by both sides in Korea. Reductions in
these forces should lower concerns about offensives,
decreasing the chances of war. Arms control can also involve
confidence-building activities and increase contacts
between the two sides that foster understanding and trust,
all of which would reduce the chances of war.
The large military forces on each side in Korea could
cause substantial damage to the other side in any conflict,
including large amounts of damage to the civilian
populations and society. Decreasing the force structure on
both sides should reduce the damage that each side would
suffer.
Specific Short-term Problems to Address.
As noted above, the large North Korean and ROK
military forces facing each other across the DMZ may
increase both the chance of war and the potential damage
that war would cause. In addition, the military in North
Korea has become a major power base. North Korean active
duty military forces represent about 5 percent of the total
population (compared to 1.5 percent in the ROK and about
0.5 percent in the United States). Given the failures of the
North Korean economy and political system, it is often
argued that the military holds a preeminent position.
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The power of the North Korean military complicates the
political decisionmaking in North Korea today, and would
likely complicate any North Korean political collapse. The
North Korean military poses a unique threat to the survival
of the Kim regime, as it is one of the few organizations with
sufficient power to overthrow the regime. Consistently, the
North Korean military is given priority on food and other
resources, which otherwise could be used to rejuvenate the
North Korean economy and sustain the North Korean
civilian population. A North Korean military of more
modest size would pose less of a threat, consume fewer
resources, and exert less influence on political
decisionmaking.
If the North Korean regime were to collapse or be
overthrown, there would be serious problems caused by
large, very powerful factions within the military/party that
could seek different outcomes in the resulting struggle for
control. Moreover, there would not likely be sufficient
resources to meet the needs of all of these factions,
increasing the likelihood of a violent, multi-sided civil war.
While a smaller North Korean military would not
necessarily prevent such difficulties from developing, the
potential number of conflicts would be reduced, as would the
likely level of violence.
For years, North Korea has supported a large military
hoping that its size would deter ROK and U.S. attacks on
the North, and give North Korea some chance of conquering
the ROK in an actual conflict. For a decade or more, the
North Korean leadership has apparently recognized that
ROK and U.S. qualitative military superiority jeopardizes
both of these objectives, despite the size of the North Korean
military. North Korea has therefore chosen to develop a
number of asymmetric threats (such as chemical and
biological weapons) to make up for its qualitative
deficiencies. Like the ROK and U.S. militaries, the North
Korean military would likely be stronger for such wartime
uses if it reduced manpower and outdated equipment, using
the monies saved to modernize selective elements of its
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forces. The resulting smaller forces would then be less of a
threat internally.
North Korea would be best served by reducing units with
outdated equipment and its large infantry forces. For
example, tank units with T-55 tanks would be appropriate
for elimination: These units would be highly vulnerable
targets for ROK and U.S. forces and would give the North
Korean military little strength in dealing with external
forces. The ROK Ministry of National Defense is
contemplating similar force changes, trading force
structure for force modernization.5 Both sides should be
encouraged to make these changes, which would reduce the
overall size of the military forces though not significantly
reduce defense budgets (the money saved on force structure
being used for modernization).
North Korea also deploys massive amounts of artillery
very close to the DMZ. While the ROK places much of its
artillery back 7 to 10 kilometers or more for defensive
purposes, most of the North Korean artillery is located
within a few kilometers of the DMZ, apparently postured
primarily for offensive purposes. Artillery deployments so
far forward are destabilizing: North Korea would fear these
sites being overrun by a ROK/U.S. offensive, and might
therefore seek to launch a preemptive attack in response to
any ROK/U.S. mobilization (even a defensive mobilization)
because of their artillery’s vulnerability. Thousands of
North Korean artillery pieces near the DMZ could cause
massive damage to the northern 20 or so kilometers of the
ROK if war began, and longer-range artillery could reach
and seriously damage the heart of Seoul. This threat would
force the ROK and the United States to rapidly target the
North Korean artillery, and could precipitate preemptive
action if North Korea mobilizes. In addition, some ROK
artillery has been moved to relatively forward locations to
fire against North Korean artillery under such
circumstances. From an arms control perspective, both the
North Korean and ROK artillery need to be reduced in
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numbers and moved back to more defensive locations
(especially the North Korean artillery).
The ROK and the United States are also concerned about
the quantity of North Korean special forces. The roughly
100,000 North Korean special forces personnel (about 10
percent of total North Korean ground forces) provide a force
which is well beyond the relative numbers of special forces
in most armies, and which could cause serious damage in
the ROK. Reducing their numbers would reduce the damage
that would be done to ROK society and ROK and U.S.
military forces.
Paving the Way to Unification.
Except in very bizarre circumstances (e.g., a successful
North Korean conquest of the ROK), Korean unification
would certainly be performed with the ROK in the lead. The
ROK military is unlikely to trust the North Korean military,
and therefore cannot be expected to accept a true unification
of the militaries. Instead, much as in the case of Germany,
the eventual, unified Korean military will involve largely
ROK military personnel, though potentially with some
significant retention of North Korean military equipment.
In any scenario, the lack of trust between the key
personnel of North Korea and the ROK is a serious concern.
In contrast to the German unification case, the senior and
mid-level leaders of the two Koreas, both civilian and
military, have had almost no contact with each other. Given
this lack of contact and the North Korean dogma about the
illegitimacy of the ROK leadership, these leaders cannot be
expected to believe or trust each other, making unification
extremely difficult. Therefore, far more than in the case of
Germany, the Koreas need confidence-building measures
for the military forces to help establish communications and
engender basic conditions for unification. This process must
be a very slow and evolutionary one, requiring considerable
time and effort; it should not be expected to yield broad trust
or to develop rapidly.
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The power of the North Korean military would likely
complicate a ROK-led unification. North Korean military
personnel would have little to gain and a great deal to lose
from such a unification. Naturally, this kind of result could
be imposed on North Korea in the aftermath of an
unsuccessful North Korean attack on the ROK. But in the
case of a North Korean collapse or a negotiated unification,
the opposition of the North Korean military could impair or
fatally doom the unification effort.
While reducing the size of the North Korean military
would lessen these difficulties, other actions are required to
address them in a fundamental way. Specifically, the ROK
needs a plan for jobs and economic security for North
Korean military personnel. At very least, this means
leaving many of the North Korean military organized in
their current units for some time into a unification
transition period. Some of these units could help the ROK
forces maintain stability among the North Korean civilian
population, while others could work on developing the
critical North Korean infrastructure (roads, rail lines, ports,
utilities, and communications). Disarming these units
would be an essential, yet very sensitive activity.
Provision would also have to be made for the retirement
and care (income, protection, and life style) of most of the
senior North Korean military leaders (probably colonels
and above in rank), since they would be too powerful and
insufficiently reliable to depend upon if left with their units.
The ROK needs a plan for these actions that is well
established and funded, thereby providing a guarantee of
physical and financial security for the North Korean
military that will greatly reduce the likelihood of rebellion
against ROK control.6 Clearly, the smaller the North
Korean military is at the beginning of this transition, the
easier such a plan will be to fund and execute, and the lower
the potential for a major rebellion in the North Korean
military that would impede unification.
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Interestingly, North Korean willingness to seriously
consider conventional arms control may be an important
indicator of their real interest in unification efforts. Some
experts worry that North Korea may make offers that
appear to be moving toward unification, while in reality
they are simply seeking to gain more aid so as to help North
Korea survive as a separate country. If North Korea is really
serious about unification, the North Korean political
leadership must convince the North Korean military to
accept actions that move toward unification. That same
North Korean political leadership ought to be prepared to
reduce their military forces toward the goal of unification. If
the North Korean political leadership is unwilling to
consider conventional arms control, their commitment to
unification would have to be considered questionable.
Dealing with the Costs of Unification.
The unification of Korea will be extraordinarily
expensive. Goldman-Sachs estimates that if unification
were to occur today, the cost could be $0.77 to $1.2 trillion
dollars over 10 years; if unification occurs in 2010, the cost
projections rise to $3.4 to $3.6 trillion dollars over 10 years.7
Expenditures in these ranges would amount to 16 to 25
percent of the ROK GDP each year over 10 years (compared
to German expenditures of 10 percent of GDP per year).
While the ROK would seek funds to help pay these costs
from other countries and international organizations, the
reality is that the people of the ROK will have to bear a
substantial fraction of this financial burden. Given that
total ROK government expenditures are in the range of $80
billion annually or about 18 percent of GDP, this suggests
that ROK government expenditures and therefore taxes
would have to nearly double to meet these needs. Of course,
these estimates assume that the ROK economy is not
damaged in the unification process (as would happen if
North Korea attacks the ROK), and also that the ROK and
North Korean economies grow smoothly after unification
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starts, without disruption, recession, or other seriously
disabling difficulties.
The bottom line is that after Korean unification begins,
the military expenses (and therefore forces) of the combined
Korea will have to decline below those of the existing ROK
forces. Recent news reports in the ROK have indicated that
the Ministry of National Defense has set a manpower target
of 400,000 to 500,000 total military personnel by 2015,8
down from 690,000 today (see Table 1); this appears to be an
appropriate goal for a unified Korea. Arms control would
thus be useful if it can help reduce the force sizes towards
this objective. Reductions in the combined ROK and North
Korean forces toward reasonable post-unification force
levels would reduce the financial burdens of these forces in
peacetime both pre- and post-unification.
Transformation of Korean Military Forces.
Current military forces in Korea are primarily
“continental” in character, with ground forces vastly
outnumbering air and naval forces in both North Korea and
the ROK. Since both countries fear invasion from the other,
and North Korea plans conquest of the ROK, this character
of the forces is to be expected. However, while Korea will
face some concern about its land borders after unification, it
will be more concerned about securing its air and sea lines of
communication. This implies that the Korean military
forces must transform in the direction of greater air and
naval force capabilities. Since air and naval forces tend to
involve very expensive equipment, maintaining a
modernized Korean military will require a general
reduction in manpower levels to help pay for modernization.
Increasingly, the modernization argument can be made
with regard to current North Korean and ROK forces. As
argued above, both sides have large numbers of outdated
weapon systems. To pay for their modernization within
reasonable budget constraints, manpower and thus force
levels need to be reduced. These reductions need to come
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primarily in the ground forces of both Koreas. Fortunately,
because the ROK Air Force modernization allows it to
increasingly provide superb support for ROK ground forces,
reducing ground force manpower to pay for fighter
modernization can actually strengthen the ROK military.
Reducing the military manpower in the ROK offers
another important opportunity. With lower manpower
requirements, the ROK military draft would become less
necessary. And with modernized military equipment, the
ROK military would need a more professional force in all of
its services (personnel serving longer and being more
experienced). This change would imply that far more of the
ROK military would be career soldiers, with more stability
and higher levels of training. This would be a considerable
change for the ROK military forces, and most likely a very
welcome one.9
Addressing Some Constraints on Conventional
Arms Control.
Opponents of arms control on either side could defeat
any effort to achieve conventional arms control in Korea.
Particular problems exist in terms of (1) the lack of trust
between the two Koreas, (2) the likely opposition to arms
control from the North Korean military, (3) concerns about
the adequacy of defenses when forces are reduced, and (4)
concerns about nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons that would not be covered by conventional arms
control. Successful arms control must address each of these
issues.
Lack of Trust. One of the major concerns in pursuing
arms control in Korea is the lack of trust between North
Korea and the ROK, with both sides likely expecting that
the other side would use arms control to establish some
military advantage. Each side would also likely fear that the
other would lie to conceal aspects of its military strengths
and weaknesses. In a security environment like that in
Korea, trust is difficult to foster; confidence-building
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measures (as described below) need to be pursued early in
the arms control process to help generate trust.
In addition, the basis for negotiations needs to be fair to
both sides. As a basic principle, both Koreas should have
their forces reduced to equal numbers of personnel and
equipment, much as was done with the Conventional Forces
Europe agreement.10 North Korea would insist upon the
removal of all U.S. forces as part of the negotiations, much
as it has for decades. As a bargaining counter, the United
States should be prepared to make modest reductions in the
size of its forces in the ROK, and then have its remaining
forces counted with ROK forces as a coalition total to be
limited by the agreement. To this, North Korea would likely
object that over time in a crisis or conflict, other U.S. forces
could be deployed to Korea, with these forces upsetting the
North Korean and ROK balance. The United States would
therefore need to agree to some limits on the deployments of
U.S. forces to Korea, as discussed below.
North Korean Military Opposition. It can be anticipated
that the North Korean military will be the greatest
impediment to arms control. The North Korean military has
grown in size consistently since the early 1960s, including
substantial growth from the mid-1970s through the
1980s.11 Militaries that experience such growth provide
great upward mobility for their officers, and a general
culture of expansion. The more limited North Korean
military personnel growth of the 1990s was likely resented
by the North Korean military. If this limited growth were
replaced by significant reductions, many personnel would
be retired or otherwise cut from active duty, and likely left
with few job prospects in a North Korea where manpower is
already underemployed. For those who remain in the
military, opportunities for promotion would be significantly
reduced, and a fear of job loss might propel personnel into
risk-averse behaviors.
While it is not possible to fully eliminate these fears by
the North Korean military, at least some of them need to be
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addressed to reduce the North Korean military opposition.
There are a number of options for reducing the impact of
military force reductions in North Korea. For example,
many ROK firms plan to develop industrial enterprises in
North Korea in the coming years. A significant number of
the jobs in these enterprises could be reserved for North
Korean military personnel required to leave the military by
arms control provisions. Considerable thinking needs to go
into planning actions like these to reduce the impact of arms
control and thereby make it more agreeable to the North
Korean military.
The Adequacies of the Defenses. Some military experts
argue that while the relative numbers of military forces in
North Korea and the ROK are important, the density of
ground forces at the DMZ is critical to preventing
breakthroughs by the opposition. Therefore, they would
argue that force reductions would leave the defending forces
too thin to prevent breakthroughs. The counter to this
argument is that, with adequate reductions, neither side
would have sufficient force to both achieve breakthroughs in
the forward area and then rapidly exploit those
breakthroughs in depth. With regards to the defense of the
ROK, modernized equipment in both the ground and air
forces would also tend to overcome the threat of
breakthroughs by providing forces with sufficient mobility
and firepower to cover sectors where the defense becomes
weak. From the North Korean perspective, the chemical
and biological weapons not covered by conventional arms
control actually have far more utility for defensive as
opposed to offensive operations, and could stall an
attempted ROK/U.S. breakthrough. However, North Korea
must recognize that the use of such weapons could lead to a
serious ROK/U.S. escalation.
Concerns About NBC Weapons. NBC weapons are
already the subjects of other arms control agreements,
including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). North Korea has
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joined the first two of these agreements, but not the third.
Nevertheless, there is still great concern that North Korea
is not fully abiding by the NPT and BWC, and possesses
significant quantities of NBC weapons that could overcome
any balance in conventional weapons.
North Korea must be encouraged to abide by its
responsibilities in the NPT and in the BWC. It should also
be encouraged to join the CWC. Until the ROK and the
United States are certain that North Korea has
significantly reduced NBC threats, they must prepare to
defend their forces and civilians from the use of NBC
weapons. Such defenses include both protection from the
effects of NBC weapons and offensive capabilities to destroy
NBC weapons and to retaliate for their use. The U.S.
Defense Department is more thoroughly analyzing these
force requirements.12
ARMS CONTROL POTENTIALS: ASSESSING THE
EXISTING FORCES
Arms control of any form in Korea must begin with the
existing forces. There is, however, no source of information
on existing military forces that is accepted by both the ROK
and North Korea. To the contrary, for logical military
reasons, North Korea carries out an active deception and
denial program to prevent the ROK and the United States
from gaining information on its forces. Therefore, this
section first examines available information on ROK and
North Korean military forces from a ROK perspective, in
both quantitative and qualitative terms. While the focus of
this chapter is on conventional arms control, the range of
military forces is examined, recognizing that forces beyond
the conventional forces affect the overall military
capabilities, and that conventional arms control must
therefore be undertaken in the context of these overall
military capabilities.
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Quantitative Comparisons.
Table 1 provides a quantitative comparison of many of
the kinds of North Korean and ROK conventional forces, as
contained in the ROK Defense White Paper, 1999. It
highlights the major differences, including the much larger
North Korean Army and Air Force manpower;13 more North
Korean tanks, artillery, surface combatants, submarines,
and fighter aircraft; and more numerous North Korean
reserve troops (despite the North Korean total population
being half that of the ROK). This table does not capture the
qualitative differences between North Korean and ROK
forces, to be addressed below.
Table 1 does not include U.S. forces deployed in the ROK.
ROK and U.S. forces plan to defend the ROK together under
their Combined Forces Command (CFC). Table 2 provides a
rough summary of the U.S. forces. Two of the three
maneuver brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division are in the
ROK, along with a large number of supporting personnel,
and the ground force equipment associated with that
division. The U.S. Air Force deploys several squadrons of
fighters in Korea. These U.S. forces would need to be
combined with ROK forces in developing a conventional
arms control agreement with North Korea.
Table 1 also does not include WMD or ballistic and other
missiles. Missiles and other delivery systems for WMD tend
to be dual-capable (i.e., they carry both conventional and
WMD munitions), and thus potentially fit within the scope
of conventional arms control. These capabilities are
summarized in Table 3. Note that North Korea has large
numbers of missiles that pose a considerable threat against
the ROK, whereas the ROK generally lacks comparable
forces. Moreover, North Korea has been and is working on
weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons), and will continue to do so, whereas the
ROK has tempered its efforts on WMD in part at the urging
of the United States. Arguably, North Korea feels that it has
offset its conventional qualitative disadvantages with its
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Classification

ROK

Troops
Corps
Divisions
Brigades5
Tanks
Army
Armored
EquipVehicles
ment12
Field
Artillery6
Heli-copters
Surface combatants
Support vessels
Navy12
Submarines/
Submersibles
Aircraft
Fighters
Air
Special aircraft
Force12
Support aircraft
Reserve troops12
Unit

Principal
forces

Army 560,000
Navy1 67,000
AirForce63,000
Total 690,000
11
503
18
2,250

North Korea
1,000,0002
60,000
110,000
1,170,000
20
634
113
3,800

2,300

2,300

5,200

12,000

580
170
20

430
4707

10

908

60
520
40
220
3,040,00010

850
8409
7,450,00011

1) Marine Corps included
2) Navy sniper brigades now under the Navy Command and Air Force Command
3) Marine Corps divisions included
4) One missile division included
5) Mobile and combat brigades such as infantry, mechanized infantry, tank, special
warfare, patrol, marine, and assault brigades included; combat support brigades excluded
6) Field artillery includes rockets, guided weapons, and MRLs
7) Approximately 170 surface patrol boats of the Surface Patrol Boat Forces included
8) Some 40 Sang-0-class submersibles included
9) North Korean aircraft (helicopters) operated by the air force
10) Eighth-year reservists included
11) The Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker/Peasant Red Guards, Red Youth
Guards, and social security agents included
12) Figures approximate

Table 1. Comparison of North Korean and ROK
Military Forces.14
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WMD deployments. Therefore, if WMD reductions will not
be negotiated, the ROK and the United States should seek
quantitative conventional force comparability.15
Type of Forces
Manpower
Army, Marines
Navy
Air Force
Equipment
Tanks
Other Armor
Artillery & MRLs
Fighter Aircraft

U.S. Today
36,130
27,084
327
8,719
116
237
72
90

Sources: The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper,
1999, p. 33; Defense Department Directorate for Information Operations and Reports,
website: http://web1.whs.osd. mil/mmid/m05/hst1299.pdf.

Table 2. U.S. Military Forces in the ROK.
Qualitative Comparisons.
Qualitative military factors include the age and
technical performance of the military equipment, the
training and capabilities of the military personnel, and the
strength of the command/control system and its military
planning. These factors can temper or totally change the
quantitative comparisons presented above. For example,
one current generation fighter like the ROK KF-16 may be
able to engage and defeat several older fighters like the
North Korean MIG-21s, though quantity can still prevail in
some cases, especially early in a conflict.
Most North Korean military equipment was designed
and manufactured decades ago (many items were designed
in the 1950s). This equipment undoubtedly has
maintenance and support problems. Indeed, given the
decline of the North Korean economy, many wonder how
well North Korea is able to support its military equipment.
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Most (but not all) ROK military equipment is newer and
more advanced, giving it clear qualitative advantages (as
shown in the Yellow Sea battle in June 1999).16 Some
exceptions to these comparisons include North Korean
long-range artillery, which has at least been manufactured
in recent years, as have some smaller North Korea
submarines (like the Sang-O), the North Korean version of
the SA-16, and North Korean ballistic missiles.
ROK
Today

DPRK Threat
Today

DPRK Threat
2010

0-199 km

12

200 - 600

100s?

200-999 km

0

400 - 1,200

700 - 1,650

1,000-2,999 km

0

100+

300 - 600

3,000+ km

0

0

75 - 125

Nuclear

0

A few?

2-20?

Biological

—

?

Tons?

Chemical

100s tons

2,500-5,000 tons

2,500-5,000 tons

Type of Forces
Ballistic Missilesa

Special weaponsb

a

Sources: For ROK, International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
1999-2000, London, 1999, pp. 194-196, 311. For North Korea, Bruce Wm. Bennett, “The
Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat: Global and Regional Ramifications.” Note that this
table does not include multiple rocket launchers, which are included in artillery in Table 1.
The range of the ROK ballistic missiles (NHK-1/2s) is actually 250 kilometers.
bSources: For ROK, “Seoul Admits to Chemical Weapons Stockpile,” South China
Morning Post, May 10, 2000. For North Korea, The Ministry of National Defense, The
Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 1999, pp. 55-57, 84.

Table 3. Comparison of Other Korean Military
Forces.
North Korea has had a checkered past with regard to
military training. For larger units, most North Korean
training is traditionally done during the winter training
cycle, but little training went on in the winter of 1999. The
winter of 1998 was a more robust training period (though
less than historical patterns in some ways), and the training
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in the winter of 2000 was also more robust. Before the
winter 2000 training, it was often argued that the North
Korean economic situation had caused North Korean
training to decline considerably. Such a decline, in
combination with maintenance and support difficulties,
would have minimized the conventional threat posed by
North Korean forces. However, the North Korean
performance in the winter 2000 training was relatively
impressive, suggesting that previous judgments have been
premature.17 ROK and U.S. forces carry out many regular
training exercises each year, and have a training program
superior to that of North Korea (having better economic
resources).
Only modest information is available on the North
Korean command/control system and military planning.
While North Korean forces are expected to be dedicated and
committed to a preplanned offensive operation, they would
likely be far less prepared than ROK and U.S. forces to
respond to combat uncertainties that invariably cause the
conflict to diverge from the original plan. When the plan
diverges, the ROK and U.S. cultural strengths in initiative
and lower-level decisionmaking ought to give ROK and U.S.
forces a considerable advantage over their North Korean
counterparts.
Overall Force Comparison.
The combination of force quantity and quality and the
likely circumstances of a future Korean conflict suggest that
some forces are more capable than others of affecting
conflict outcomes. From the perspective of both sides, these
forces are thus a logical focus for conventional arms control.
Table 4 combines the quantitative and qualitative factors
discussed above with the standard ROK and U.S.
perception of a future conflict, which proceeds through
several phases.
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Force
DPRK
standard
artillery
DPRK longrange
artillery
DPRK
infantry
DPRK heavy
forces
DPRK SOF
DPRK
ballistic
missiles
ROK/U.S.
(CFC) aircraft
ROK/U.S.
(CFC) heavy
forces
ROK/U.S.
(CFC)
artillery
ROK/U.S.
(CFC) navy

For
DPRK
+

For
CFC

Timing; Type of Impact on Campaign
Early; create holes in the defense, cause damage

+

Early; threaten heavy forces, C4I, Seoul

+

During offensive; overwhelm defenders

+

During offensive; penetrate the defenses

+
+

Early; disrupt/impair CFC operations
During offensive; disrupt airfields, ports, C4I
+
+

Throughout; stop ground forces, destroy artillery, disrupt
rear operations
Throughout; stop DPRK offensive, support a
counteroffensive

+

Throughout; destroy artillery, stop ground forces

+

Throughout; stop SOF insertions, control SLOCs

Code: “+” indicates that this force could make a major difference for the side indicated.

Table 4. Conventional Forces Capable of Making a
Difference in a Korean Campaign.
• North Korean Offensive, Early-Phase. During the
first several days of a North Korean offensive, North Korean
forces at the front will be seeking to create holes in the
ROK/U.S. defenses, and then to exploit these holes in
operational breakthroughs. North Korean standard
artillery will have the primary role of creating holes (likely
employing chemical weapons), North Korean infantry will
seek to establish these holes in tactical breakthroughs, and
North Korean heavy forces will seek to convert these into
operational breakthroughs. North Korean forward area
SOF will support these efforts. Meanwhile, North Korean
long-range artillery will seek to damage ROK and U.S.
heavy forces (the theater reserves that could plug holes in
the defense), disrupt forward area C4I, and damage major
command and control targets in the Seoul area. North
Korean rear area SOF and ballistic missiles will seek to
disrupt or impair ROK and U.S. air forces on their bases,
port operations, transportation, and other activities in the
rear area.
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Most ROK and U.S. experts believe that North Korea
will fail to adequately suppress CFC air bases, allowing
ROK and U.S. air forces to devastate the North Korean
ground forces (especially artillery and heavy forces). ROK
and U.S. artillery will significantly add to the damage of the
North Korean ground forces, and ROK and U.S. heavy
forces will counterattack and destroy large elements of the
North Korean ground forces within the first few weeks.
Thus, North Korea will ultimately fail in its efforts, and in
the process its artillery, heavy forces, and ballistic missile
systems will be significantly damaged, as will be its means
for inserting North Korean SOF (at the hands of the CFC
ground, naval, and air forces). Nevertheless, considerable
damage will be done to CFC forces in the process of such an
offensive.
• North Korean Offensive, Mid- to Late-Phase.
North Korean infantry and heavy forces will continue the
North Korean offensive. North Korean ballistic missiles will
continue to disrupt operations in the CFC rear areas. ROK
and U.S. air forces, artillery, and heavy forces will continue
to seriously damage the North Korean ground forces, until
the North Korean progress is stopped. ROK and U.S. air
forces will also attack other targets throughout the depth of
North Korea.
• CFC Buildup Phase. About the time that the North
Korean offensive ends, U.S. forces will be freely flowing into
the ROK, protected by CFC naval and air forces. During the
buildup, the CFC air forces will attack ground forces and
other resources in the North, preparing for a
counteroffensive.
• CFC Counteroffensive Phase. Once the U.S. and
ROK build-up is complete, CFC heavy forces and artillery
will press the counteroffensive, with CFC air forces
providing support and removing other threats.
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Focuses for Arms Control Reductions.
Each of the forces identified in Table 4 is an appropriate
focus for conventional arms control. Even if the ROK and
U.S. expectation is that North Korean forces will be soundly
defeated, there is some risk in any war, and considerable
damage would be done to the ROK in the process, especially
in the area of Seoul and further to the north. Thus reducing
North Korean forces may help lower the chances of a war,
reduce some risks, and decrease the damage the war could
do.
SOME SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS
Conventional arms control pertains to the kinds of forces
listed in Tables 1 and 2 and the missile systems listed in
Table 3. As we have seen, arms control in Korea should
begin by implementing confidence-building measures, and
then move on to force reductions. This section recommends
specific arms control options in each of these areas, and then
presents an approach to implementing the force reductions.
Confidence-building.
As argued above, the two Koreas need to begin by
developing communication with and trust in each other at
both a national and personal level. For military forces,
confidence-building measures provide the opportunity to
help generate such trust. Confidence-building can take a
variety of forms. With regard to Korea, some specific options
worth considering include the following.
Communication . The almost complete lack of
communication between the two Korean militaries needs to
end. While arms control discussions will allow some
communication, these discussions will be inherently
confrontational in nature. Therefore, a parallel,
nonconfrontational set of activities needs to occur, even if
sponsored only on a unilateral basis by the ROK (with U.S.
support). For example, North Korean officers should be
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invited to visit ROK military units as well as ROK and CFC
military exercises. ROK military officers (especially senior
officers) should be encouraged to establish communication
with one or more counterparts in the North. The ROK
should make available its literature on unclassified military
issues to the North on a systematic basis (i.e., regular
distribution). North Korean/ROK military conferences
should be held to discuss military strategy and other issues.
While these efforts could proceed unilaterally, there would
need to be some North Korean/ROK agreements on these
early in the process; otherwise, participating officers in
North Korea might be accused of treason and removed from
their positions.
Hot Line. A key form of communication needed between
the North Korean and ROK militaries is a hot line. This line
would connect the senior North Korean and ROK military
leadership, and allow conversations in particular when
crises develop. Hopefully, such conversations would diffuse
such crises. North Korea has previously proposed
establishing such a hot line,18 suggesting that this may be
relatively easy to implement. Indeed, in the June 2000
North Korean/ROK Summit, the two sides agreed to work
on a hot line.19
Exercise Monitoring. The monitoring of exercises was set
up between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, and
proved to be a helpful confidence-building measure. It also
provided for communication between the two sides, in itself
desirable. Monitoring of any exercise above ground force
regiment level seems appropriate, which would mean any
exercise involving more than about 2,500 personnel
(alternatively, a division-level threshold could be
considered of 10,000 or so personnel).20This would clearly
include the North Korean winter training cycle, and a
number of annual ROK and U.S. exercises. Exercise
monitors would be responsible for observing and reporting
on exercises, and would seek to assure that any transition
from an exercise to combat preparation was rapidly
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reported. Several aspects of this proposal are being
discussed in the aftermath of the June 2000 Summit.21
Artillery Pull-Back. As noted above, most of the North
Korean artillery around the DMZ is located in offensive
positions within a few kilometers of the DMZ. Some of the
ROK artillery is also located closer than 10 kilometers from
the DMZ. It would be best to pull these artillery units out of
range from the opposing artillery into truly defensive
positions, making it more difficult for either side to begin
offensive operations. A 10-kilometer artillery-free zone
should be established on each side of the DMZ, placing the
opposing artillery no closer than 24 kilometers from each
other (the four kilometers of the DMZ plus ten kilometers
without artillery on either side of the DMZ).
DMZ “Cold Zone.” As an extension of the artillery
pull-back, it would be ideal to create a DMZ “Cold Zone,” an
area of 10 to 20 kilometers on each side of the DMZ where
forces are generally not allowed out of barracks, except for a
few, disconnected small-unit exercises each year.22 The
units in this area would be paired at the division level,
North and South, and a council setup for each division pair.
Both sides would be expected to do what they can to improve
life on the other side and provide mutual support. For
example, each side could end its propaganda broadcasts,23
and, where needed, provide the other side (the ROK to
North Korea) with power, food, medicines, and other needed
commodities. The division commanders of each paired
division would meet in a council at least monthly to review
the needs and determine how to fill them. Such an approach
recognizes that even the North Korean military is suffering
from humanitarian limitations; by providing North Korean
forces with humanitarian needs, ROK forces will have the
opportunity to establish communication and begin creating
an environment of reconciliation between the North Korean
and ROK militaries.
Accepting the Risks. During the conference at which this
chapter was first presented as a conference paper, several
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discussants commented that there are risks associated with
some of these confidence-building measures. For example,
allowing North Korean observers at ROK and U.S. exercises
might help the North Korean military better understand
ROK and U.S. vulnerabilities, and learn how to copy ROK
and U.S. strengths. Alternatively, there will also be
opportunities to display ROK and U.S. strengths which the
North Korean leadership likely does not appreciate,
hopefully enhancing deterrence.24 Decisions about how far
to proceed with confidence-building measures, and
eventually on force reductions, must be a function of the
ROK and U.S. assumptions on when major changes could
occur in the North. If a North Korean collapse or negotiated
unification is quite possible within the next decade or so,
ROK and North Korean forces need to prepare for these
changes by pursuing conventional arms control. But if some
form of unification is unlikely for many decades to come,
ROK and U.S. forces should be conservative and maximize
defensive capabilities over the coming years.
Force Reductions.
It may take many years of confidence-building efforts
before the North Korean and ROK militaries are prepared
to discuss military force reductions on a reasonable basis.
Whenever that time comes, each side will need to be
prepared to discuss alternative means for achieving
reductions. Given the principles discussed above, the
military requirements for combined Korean forces
post-unification become a useful target toward which arms
control efforts ought to be directed. As with the
Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement, the two
sides should seek to reduce their forces to equal ceilings.
Both sides would have to determine the precise forces that
they require and the ceilings they are willing to employ; this
section suggests some sample numbers that might be
considered. Adjustments around these numbers are
certainly possible, and need to be evaluated.

314

On the ROK side, most of the force reductions would
have to come in the ROK ground forces (Army and Marines).
Looking at these forces in somewhat more detail, Table 5
summarizes this author’s approximation of a possible
Korean ground force structure after unification, very much
reduced from existing forces to facilitate modernization and
to reduce overall defense expenditures. This force structure
would create five corps of relatively heavy forces, plus
another corps of cadre divisions to cover the Chinese border.
Many of the divisions would be heavy divisions with high
mobility to cover the much expanded territory of Korea,
giving Korea more tanks and other armor vehicles than the
ROK currently has.
Type of Ground Force
Active divisions
Reserve divisions
Regular corps
Other
Total

Number
17
13
6
—

Active Duty
Personnel

Tanks

185,000
45,000
90,000
80,000
400,000

1,600
500
400
—
2,500

Other
Armor
3,500
—
300
—
3,800

Artillery
& MRLs
2,000
1,200
800
—
4,000

Table 5. Sample Korean Ground Force Structure,
Post-Unification.
Table 6 uses this possible future Korean force structure
as the basis for recommending force reductions. The
unification goal for ROK forces has been added to a modestly
reduced U.S. force size to reach proposed force ceilings
under arms control. For example, we add 25,000 U.S.
ground forces (a modest reduction in current U.S. forces) to
the 400,000 Korean ground forces (Army and Marines)
proposed for unification to arrive at a proposed arms control
ceiling of 425,000. This approach is based on the previously
noted anticipation that only a modest number of North
Korean military forces would be retained in the long term
after unification.25 Total U.S. manpower might be limited to
34,000 or so within these ceilings. In contrast, the
post-unification Korean military might retain a significant
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number of North Korean weapon systems, especially tanks
and other armor. Therefore, the proposed arms control
ceiling for tanks is a little more than half of the unification
force requirements (a ceiling of 1,600 allowing for 3,100
total ROK and North Korean systems to be retained besides
the 100 U.S. tanks). Artillery, MRLs, and fighter aircraft
are handled more like personnel because many of the North
Korean weapon systems appear to be qualitatively inferior,
and thus unlikely for retention after unification.
Type of Ground
Force
Manpower
Ground

Unification
Goal

U.S.
Today

ROK
Today

DPRK (NK)
Today

Proposed
Ceiling

400,000

27,084

585,000

1,000,000

425,000

Air Force

60,000

8,719

63,000

110,000

68,000

Navy
Tanks
Other Armor
Artillery & MRLs
Fighter Aircraft
Ballistic missiles

40,000
2,500
3,800
4,000
500
200

327
116
237
72
90
—

42,000
2,250
2,300
5,200
560
12

60,000
3,800
2,300
12,000
850
7001,900

40,000
1,600
2,100
4,100
500
200

Table 6. A Basis for Negotiated Force Reductions.
In addition to the ceilings shown in Table 6, some other
force limitations may need to be part of the force reductions.
Because special forces are of particular concern, they should
be limited in numbers to no more than 8 to 10 percent of the
ground force structure on each side. Thus, North Korean
special forces are reported to constitute 100,000 of their
current 1,000,000 ground force personnel (10 percent);26
with a ceiling of 425,000 North Korean ground force
personnel, the special forces would need to be reduced to no
more than 42,500 (34,000 if 8 percent is used).
North Korea will be concerned about U.S. force
deployments to Korea or the area around it. North Korea
would be particularly opposed to U.S. deployments to
support an offensive against the North. Since the United
States is not interested in carrying out such an offensive in
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peacetime, the United States would likely accept peacetime
deployment limitations, but then would want these limits
removed if North Korea commits an act of war against the
ROK. For North Korea to accept such limitations, a major
threshold would have to exist between peacetime and
wartime deployment rules. Two alternatives are
possibilities. First, U.S. deployments to Korea could be
limited until the United States Congress declares a state of
war against North Korea. Congress is very unlikely to
declare war against North Korea for offensive purposes,
thus meeting the North Korean objective. In response to a
true North Korean attack on the ROK, such a resolution
hopefully could be obtained promptly although the process
would slow deployments somewhat. Second, the alternative
threshold could depend upon some international
organization determining when U.S. deployments would be
authorized, though such an approach would further delay
U.S. deployments in defense of the ROK, and thus be
unacceptable to the ROK and United States.
North Korea would likely want constraints on two kinds
of U.S. military deployments into or around Korea. The first
would be deployments of U.S. ground, air, and support
forces onto the peninsula. Within reason, these
deployments could be limited to the levels that typically
occur in major CFC exercises; for example, the United
States could not have more than 44,000 military personnel
in the ROK (the 34,000 day-to-day ceiling mentioned above
plus a 10,000 training augmentation). The expansion from
the 34,000 to 44,000 would be allowed for only 8 weeks or so
each year. The second deployment limitation would involve
U.S. naval forces around Korea. The United States could
commit to keeping no more than one carrier battle group
and one amphibious ready group within 1,000 kilometers of
the North Korean coastline, which would extend to cover the
Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the northern part of the
East China Sea. This exclusion zone would not reach as far
south as Okinawa. These deployment limitations would
reassure North Korea that the force reductions it makes to
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reach the ceilings proposed above will not leave it
vulnerable to U.S. coercion in peacetime.
Note that all of the numbers in this section are examples
of the reductions that could be used. To formulate actual
arms control proposals, North Korea, the ROK, and the
United States would need to decide whether these
illustrative numbers are reasonable and if not, what
alternatives would be appropriate.
The Mechanisms for Force Reductions.
For force reductions even to be considered by the two
Koreas, a considerable degree of trust and communication
needs to be generated on both sides. Confidence-building
measures will help achieve this objective. Nevertheless, the
procedures actually used to achieve force reductions will be
critical. The following sequence of procedures is
recommended.
First, both sides must agree to a list of existing forces
from which reductions would be negotiated. This list needs
to be specific, with a designation of the units at each
location, with their manpower and combat equipment (for
example, the 6th tank battalion at location X has 410
personnel and 31 tanks). An organizational hierarchy will
also be needed so that divisions and corps can be clearly
identified. Because of North Korean reluctance to discuss
such issues, the ROK/U.S. will need to develop a proposed
listing for both sides, with some DPRK units perhaps listed
at unidentified locations, or the relationships between some
units shown as “not known.”27 This process may need to be
undertaken by area, with the first effort devoted to the area
around the DMZ to facilitate discussion of the DMZ “Cold
Zone” notion and the artillery pull-back. This effort should
begin as soon as possible, and should be a part of the
confidence-building measures early in the arms control
agreements.
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As part of this process, some counting rules need to be
developed. These include what personnel and equipment
categories should be used for reductions (the ones shown in
Table 6 being an initial proposal), and what personnel and
equipment should be aggregated into each category. For
example, does a T-34 count as a “tank” or an “other armor
vehicle”? In addition, what equipment should be counted?
For example, in many units, especially air force fighter
squadrons, it is typical to talk of total aircraft inventory
versus primary aircraft inventory (the difference usually
being spare aircraft for maintenance purposes). To avoid
confusion, the arms control discussions should deal with
total aircraft inventory and total equipment in other
categories, including the maintenance spares (even if the
spare aircraft are not functional and are used entirely as a
source of spare parts).28 If this were not agreeable, the
alternative counting rule would use primary aircraft
inventory and allow a maximum addition of 10 or 15 percent
for maintenance spares.
Second, both sides must agree to an inspection effort to
verify the force lists that are developed. These verification
inspections should begin immediately (not waiting for arms
reductions), and should involve at least 2 percent of the
forces each month (thus taking no more than about 4 years
to achieve full verification). In addition to verifying the unit
information, these inspections should involve a
determination of humanitarian needs (as discussed in
connection with the DMZ “Cold Zone”), with the ROK/U.S.
making follow-up visits (not verification inspections) to
deliver needed aid. For ground forces, this process should
start in the DMZ “Cold Zone” and then spread back to forces
beyond. Note that this process would also be an important
confidence-building measure, with both sides encouraged to
act in ways that generate trust (e.g., no movement of
personnel or equipment before inspections).
Third, both sides need to agree to the principles for
reduction. As argued above, the preferred alternative is that
used in the CFE negotiations, i.e., reduction to equal
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ceilings. The next best alternative would be a percentage
reduction in the existing force. Either of these alternatives
requires an accurate accounting of the North Korean forces
in the first two steps. At the same time, the ROK/United
States must determine how far they can reduce. From a
ROK perspective, this means that the ceilings on forces
cannot reduce forces to the point where the defense loses its
coherence (serious analysis must be done on the
requirements of a coherent defense, given the likely North
Korean threat). Since one objective of arms control is to
reduce in the direction of forces required after unification,
forces should not be reduced below appropriate ceilings as
suggested in Table 6 and confirmed by ROK and U.S.
analysis. From a U.S. perspective, reductions should not be
beyond the threshold that will continue to sustain
deterrence in Korea, nor below the level and types of U.S.
forces desired post-unification.
Fourth, both sides should consider limiting munitions.
For example, artillery rounds could be limited to 1,000 or so
per tube, adequate for a defensive operation but not for an
offensive operation. This would reduce the fear of both sides
relative to offensives. For munitions limitations to work, a
comprehensive inventory of munitions and their locations
would need to be created, although this would be difficult to
verify if all locations have not been reported. Since these
locations are unlikely to be fully known in the North, rules of
thumb would need to be developed to assist in locating
supplies. For example, how many rounds per tube need to be
forward at the start of a campaign, and within what
distance (or distances) from the batteries? If appropriate
storage sites cannot be found for each battery, then a
challenge would need to be lodged to determine the storage
site location. Examination of storage sites would confirm
quantities of the munitions stored there, but would also be
useful in determining the status of the munitions stored
there. If some munitions show qualitative deterioration,
this would be useful information, and would also lead to a
good basis for recommending future reductions.
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Fifth, the reduction process should begin. Because some
of the reductions recommended in Table 6 are massive, they
should be done in phases as shown in Table 7 (the third
phase is the proposed ceiling). For example, to go from one
million to 425,000 ground forces, North Korea would reduce
about 200,000 in each phase. Because it would take a
substantial time to find jobs for the personnel reduced,
these phases should occur at something like 1-year
intervals. The ROK side will undoubtedly need to work with
North Korea to help develop civilian jobs for those North
Korean military personnel released from military service.
Phases like these allow each side to verify the opposing
side’s reductions before going too far in the reduction
process.
Type of Ground Force

Ground force
personnel
Air Force
personnel

Side

U.S.
ROK
DPRK
U.S.

Number
Today

First
Phase

Second
Phase

Proposed
Ceiling

27,084
585,000
1,000,000
8,719

26,500
523,000
808,000
8,500

25,500
461,000
617,000
8,200

25,000
400,000
425,000
8,000

ROK

63,000

62,000

61,000

60,000

DPRK

110,000

96,000

82,000

68,000

Navy

U.S.

327

320

310

00

personnel

ROK

42,000

41,200

40,400

39,700

DPRK
U.S.
ROK
DPRK
U.S.
ROK
DPRK
U.S.
ROK
DPRK
U.S.
ROK
DPRK
U.S.
ROK
DPRK

60,000
116
2,250
3,800
237
2,300
2,300
72
5,200
12,000
90
560
850
0
12
1,000?

53,000
110
2,000
3,100
225
2,170
2,230
72
4,800
9,300
90
510
730
0
200
730

47,000
105
1,750
2,300
210
2,040
2,170
72
4,400
6,700
90
450
620
0
200
460

40,000
100
1,500
1,600
200
1,900
2,100
72
4,000
4,100
90
400
500
0
200
200

Tanks

Other Armor

Artillery &
MRLs
Fighter
Aircraft
Ballistic
missiles

Table 7. Proposed Phasing of Force Reductions.
As force reductions are made, excess (and in particular,
outdated) equipment needs to be destroyed. The process of
destruction needs to be clearly defined for different classes
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of equipment along with the means for verifying
destruction. Some equipment that will be reduced will need
to be replaced with alternative equipment of the same type.
Thus, rather than reducing two battalions from 31 to 15
T-55 tanks each, it may be better to completely eliminate
the T-55s of one battalion and replace them with 15 or so
more modern (e.g., T-62) tanks. Thus, reductions need to be
planned at the unit level, using basic principles accepted by
both sides. Realignments also need to be planned and
agreed to in advance by all.
For verification, observers should be placed in units on
the opposing side both to facilitate communication and to
confirm the reductions. Force and supply levels should be
closely monitored and equipment destruction confirmed to
make sure functionality is lost. The equipment should be
followed from storage locations to destruction locations.
Inspectors should examine the storage location after
destruction to make sure the force has been appropriately
reduced, or that any realignments (e.g., 15 T-62s replacing
31 T-55s) are done within the agreed parameters. For
personnel reductions, reductions will be difficult to verify
(many military forces could be moved to comparable police
forces or quasi-military forces). To reduce the feasibility of
such cheating, where possible the manpower in each unit
should be reduced by some amount rather than whole units
being cut.29This procedure might work best even if these
units are made cadre forces into which reserves could be
moved to bring them back to full strength. The reserves
would be less ready than active forces, and they would have
to be removed from existing reserve units to become part of
the cadre units.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED
REDUCTIONS
The DPRK and the ROK must yet negotiate the
conventional arms control process proposed herein. The
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numbers used here are approximations for illustrative
purposes; the Koreas may choose their own ceilings.
The Korean Summit created considerable euphoria
concerning the movement toward unification in Korea.
Many would now argue that unification of some form could
occur within the next decade or so. If that is the case,
conventional arms control is needed in Korea now. The risks
to unification of not reducing the military forces of North
Korea and the ROK are far greater than the risks to current
defenses implied by pursuing conventional arms control.
The confidence-building part of the process should help to
develop understanding and trust on the two sides, reducing
the chances for war and helping prepare the conditions
needed for unification. The force reductions proposed
should also lower the likelihood of war, facilitate force
modernization by both Koreas, reduce military costs, reduce
the damage that could occur as a result of a war or conflict
associated with North Korean collapse, and transition
military personnel to economically productive roles where
they would be less likely to threaten the unification process.
All of these are important goals for a Korea seeking peaceful
unification; indeed, peaceful unification may not be possible
without such efforts.
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U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2000.
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English Version), June 22, 2000.
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Military,” Chosun Ilbo (Electronic, English Version), June 19, 2000.
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The Republic of Korea, p. 51.
27. The completed force lists need to address total personnel, and
thus need to include personnel on oversees assignments, headquarters
personnel, personnel in training, and so forth.
28. Aircraft, including outdated aircraft in storage, would be
excluded from total aircraft inventory only if the aircraft are totally
disabled, or if both sides agree that some aircraft should not count.
29. If the number of divisions, wings, and so forth remains the same,
many of the flag officer positions would not have to be eliminated,
potentially reducing the objections of the North Korean military.
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